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Abstract 
Tu Lan: Made in Italy, by Chinese: how Chinese migration changed 
the apparel production networks in Prato 
(Under the direction of John Pickles) 
 
As a prototype of the Italian industrial districts (IDs), Prato has become a unique case in Italy and hosts 
the second largest Chinese community in Italy. In the past two decades, a Chinese apparel industry in 
Prato, known as the pronto moda, developed from a few stitching workshops into a full-fledged 
production network, including designing, manufacturing, and wholesale. Exclusive ethnic enclave and 
widespread irregular labor have triggered social tensions between Chinese immigrants and the local 
society. This dissertation investigates the formation of this immigrant’s industry, the expansion of its 
global production networks, and its interactions with the local institutions. In conversation with the 
literature of industrial district and global value chains, it argues that the apparel value chains created by 
Chinese immigrants in Prato have been a historically contingent consequence of regional economy and 
national institutional contexts. There are three main findings in the dissertation. First, the emergence of 
the Chinese pronto moda is a unique response to the rise of fast fashion and regionalization of apparel 
production in Europe. In particular, it targets to low-end fast fashion and fills the specific niche market 
between the European fashion brands and Made-in-China garments. Second, the social tensions in Prato 
have to be understood in terms of its conjuncture. Power asymmetry within Chinese pronto moda has 
resulted in a specific spatial pattern of “subcontracting the visibility”, which in turn triggers conflicts 
between Chinese and Italian communities. Finally, to integrate and regularize the Chinese apparel 
industry requires a transformation of the existing institutional framework in Prato, and the future of Prato 
may rely on the transnational business community between China and Italy. By so doing, this dissertation 
iv 
attempts to dislodge two major myths in the literature of industrial district and Chinese migration. On the 
one hand, Prato has been never an endogenous entity, and the recent Chinese influx is one of the many 
exogenous forces that shaped and are still shaping the Pratese economy. On the other hand, neither a 
passive sufferer nor a government conspiracy, the Chinese migration to Prato has actively responded to 
institutional contexts in quite innovative ways. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On January 1, 2011, 274,417 Chinese nationals lived in Italy.  They were and still are the fourth largest 
foreign immigrant group in the country and the largest group from Asia (ISTAT 2012). Compared with 
other immigrant groups, the Chinese community has been involved in entrepreneurial activities in very 
specific and relatively large-scale ways. In particular, Chinese immigrants in Italy concentrate in the 
traditionally Made-in-Italy sectors such as apparel and leather goods, and in specific industrial districts in 
the northern and central part of the country (Barberis 2009, 9–10). In this dissertation, I focus on the 
Chinese apparel industry in the most important of these industrial districts, Prato, Tuscany. Prato has been 
globally renowned for its textile production since the 1930s, but in the past two decades, the Chinese 
apparel industry in Prato has developed from a few stitching workshops into a nearly full-fledged network 
including manufacturing, designing and wholesaling.  Mainly serving the lower cost market, the 
magnitude of this industry has been widely reported as a threat to the reputation of high-value Made-in-
Italy textile and apparel (Donadio 2010). 
What makes it possible for the cluster of small and medium-sized apparel companies headed by Chinese 
immigrants to emerge in the middle of an Italian industrial district? Why do these companies bring 
Chinese workers overseas instead of producing and sourcing in China? What makes this cluster different 
from other regional economies that rely on migrant workers? I argue that on the one hand, the changing 
institutional contexts and socioeconomic circumstances of varying scales have been important in shaping 
the structure of the Chinese production network in Prato, while on the other hand, Chinese migrants have 
been responding to markets and social pressures in their own ways. Working through theories of 
industrial districts and global value chains, this dissertation analyzes the position of the Chinese apparel 
industry in Prato and its implications for the hosting society. 
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1.1. Chinese migration to Italy 
As early as the 1910s, people from the districts of Wenzhou and Qingtian in Zhejiang province arrived in 
Europe as the street peddlers and war recruits for the labor shortage during and after WWI (Live 1998, 98; 
Li 2002, 106). The number of Chinese in Italy remained small until China’s reform in 1979 and the 
subsequent relaxation of the emigration policies (Li 2002, chap. 5). Following the Sino-Italian treaty in 
1985 and a series of amnesties in 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2012, Italy became the most popular 
destination in Europe for the Chinese (Carchedi and Ferri 1998; Ceccagno and Rastrelli 2008). As a result 
of these regulations, many Chinese also came illegally from China and other European countries hoping 
for the next amnesty (Ceccagno 2003). The recent arrival of Fujianese and Northeasterners to a certain 
degree diversifies the Chinese population in Italy, although it is believed that immigrants from Zhejiang 
still dominate the Chinese population in Italy (Pieke et al. 2004, 118). Part of the Chapter 3 is devoted to 
this history and contemporary situation of Chinese migration to Italy. 
The Chinese immigrants in Italy show a strong propensity toward entrepreneurship. At the national level, 
although Chinese immigrants are only 4% of the total foreign population, in 2010 the number of 
companies registered by Chinese businessmen and women reached 53,000 or 8.5% of the total foreigner 
headed companies (Camera di commercio di Torino 2011, 119).  Unlike their Western European and 
North American counterparts, many of Chinese immigrants in Italy work in consumer goods 
manufacturing sectors that were traditionally recognized as “Made in Italy” products.  Data in 2004 shows 
that there were 18,554 businesses in Italy run by the Chinese (PRC nationals), of which 6,236 were in the 
textile and clothing sector and 7,735 were in the wholesale and retail sector, most of which were also 
related to the textile and clothing industry (Ceccagno 2007).  Similar to what happens in Italy’s 
mainstream economy, 69.5% of Chinese firms were those with only one person or imprese individuali 
(Camera di commercio di Torino 2011, 119).  Although these workshops originally ran as the 
subcontractors of bigger Italian apparel companies, since the early 2000s, they have started to upgrade to 
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supply higher-end fashion brands such as Armani or Gucci, or to directly supply lower-end fast fashion 
market (Ceccagno 2003). 
This occupational pattern results in a unique demographic and economic geography. Unlike other major 
immigrant groups, the Chinese have moved primarily to the industrial districts of Central and Northern 
Italy. The top four regions with the largest numbers of Chinese population are Lombardy, Tuscany, 
Veneto and Emilia-Romagna (ISTAT 2012). In particular, Prato, Tuscany has been identified as the 
manufacturing center of the Chinese apparel industry, while Milan and Rome are the wholesale centers 
for importing and selling finished goods (Cologna 2005; Lucchini 2008).  Partly because of language 
barriers and the closure of the community to non-Chinese speaking scholars, research of the Chinese in 
Italy and their specific effects on manufacturing in Italian IDs remains very limited (Barberis 2009). 
1.2. Industrial Districts and the Made-in-Italy products 
The concept of industrial district (ID) was originally defined by Alfred Marshall (1890) based on three 
mechanisms: scale economies, external economies and a sufficient pool of skilled labor (discussed in 
Chapter 2). This Marshallian concept was later developed by a number of Italian scholars and became one 
of the doctrines for regional studies (Becattini 1978; Brusco 1982). In an ID, the majority of firms are 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which cooperate usually in one sector and in auxiliary 
industries and services, and these firms form a communal network with common business conventions 
(Becattini et al. 2003).  During the golden age of Italian industrialization between the 1950s and 1970s, 
IDs concentrating in the northern and middle part of the country played a significant role in the national 
economy, as they exported (1/4 of the total) more than the heavy industries in Piedmont and Lombardy 
which mostly served domestic market (Becattini 2001, 40; Dunford and Greco 2006).  Their products 
were mainly light consumer goods such as textile, apparel, leather and furniture which build the 
reputation of “Made in Italy” around the world.  The persistent importance of IDs finally pushed the 
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Italian congress to pass a law in 1991 which officially authorized the ID as one of the most important 
instruments in the state’s economic policies (Becattini 2001, 125; Lazerson and Lorenzoni 1999, 239). 
Although I give a detailed analysis of Italian IDs in Chapters 2 and 3, it is worthwhile to mention a 
number of its most distinct characteristics here. First, compared with vertically integrated factories of 
their northern neighbors, IDs in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany are constituted by small and medium-sized 
companies each of which specializes in a specific phase of production. Second, nearly all of the IDs are 
located in the 2nd or 3rd tier towns, or “urbanized countryside” (Sforzi 2003, 36) such as in my case Prato 
instead of metropolitan areas such as Turin and Milan. Third, IDs are extremely adaptive to new market 
conditions because of their mechanisms for innovation, arm-length transaction, and exchange of 
“contextual” or “uncodifiable” knowledge between SMEs (Becattini 2001, 12). Finally, strong tradition in 
organizing political and social institutions has been viewed as one of the major factors for the relatively 
harmonious relationship between labor and capital in the IDs, and therefore protected the districts from 
the violent turmoil of class struggles common in the northern part of the country. Despite the tremendous 
changes of the global market and local society between the 1950s and now, IDs maintain their unique and 
consistent socioeconomic identity (Becattini, Bellandi, and De Propris 2010).  Scholars, in particular 
Italian scholars, believe that the continuity of local business and institutions has successfully mitigated the 
discontinuations imposed by external forces: “I believe – though I cannot prove it – that Prato’s ‘social 
kernel’ has not merely allowed the modern world to surge through it but has tried to experience it on its 
own terms, pushing and pulling it this way and that to make it fit in, as far as it could, with its own 
potential and its own values” (Becattini 2001, 197).  The social kernel of Prato comprises not only the 
culture of entrepreneurship and knowledge sharing, but also a number of social and governmental 
institutions. Therefore, the development of the Pratese ID was seen as being mostly propelled by its own 
internal/endogenic “social kernel” instead of external forces. 
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Fig. 1.1: Industrial districts officially endorsed by the Italian government 
However, in spite of the positive readings given to the successful IDs, many IDs have some inherent 
deficiencies and therefore have been suffering a prolonged recession since the 1990s. On the one hand, 
the low fertility rate and the occupational preference of the younger generation have caused a shortage of 
labor in the IDs (Becattini et al. 2003). On the other hand, the competitiveness of Made-in-Italy products 
has been hurt for a number of reasons including shifting market tastes, restructuring of the retail network, 
competition from emerging Asian economies and the appreciation effects caused by the currency change 
from Lira to the Euro (Becattini et al. 2003; Dunford and Greco 2006). Evidence shows that the economic 
unevenness among Italian regions has rapidly increased in the past 10 years with advantaged regions in 
Lombardy and Piedmont becoming more advantaged, and disadvantaged regions in the Center and South 
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becoming more disadvantaged (Dunford and Greco 2006, chap. 4). I discuss the transformations of Italian 
IDs in Chapter 2, and those specific to Prato in Chapter 3. 
As Belussi and others argue, there have been many evolutionary paths that the IDs follow, and different 
origins and different genealogies often result in very different responses to the economic crisis (Belussi 
and Sedita 2009; Camuffo and Grandinetti 2011; Belussi and Sedita 2012). First, evidence shows that a 
substantial increase of the size of firms is occurring in some of the IDs (Dunford and Greco 2006; Dei 
Ottati 2009b). Facing competition pressures from emerging economies, some Italian SMEs have started 
vertically integrating themselves in order, on the one hand, to capture more value added in the commodity 
chain, and on the other hand, to concentrate capital for foreign investments and innovation (Rabellotti, 
Carabelli, and Hirsch 2009). With the increasing size of the firms, whether or not many of the districts 
qualify as an “Industrial District” as defined by law remains a question. Second, quality upgrading and 
product shifts are happening throughout the IDs. As mentioned earlier, the IDs are always export-oriented. 
In 1996, the share of manufacturing exports from IDs accounted for 46% of the Italian national total 
(ISTAT 2002). Many argue that since the majority of these exports are low-price, low-skilled products, 
the competitiveness of IDs is doomed to lose to the emerging economies in Asia (Dunford 2006). 
However, Rabellotti et al. (2009) argue that since the 1990s, many Italian IDs have undergone a 
substantial upgrading. In particular in the textile industry, many IDs have either upgraded to produce 
branded luxury products or shifted to produce machineries for consumer goods. Therefore, even though, 
by definition, these IDs remain in their traditional sectors, they are not actually competing with emerging 
economies. Third, outsourcing has been used by many IDs as a way to reduce costs. Since the late 1990s, 
many Italian firms began to move assembly lines to Eastern Europe (in particular Romania) and North 
Africa (in particular Tunisia), but still kept the key components i.e. the innovation department and a 
substantial production capacity in Italy (Corò and Volpe 2006). This trend is officially encouraged by the 
Italian and EU governments as Outward Processing Trade (OPT) (Smith 2003). However, parallel to OPT, 
another kind of “outsourcing” is also occurring in the IDs—that is, the “in-sourcing” to immigrants’ 
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ethnic firms. Many believe that the emergence of Chinese firms helps the IDs to keep its competitiveness 
(Ceccagno 2009), while others argue that these firms sustain the low-skilled jobs and therefore counteract 
the preferable upgrading (Dei Ottati 2009a). Some argue that the emergence of Chinese Italian firms only 
temporarily slows down the pace of upgrading without changing either the internal structure or external 
market of the IDs, and so when the accumulation of these firms reaches a certain level, upgrading will 
resume (Rabellotti, Carabelli, and Hirsch 2009). 
All these trends are intertwined to various degrees among IDs. In many cases, one trend is conditioned by 
another. For example, in the textile industry, outsourcing to Eastern Europe is usually accompanied by the 
vertical integration of the firm, because the FDI requires a hoard of capital which is usually impossible for 
smaller firms (Rabellotti, Carabelli, and Hirsch 2009). Moreover, as many have argued, each individual 
ID has its distinct composition of strategies and responds to globalization differently (Dunford and Greco 
2006; Belussi and Sedita 2009). That is, the success of one industry in one ID can by no means be applied 
to another industry in another ID. Globalization never diminishes the local; it simply transforms the ways 
in which the locale is connected to the global (Harvey 1991; Agnew 2002). As shown in the later chapters, 
global value chains and transnational migration have never erased the distinctiveness of the production 
network in the Pratese ID. Instead, these “global” forces innovatively rearticulated production networks in 
Prato. The emergence of Chinese firms in fact is part of this bigger picture of transitions in the Italian 
economy. If we see them as the response to the differential transitions in different IDs, from a 
functionalist point of view, they must have very specific impacts in different IDs—that is, the firms in 
Milan should be very different from those in Prato. In that sense, any research on Chinese businesses in 
Italy ought to be locally specific and should not be overly generalized. 
1.3. The case of Prato 
““We don’t want to become Prato.” Alarm for the expansion of the Chinese illegal economy 
is almost everywhere across Italy, from Veneto through Emilia Romagna to Puglia. It creeps 
into the industrial districts of furniture, leather goods, knitwear,  and sofas, and increases the 
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fright triggered by crises and the fears of unfair competition at home.” (Pieraccini 2010, xi) 
My translation. 
The beginning of Silvia Pieraccini’s L’assedio cinese (The Chinese Siege) partially explains the stimulus 
for my research. Prato is less than 20 km to the northwest of Florence. 1 Historically a production and 
trade center for woolen fabrics in the Medieval Age (Origo 1957), Prato is now one of the most 
industrialized towns in the region of Tuscany. The province of Prato is one of the newest and smallest 
provinces in Italy (The Province of Prato 2012; Agnew 2002, chap. 9). It became independent from the 
province of Florence in 1992 as part of the national political reform towards local autonomy. On January 
1, 2011, there were 249,775 residents in the province, of which 188,011 lived in the city (comune) of 
Prato (ISTAT 2012). Despite its relatively small population, Prato is among the most popular Italian 
destinations for immigrants. By the end of 2010, 33,874 foreign nationals lived in the province, 
accounting for 13.6% of the total population. In particular, in 2010, the Prato Province hosted the 
country’s second largest community of Chinese immigrants, a population of 24,626, behind only Milan 
(31,385) but ahead of Florence (20,650) and Rome (15,970) (ISTAT 2012).2 In terms of the ratio between 
immigrant and local populations, the city of Prato had the highest percentage of Chinese immigrants 
among all the Italian cities, 9.9% of the total population, far ahead of Ascoli Pecino of Marche (2.6%) and 
Florence (2.0%), which follow in the list.  Apart from those who held resident permits, there are also a 
significant number of undocumented workers in Prato. Since many of the migrants do not hold residence 
permits, estimates for the Chinese population in the city of Prato goes as high as 28,000 (Smyth and 
French 2009, 4). 
                                                          
1 Prato is the name both for the province and the city which hosts the provincial seat. Since the data used in this 
dissertation comes from both the city (municipal) and provincial institutions, I have carefully specified the level of 
the statistics in each of the cases. 
 
2 According to the manual book provided by ISTAT, these numbers only count the number of immigrants who held 
a permessi di soggiorno (permit of residence) which is required for any foreigner who stays in Italy longer than 3 
months. Therefore, these numbers could be less than the real numbers of Chinese nationals because many did not 
apply for a permit. 
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Fig. 1.2: Map of Prato 
Sources: Author’s illustration with the city map from Comune di Prato. 
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Fig. 1.3: Number of Chinese immigrants by province 
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Fig. 1.4: Percentage of Chinese immigrants by province 
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Fig. 1.5: Number of textile and apparel firms in the ID of Prato, 2000-2012 
Sources: Author’s illustration with data from the Prato Chamber of Commerce and UIP. Note: The 2000 
and 2001 numbers are estimated based on numbers of active firms in respective sectors; the 2012 number 
is predicted in the 2nd quarter of the year. 
 
Fig. 1.6: Prato’s export in value (thousand Euro), 2002-2011 
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Source: Author’s illustration with data from the Prato Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Fig. 1.7: Ethnic shares of the textile and apparel industries in Prato 
Source: Author’s illustration with data from the Prato Chamber of Commerce.  
The Chinese apparel industry in Prato is characterized by the large portion of small firms, the 
predominance of manufacturing and sheer number of establishments. What makes the issue more 
interesting is that Prato has the biggest number of Chinese individual firms among all the provinces: 11.5% 
of total Chinese individual firms in Italy are in Prato Province (Camera di commercio di Torino 2011, 
123), among which 81% or 3,249 were apparel manufacturers (UIP 2012). This percentage also made 
Prato the primary manufacturing center for Chinese apparel in Italy. 
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Fig. 1.8: Number of Chinese individual firms in the top 8 provinces in 2010  
Source: Author’s illustration with data from the Turin Chamber of Commerce (2011, 125). 
The emergence of this Chinese apparel industry is closely related to the trajectory of the local textile 
industry in three aspects. First, as the apparel industry grew, the traditional textile industry in Prato 
suffered a prolonged downsizing and verticalization during the same period. Having been the production 
center for woolen fabrics since the WWII, since the 1980s, the Pratese textile industry has been facing a 
series of difficulties. Rising labor cost, the phasing-out of the Multi Fiber Agreement (MFA) and the 
continuous decline of market demand for woolen fabrics are among the most important factors (Becattini 
et al. 2003; Dei Ottati 1996; Dei Ottati 2009b).   
Data provided by the Unione Industriale Pratese (UIP, Association of Pratese Industrialists, local branch 
of Confindustria) and the Italian census bureau, ISTAT (Dei Ottati 2009b, 1882) give a clear picture of 
this shift from textile to apparel, and why local Italians are not very contented with the shift.  First, 
between 1991 and 2011, the number of textile firms in Prato plummeted from 9,411 to 2,979, while the 
number of apparel firms soared from 1,219 to 4,388.  The closures also resulted in high unemployment 
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rates in Prato. According to a report by Istituto Tagliacarne (2012), between 2007 and 2012, the 
unemployment rate in Prato rose from 5.1% to 9.3%. In particular, the rate of youth unemployment 
(between 15 and 24) rose 2 percentage points every year, reaching 31% in December, 2011 (Pignalosa, 
Dorato, and Martone 2012, 7). Second, although the production volume of the apparel industry has been 
large, the value of apparel products remains much lower than the textile industry. In 2010, the annual 
turnover of the textile and apparel industry was 4,528.5 million euro, in which 3,004.6 million or 66% 
was produced by the textile industry (UIP 2012). In terms of export values, in 2011, Prato’s textile export 
(1.2 million euro) was still two times bigger than the apparel export (0.6 million euro). This contrast 
implies the huge gap between the qualities of textile and apparel produced in Prato. While Italian textile 
firms were suppliers for high fashion brands, Chinese apparel companies mainly produced for low end 
markets.  Therefore, it becomes natural for people to worry whether or not the Made-in-Prato apparel is 
impairing the reputation of Made-in-Italy in general and the prestige of the Pratese ID in specific.  Finally, 
because the local apparel industry is dominated by Chinese companies, some have argued that the 
Chinese apparel industry in Prato has been an independent ID within the ID, and for that reason, has been 
making use of the local resources without paying back to the local society (Dei Ottati 2009a).  Data 
provided by the UIP show that until the 3rd quarter of 2011, among all the 4,072 apparel firms, only 882 
firms or less than 1/4 were registered by Italian nationals.  Although to what extent the Chinese apparel 
industry is benefiting the local economy remains a question (I discuss this question in Chapters 6 and 7), 
the ethnicization of the apparel industry has caused widespread local hostilities. 
Since 2000, socioeconomic changes redrew the political image of Prato. In the past years, problems of 
immigration became one of major discursive instruments for the right wing parties to address social issues 
(Zincone 2006).  In particular, as evident in many of the recent Italian publications (Oriani and Stagliano 
2008; Pieraccini 2010), the case of Prato has been widely reported as a Chinese triumph over the local 
economy, inflicting fears in the Italian society. The recent coverage of Chinese in Prato by the New York 
Times helped this process by making it one of the best examples of how Chinese emigration is 
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threatening the world (Donadio 2010).  In 2009, by manipulating anti-immigration sentiments, the right 
wing coalition including Popolo della Libertà and Lega Nord won the municipal election for the first time 
in Prato’s postwar history (Fazzino 2010). As one of its electoral promises, the new municipal 
government imposed stricter regulations on the Chinese community by introducing army patrols in the 
downtown area, restraining the hours of Chinese businesses, and launching more frequent police 
investigations targeting Chinese firms, all of which were highly visible in local newspapers.3 The Italian 
debt crisis beginning in 2009 further exacerbated the tensions between the Chinese and local communities 
and made the future of Chinese firms unpredictable.  
1.4. Main analytical questions 
This dissertation is structured into three main analytical questions: 
(1) How did the development of Prato and the institutional contexts both in Italy and China prepare the 
conditions for the Chinese apparel industry in Prato? 
At the heart of my question is a local debate about whether or not the Chinese apparel industry halted the 
upgrading of the ID by introducing low-road competition based on undocumented workers. On the one 
hand, scholars such as Dei Ottati (2009a) and Toccafondi (2009) are concerned with the tensions between 
Chinese firms and local society, and argue that without institutional intervention, the lower value apparel 
produced by Chinese firms would banish the higher value textile companies and eventually impair the 
overall reputation of Made-in-Italy products. On the other hand, scholars such as Ceccagno (2007) argue 
that Chinese apparel firms have actually been supporting the Italian production network, since many of 
Chinese firms were subcontractors of Italian firms until recently. Notwithstanding the disagreement, most 
of these scholars admit that the particular timing of the arrival of Chinese immigrants has been important 
                                                          
3 For instance, within the single week between February 25, 2012 and March 2, 2012, there were 18 police raids 
targeting Chinese companies reported in the Le Notizie di Prato (http://www.notiziediprato.it/).  During the first half 
of 2010, the year after the historical election, the authority closed down 154 Chinese companies in Prato (Fazzino 
2010). 
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for their success. Therefore, I want to investigate the entry point of the Chinese companies and elucidate 
the historical contexts that made the entry happen. My research shows that the entry of Chinese apparel 
firms was by and large contingent upon a number of historical events. In addition to changes of the 
institutional contexts in both sending and receiving countries, the development trajectory of Prato has 
prepared in important ways a niche for the Chinese apparel industry.   
Focusing on this debate, the dissertation seeks to de-essentialize the dominant story portraying the 
Prato ID as an endogenous system.  Instead, I shall show that the entry of Chinese firms must be viewed 
as one of the latest phenomena along the array of global and national forces that have changed the ID 
since its origin.  At the same time, I want to de-essentialize the dominant story of Chinese migration 
which so far has been seen either as a cultural exception or as a strategic conspiracy of the Chinese 
government (Skeldon 2007). In contrast to these stereotypes, the history of the Chinese apparel industry 
in Prato has been full of contingencies and subject to a variety of economic, social and political factors. 
For this reason, my research attempts to contextualize it and presents it in its peculiar historical 
conjuncture. 
(2) How do Chinese apparel manufacturers and traders in Prato participate in the local and global value 
chains that have been transforming the ID over the past two decades? 
Chinese companies in Prato are, at the same time, both local and global. As local companies in the ID, 
they are dependent on local infrastructure, existing business model and local supplies of industrial inputs. 
Moreover, the Italian and European markets have been one of the main reasons for them to relocate here. 
On the other hand, as immigrants’ companies, they participate in the global value chains in particular 
ways.  Being largely excluded from the mainstream value chains controlled by lead firms, these Chinese 
companies have established their own distribution networks throughout Europe.  For working class 
consumers in many European countries, these value chains have been important supplements to those of 
the multinationals. Meanwhile, I focus on the historical contexts in which Chinese companies built their 
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value chains. On the one hand, regulations at national and local levels left significant vestiges in the 
Chinese apparel value chains.  As immigrants’ companies, Chinese in Prato faced a number of barriers 
including immigration laws and local business regulations.  On the other hand, Chinese immigrants 
responded to these regulations in their own ways.  Based on their specific cultural and social norms, they 
invent different ways to circumvent or co-opt the unfavorable regulations.  More importantly, such 
interaction between institutions and immigrants does not always produce favorable results for the 
immigrants. Benefitting from the transformation of the Prato ID, the Chinese companies and workers are 
also victims of the transformation, as evident in the widespread irregular labor and under-standard 
working conditions (see Chapter 6). To sum up, I want to argue a more dialectical relationship between 
Chinese firms and local society, and problematize the simplified story of the Chinese triumph in Prato. 
(3) What roles have local and national governments played in shaping the structure of the Chinese 
production network and coping with the tensions between Chinese and local societies? 
Throughout the history of Chinese migration to Prato and the evolution of the Chinese apparel industry, 
local and national governments were important in at least three ways. First, the institutional contexts 
defined the condition of possibilities for immigrants’ businesses; the choices of industries, location, 
partners and the ways of contracting are shaped by laws and regulations. In particular, I see the economic 
behaviors of firms not only determined by economic factors but also connected to a variety of social and 
political forces.  Through the perspective of conjunctural analysis (Hall and Massey 2010; Grossberg 
2010, chap. 3), I want to present the complexity of relations and tensions between groups of people in 
Prato. Second, among others, I study a particular dimension of the tensions between Chinese and Italian 
communities: the contest between different ways of managing space. While the Chinese firms and 
workers tend to diffuse working and living spaces, the Italian authority tries to enforce a clear boundary 
between the two.  This contest has become the center of the struggles between Chinese immigrants and 
local society in Prato.  Finally, as many recent research shows, the traditional leadership in Prato is no 
longer able to coordinate the industrial transformation (Bailey et al. 2010). In particular, by the 
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transnational nature of the Chinese apparel industry, the cooperation between local Italian and Chinese 
firms necessarily goes beyond the border of the ID. Therefore, I argue that Prato requires a new form of 
development in which a transnational community of private and public agencies should pay a more 
important role. 
Responding to these questions, I engage with a number of theories in economic geography and related 
disciplines. First, the literature of Post-Fordist regional development in general and the debate about the 
“Third Italy” model of industrialization in specific are important for me to rethink the concept of 
industrial district (ID) with Chinese migration. Second, the literature of Global Value Chains (GVC) 
provides a set of theoretical and methodological tools for me to study the firms and inter-firm relations in 
the Chinese apparel industry. Recent elaborations by economic geographers expand the new scope for 
studying the broader social impacts of industrialization. Both ID and GVC literatures offer a variety of 
frameworks to study the transnational trade and entrepreneurship. By interrogating the boundaries of 
these studies and with the help of the critical tradition in economic geography, I attempt to propose a new 
model of regional development incorporating transnational migration. 
1.5. Fieldwork and data sources 
The dissertation is based on over 70 interviews with 60 subjects between 2011 and 2013.  The dates were 
split between China and Italy.  In Italy, I spent 5 and half months in total, with 1 month in Turin and 
Milan, 4 months in Prato, and about 2 weeks in Rome and Naples.  Compared with the continuous stay in 
Italy, the part of the fieldwork in China comprised short visits to the hometowns where the majority of 
Chinese immigrants come from; 20 days in total were spent in Wenzhou City and its neighboring 
Qingtian County.  A number of half-day visits were spent in Lianjiang where many Fujianese immigrants 
in Italy come from.  I also made several visits to Xingtang and Nanhai of Guangdong Province to find (in 
vain however) some of the factories in which Chinese Italian entrepreneurs invested.  The subjects of my 
interviews were mostly entrepreneurs, migrant workers and policy makers, both Chinese and Italian.  
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Additionally, it was my surprise to find a number of Italian and Chinese scholars and social activists who 
had been working to tackle the tensions between Chinese immigrants and local communities.  The 
interviews with them, although few, broadened my understanding of those seemingly “economic” 
tensions that mass media and politicians were highlighting.  To protect my subjects, all the names in this 
dissertation have been replaced by aliases. 
Data were collected from a variety of Chinese and Italian institutions and publications during the same 
period.  Reports and books of chorography (as Difangzhi in Chinese referring to an old tradition of 
writing local geographies and histories) were acquired from local governments in Wenzhou, Qingtian, 
Wencheng, Florence and Prato.  Trade and industrial statistics were mostly obtained from the Unione 
Industriale Pratese and Prato Chamber of Commerce, in particular the latter.  On their website, Prato 
Chamber of Commerce provided yearly import and export data between Prato and other countries 
(http://www.po.camcom.it/servizi/datistud/index.php).  Estimates of immigrant population have been 
disputed in Italy, since a couple of institutions are reporting different numbers at the same time.  In the 
dissertation, I rely extensively on the data published by the national census bureau of Italy, the ISTAT.  
Compared to other data sources such as the one offered by the Catholic Church (Caritas), the data from 
ISTAT are usually conservative and collected through statistically robust methods.4 
1.6. Chapter outlines 
The dissertation is structured into 7 chapters. In this introductory Chapter 1, I have laid out the scope of 
the problematic and the analytical frameworks for my research. I also briefly review the fieldwork and 
methodology that this research relies on. 
Chapter 2 generally engages with 2 bodies of literature that are most important to my dissertation. The 
literature of industrial districts emerged upon the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s and has generated a series 
                                                          
4 Technical insights of different data sources were offered by Dr. Luisa Salaris at the University of Cagliari and Dr. 
Valentina Pedone at the University of Florence. 
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of international debates on models of regional development in general, and the case of the Third Italy in 
specific. They provide necessary background knowledge and a theoretical framework to study Italian IDs, 
such as Prato. The second body of literature I engage with is the global value chains. Instead of reiterating 
the history of this literature, I focus on a number of useful methodological tools offered by it and show 
how these tools can be applied to my case.  Beyond these two bodies of literature, I also borrow the 
concepts of conjuncture and conjunctural analysis from British Cultural Studies. 
Chapter 3 has two general purposes. First, it gives a brief overview of the history of Chinese migration to 
Italy. It describes the flow of workers and owners mainly from the southern part of Zhejiang Province 
since the early 1900s.  It then shows how the establishment of the Chinese community as a permanent 
aspect of the Pratese industrial district and in Italy more generally was an outcome of a series of historical 
contingencies.  Many of the contemporary characteristics of the Chinese Italian community were shaped 
by a specific sequence of Italian and Chinese national policies.  By so doing, I want to contextualize the 
Chinese migration to Prato and help to de-essentialize the stereotype of Chinese migration either as 
cultural exception in which mechanism such as guanxi dominate or as a government conspiracy. Second, 
based on secondary researches, the chapter also reviews the postwar history of Prato ID.  I want to show 
that the concept of industrial district should not be fetishized as an endogenic process in which only local 
forces play dominant roles. There have been a handful of historical moments at which Prato could have 
followed different paths of development.  By so doing, I want to de-essentialize the concept of ID and 
argue that the emergence of the Chinese apparel industry in Prato, alongside the return of vertically 
integrated producers and the polarization between small and big firms, was a unique outcome of the 
ongoing transformations in Italian IDs.  
Chapter 4 is devoted to the internal structure of the Chinese apparel industry. I make two investigations in 
the chapter. First, I introduce the production network of Chinese apparel firms in Prato commonly known 
as pronto moda. Although many would presume that the Chinese apparel companies emerged at the cost 
of the local textile industry, I show that the proliferation of Chinese firms was in fact the continuation of 
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the transformation that local firms have pioneered.  Chinese firms inherited the existing governance 
structure of the Italian pronto moda but introduced new functions that boost productivity and flexibility.  
Second, I analyze the competitive advantage of the Chinese pronto moda and attempt to shed lights on the 
dark side of these production teams.  In particular, the Chinese pronto moda, compared to its Italian 
precedent, has been more unequal in terms of governance structure and the consequent power asymmetry.  
This inequality defined the competitiveness of Chinese firms, but at the same time also engendered 
profound social problems.   
Chapter 5 continues the analysis of the competitiveness of the pronto moda, but from the perspective of 
its trade networks outside of Prato. It argues that another part of its competitive advantage also relies on a 
horizontally integrated wholesale network of Chinese migrant traders living across Europe.  On the one 
hand, these traders follow a business model that concerns fashion designs, faster replenishment, and smart 
inventory control.  In this sense, they are very similar to what major European fashion brands, such as 
Zara, have been doing.  On the other hand, different from major European brands, this Chinese trade 
network is less capitalized and targets a niche market with cheaper price and lower quality.  In this sense, 
they fit the niche market between major European brands and Made-in-China garments. 
The 6th chapter focuses on the tensions between Chinese firms and local Italian authority on the ways in 
which productive and living space is managed in pronto moda. In particular, drawing upon the 
conjunctural analysis from British cultural studies, I study the conjunctural spatial logics behind the 
apparel production networks in Prato.  While the Italian authority carefully defines the spatial boundary 
between factories and houses, the Chinese stitching workshops tend to ignore the regulation for economic 
and social reasons. Because of the power asymmetry between final firms (firms that organize the 
production team and specialize in design and output phases) and stitching workshops (firms that 
specialize in the stitching phase alone), final firms are able to subcontract not only the least profitable 
phase but also the more precarious forms of work to stitching workshops. Such power symmetry has 
resulted in a distinct spatial arrangement in pronto moda. While some phases of production that heavily 
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depend on flexible labor are deemed too risky to be seen even though it might have little to do with 
illicitness, other phases of production such as exhibit of final products are intentionally to be public. This 
is the reason why stitching workshops are forced to hide themselves from the local society. I show that 
the hiddenness of the Chinese workshops contributes to the misunderstanding between Chinese and 
Italian communities, which culminated in the annual dragon parades of the Chinese New Year. 
The central question of the Chapter 7 is how the local institutions in Prato respond to the tensions and 
why some of the ongoing efforts made by Italian local government failed.  In this chapter, I discuss how 
local business associations and local governments tried to cooperate and regularize the Chinese pronto 
moda. I point to the main obstacles of cooperation between Chinese firms and local authority, and suggest 
a possible way to overcome the obstacles. In particular, I focus on the ongoing project, called CREAF 
(Centro di Ricerche e Alta Formazione, Center for Research and Higher Education) between the region of 
Tuscany and the province of Zhejiang which attempts to collaboratively solve the problems of Chinese 
apparel firms in Prato.  As part of a bigger project called the Programma MAE-Regioni-cina which 
convenes Italian regions to seek economic opportunities in China, this program attempted to create a joint 
research center in Prato with both inputs from Tuscany and Zhejiang where the majority of Chinese 
immigrants came from. I argue that the current stagnation of the project may be due to its top-down 
process initiated by the regional and provincial governments.  Without the support from local firms and 
the transnational investment promotion community (Sellar and Lan 2013), the project is bound to face 
numerous problems. 
The last chapter concludes this dissertation and raises a number of questions for future research.   
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Chapter 2: Industrial districts and global value chains 
“Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a ruler, 
a glue-pot, glue, nails and screw. – The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of 
these objects” (Wittgenstein 1953, 11). 
I engage with in general two traditions in economic geography and related disciplines. First, as the 
prototype of Italian “industrial districts” (IDs), Prato has been at the center of many debates in regional 
studies and economic geography.  The original concept of industrial district was defined by Alfred 
Marshall (1890) based on the textile industry of Lancashire. After the 1970s, when capitalism fell into 
another crisis, the concept of distretti industriali in the regions of Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna was 
reintroduced by Italian scholars and then received strong resonance in the Anglophone academia as an 
alternative to the Fordist model of mass production. Being used as the primary model by leading scholars 
such as Becattini and Sforzi, the development path of Prato’s textile industry has been thoroughly 
analyzed and treated as an ID of IDs (Becattini 2001; Becattini et al. 2003). In this literature, Prato has 
been described as a cultural and social entity which fosters widespread entrepreneurship and communal 
trusts between interest groups. The recent emergence of Chinese apparel industry in Prato has raised 
important challenges to the development of Prato ID in specific and the theoretical viability of IDs in 
general. What are the relations between the Chinese apparel industry and the local textile industry? To 
what extent are Prato’s internal forces still dominating the local economy? What can be learned by other 
Italian IDs in the Prato case? To respond to these questions, one has to understand the conception of 
industrial districts, in particular the genealogy of its Italian version since the 1970s. 
Second, based on an analysis of the world system of capitalism, the concept of global value chains (GVCs) 
has been recognized as one of the handiest theoretical tools for understanding the firm-level involvement 
in the globalization of production (Bair 2008). Compared with the tradition of industrial districts, this 
29 
 
tradition of GVCs is concerned with the external linkages of local production systems, and argues that it 
is these value chains organized by multinational corporations that boost the process of industrialization in 
less developed countries/regions (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002).  In Prato as well as in many of the 
Italian IDs, this theory has very concrete meanings. Theoretically, the production and retail networks of 
IDs, with a myriad of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), are fundamentally different from the 
GVCs organized by multinationals.  However, because of the transformation of global markets and 
competitive pressures imposed by newly industrialized countries (NICs), IDs are no longer able to export 
the traditional Made-in-Italy products in the ways they did before the 1990s. In the lower end market, IDs 
lost market share to NICs because of rising labor cost in Italy, while in the higher end market, IDs faced 
difficulties competing with multinationals which invested heavily in research and design (R&D). The 
substantial decline of many of the Made-in-Italy goods has spurred people to rethink the model of IDs and 
its inherent limits in reducing cost and funding R&D (Corò and Volpe 2006; Chiarvesio, Di Maria, and 
Micelli 2010). Can SMEs in Prato compete with the multinationals that have taken advantage of chasing 
the lowest cost in the developing world? How can Italian SMEs make use of the GVCs rather than being 
excluded from them? 
For Italian scholars, the Prato case has a special meaning. Facing pressures from GVCs, Italian scholars 
have been debating on the future of Italian IDs (Belussi and Sedita 2009; Rabellotti, Carabelli, and Hirsch 
2009; Becattini, Bellandi, and De Propris 2010).  At the center of this debate is the question whether or 
not the Italian IDs are still a viable development model.  Many Italian scholars believe that IDs in fact 
have diverse origins and obtain very different competitive advantages (cf. Belussi and Sedita 2009). 
Therefore, at least some of the IDs are still or have the potentials to be competitive in global markets.  
However, what happened in Prato poses a difficult challenge to this debate, because if the Chinese pronto 
moda continues to thrive while the Italian textile in Prato continues to decline, to what extent we can say 
this is a “successful” transformation of an “Italian” ID, and more importantly, to what extent we can still 
say this is an “Italian” ID at all?  While indeed what has happened in Prato is not happening in other 
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Italian IDs, or at least not at the same scale, I argue that the Chinese pronto moda is one of the many 
possibilities that can happen and in fact has already happened around the world.5 
Influx of immigrant companies and workers has been nothing new in the history of capitalism. During the 
heyday of the Italian industrialization in the 1950s and 60s, it was the migrants from southern Italy who 
came to Prato and finally became entrepreneurs in one generation (see Chapter 3).  Similar story has also 
been observed when Turkish entrepreneurs and workers migrated to the bordering industrial districts in 
Bulgaria (Begg et al. 2005).  What is really unique in Prato is the scale of the pronto moda and the ways 
in which it represents the characteristics of probably a new phase of globalization.  As Henderson et al. 
(2011; 2013) have argued, with the rising Chinese economy, the world may begin to see a new phase of 
globalization with distinct characteristics of  Chinese capital and labor. In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, I show that 
this “globalization with Chinese characteristics” (Henderson, Appelbaum, and Ho 2013) is indeed 
impacting not only the production networks in Prato but also redefining the business networks across 
Europe and between Europe and China. 
For Chinese apparel firms in Prato, the concept of GVCs has a different but no less important meaning. 
Similar to its Italian counterpart, the Chinese production network is also organized by SMEs.  However, 
interestingly, similar to fast fashion chains such as ZARA, Chinese firms have been able to occupy niche 
markets in Italy and other parts of Europe.  If we take account of the competition from low-value clothing 
imported by their colleagues from China, their success in Prato is even more impressive.  How do 
Chinese apparel firms from manufacturers to wholesalers organize their value chains? What are the 
differences between their chains and the mainstream ones organized by Italian ID firms?  What are their 
competitive advantages against peer producers in Europe and in China? The literature of GVCs offers a 
theoretical framework in which value chains of the Chinese apparel can be fitted, and provides a 
methodological tool-box to analyze these questions in systematic ways.  
                                                          
5 Carpi in the region of Emilia-Romagna has also hosted a cluster of Chinese apparel firms. However, most of those 
firms are still subcontractors of local Italian firms and the scale is still not comparable to the one in Prato (Ceccagno 
2007, 640–1). 
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Beyond these two traditions, I also borrow a number of conceptual tools from cultural theories. One of the 
most important tools in my dissertation is the conception of conjuncture and conjunctural analysis.  
Developed by British cultural studies, it offers a theoretical angle to look into the complicated relations of 
economic, social and political forces in Prato. In this chapter, I do not intend to give the entire genealogy 
of either the British cultural studies or the concept of conjuncture. Instead, I elucidate my particular 
engagements with the concept in the case of Prato. 
2.1. Industrial Districts 
The golden age of post-WWII capitalism was dominated by the model of mass production in vertically 
integrated corporations. This model was named after Henry Ford’s Detroit auto plants as Fordism and 
prevailed across the developed countries until the 1960s, when a series of crises hit the shores (Harvey 
1991, 142–150).  Stagnant rates of profit and accumulation, soaring rates of unemployment, and 
competitions from emerging newly industrialized countries (NICs) eventually led to serious social unrests 
in Western Europe and the United States.  The end of Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the oil embargo 
after the Yom Kippur War in 1973 aggravated the situation and severely affected the foundation of 
capitalist accumulation in the western economies. Facing economic and social crises, academics began to 
rethink the dominant discourse of development and industrialization. 
A number of theories emerged from different parts of the developed world and responded to the crisis 
from the perspective of their own contexts. While the Anglophone academy was interested in the 
paradigm shift of the capitalist regime of accumulation from Fordism to Post-Fordism, the Italian 
academy was more concerned with the fact that provincial economies in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany 
maintained strong growth in contrast to the large plants in Piedmont and Lombardy (Sellar 2007, 24).  As 
Sellar nicely summarizes, although these two trends were developed separately for different purposes, 
they intensively interacted and later on converged into a reappraisal of models for regional development. 
Third Italy 
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When the crisis deepened in major developed countries in the 1970s, Italy surprisingly maintained 
relatively strong growth.  After disaggregating the regional export data from Italy, scholars discovered 
that a large part of the growth was contributed by clusters of consumer goods producers in the northern 
and middle part of the country (Becattini 2001, 40).  Compared with the Fordist model of vertically 
integrated factories, the production in this part of Italy was structurally different and revived interest in 
the “industrial district” in relevant disciplines.  The concept of industrial district was originally defined by 
Alfred Marshall (1890) based on three mechanisms: “(1) scale economies, which result from a high 
degree of specialization and division of labor; (2) external economies, which arise from the existence of 
shared infrastructures, services, and information; and (3) the availability of special skills and the pooling 
of the workforce, which for example, allow individual enterprises to adjust their size and composition 
rapidly without jeopardizing employment and the reproduction of skills at a system level, as long as 
cyclical movements in demand and employment in different subsectors are not in phase with one another” 
(Dunford 2006a, 27). During the 1970s and 80s, Giacomo Becattini (1978; 1979) and Sebastiano Brusco 
(1982), among other Italian scholars, revived this concept of ID in order to explain the phenomenal 
growth of regional economies in the central part of the country. 
An Italian ID is distinct in two ways.  First, an ID is a cluster of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) among whom competition is mitigated and knowledge sharing is encouraged by social and 
cultural mechanisms.  Such division of labor (distributing production among SMEs instead of integrating 
in one company) has been proven to be more effective than the vertically integrated plants especially in 
producing non-standardized products such as textile and apparel (Sforzi 2003, 41). Evidence also shows 
that SMEs inside the ID have greater productivity and enjoy better profitability than firms outside as a 
result of widespread entrepreneurship and hard-working ethics (Signorini 1994).  Second, unlike 
vertically integrated plants in the metropolitan areas of Turin and Milan, Italian IDs are usually located in 
an area that is not completely urbanized, yet has sufficient infrastructure to develop a particular sector of 
industry (Sforzi 2003, 36–8).  This infrastructure includes not only the physical constructions such as 
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roads, buildings and machines, but also a community which is capable of innovating, reproducing and 
sharing know-how.  These two characteristics made this part of the country stand out of the binary 
division between the North and South, and eventually became known as the “Third Italy” (Bagnasco 
1979).  However, the consequences of such disintegration of production are more complicated than 
appeared at the first glance. From the viewpoint of capital, by dismantling one integrated phase of 
production into many, there are both gains and losses at the same time (Harvey 1982, 130–2). On the one 
hand, for each of the companies, disintegration of production means faster turnover rates and more 
flexible composition of constant and variable capital for its specific intermediate products. On the other 
hand, by so doing companies have to trade off a portion of profit to their partners, because profits 
maximized by companies tend to augment overall transaction costs, and thus make the products 
uncompetitive.  Excessive competition among SMEs might easily lead to mass closures during economic 
downturns. Why did most of the Italian IDs manage to maintain its peculiar production network 
constituted by SMEs during the past crises? Why do they agree to cooperate and collectively control the 
competition to a limited level?  What keeps the transaction costs low enough to offset the detrimental 
effects of disintegration?  Despite the different starting points of their theorizations, most Italian scholars 
of industrial districts point to the importance of local institutions in organizing and regulating the inter-
firm relations.6 
Their emphasis on institutions is largely dependent upon the specific ID cases in their empirical studies. 
For example, most of Becattini’s research is based on Prato which places my dissertation in direct 
conversation with them. For Becattini and his followers, it is the artisan tradition and its historically open-
minded custom that gave birth to various associations of artisans, industrialists and migrant workers. The 
proximity of  local schools and research institutes has allowed the Prato ID to survive economic crisis 
after crisis (Becattini et al. 2003, 17–20; Dei Ottati 1996; 2003).  Previous research has shown that there 
                                                          
6 Although sometimes referred to as a homogenous group, Italian ID scholars are in fact diverse. Becattini’s research 
team based in Florence and Brusco’s team in Modena differ on number of theoretical arguments. For a complete 
comparison between the Florentine and Modena schools, see Sellar (2007, 32–5). 
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have been many uncertainties during the history of Prato’s development. It was possible that a “vicious 
circle” may have emerged if the bundle of socioeconomic circumstances and institutional contexts were 
not coordinated in the right place at the right time (Becattini 2001, 95).  For instance, during the heyday 
of strikes and social turmoil in the 1970s, Prato kept its development pace thanks to the successful 
mediation of the local communist government (Becattini 2001, 143).  Similarly, the IDs of Emilia-
Romagna are the primary case studies for Brusco. Among other factors, Brusco (1982, 181) refers to the 
left-wing local governments who helped to alleviate the tensions between labor and capital, fostering 
internal solidarity against competition from the outside. Also, for him, governments are responsible for 
designing development policies which have significant impacts on the regional performance and inter-
firm relations in the IDs (Brusco 1990). 
In spite of many insights that have been offered by the Third Italy model, there are two major limitations 
of this literature. First, the primary focus of the Italian schools is on domestic issues. They are not very 
interested in expanding their models to other parts of the world (Sellar 2007, 38). Second, because its 
leading practitioners are economists, this work is highly empirical.  Conceptual relations with broader 
theoretical debates in other disciplines, as a result, are not common until much more recently (as I discuss 
in the later section on the “convergence” of Italian and Anglophone schools). 
From Fordism to Post-Fordism 
Perhaps because of the global reach of Anglophone empires, scholars across the Atlantic were more 
concerned with the implications of the crisis of Fordism in other parts of the world. As a consequence, 
lessons about the Third Italy became a way to rethink the roads to industrialization in general.  Through 
these debates, some scholars have developed a number of useful theoretical tools to fit the Third Italy into 
a bigger map of capitalist development. 
Inspired by the early works of the Third Italy and similar cases elsewhere, Suzanne Berger and Michael 
Piore were among the first to suggest an ongoing paradigm shift of capitalism (Berger and Piore 1980; 
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Berger 1994).  Opposing the then dominant models of liberal individualism and market rationalism, they 
argued that there were multiple paths of capitalist development, and the classic model of development 
based on the history of the UK and US should not be assumed for other countries.  Based on specific 
compositions of material and cultural resources inherited from the past, the “optimal solutions” to 
industrialization differ from one country to another.  Among the things that define optimal solutions, 
institutions, especially state and local governments, usually play an important role by defining incentives 
and constraints for a given behavior, and thus make certain solutions more likely than others (Berger and 
Piore 1980, 4).  Therefore, mass production in one vertically integrated firm has never been necessary for 
industrialization, while industrial districts comprising SMEs with their highly specialized labor may be as 
good a solution or in certain cases much better than the former.  “In order to release both imagination and 
will from the constraints of false necessity, we need a vision of the diverse possibilities that can be 
realized within industrial societies” (Berger and Piore 1980, 12). 
This argument was later developed by Piore and Sabel (1986) into “the second industrial divide” in the 
history of capitalism. They argue that it is the Fordist model of development based on mass production 
that caused the crisis (Piore and Sabel 1986, 3).  “Flexible specialization” that occurred in the IDs with its 
institutional contexts accommodated the intensified uncertainties in the late capitalism better than the 
Fordist model. “This strategy is based on flexible – multi-use – equipment; skilled workers; and the 
creation, through politics, of an industrial community that restricts the forms of competition to those 
favoring innovation. For these reasons, the spread of flexible specialization amounts to a revival of craft 
forms of production that were emarginated at the first industrial divide” (Piore and Sabel 1986, 17). 
The contrast between the prosperity of Third Italy and the crisis of other places also aroused alternative 
thinking in economic geography.  Building upon the works of the French regulation school, Allen Scott 
and Michael Storper argued that the ongoing crisis should be perceived as a paradigm shift in terms of the 
“regime of capitalist accumulation” (Scott and Storper 1986; Scott 1988). Because of the many 
uncertainties in each of the steps of capitalist accumulation, a network of regulatory institutions is always 
36 
 
indispensable for stabilizing the process of accumulation. Based on the regulation school, this system of 
institutions, including governments, non-government associations, and educational and research institutes, 
and the ways in which they regulate the society, is called the “mode of social regulation” (Lipietz 1987).  
The crisis of Fordism was therefore the crisis of the Fordist regime of accumulation with its rigid mode of 
social regulation which could not meet the diversified demands of consumer goods and intensified 
struggles between labor and capital. Moreover, Scott and Storper emphasized the importance of industrial 
spaces for the new regime of flexible accumulation in two ways. First, geographical proximity is 
important for reducing the uncertainties during transactions (Scott 1988, 13). Face-to-face meetings are 
usually the most trusted way of signing contracts and building long-term collaboration. Second, the 
previously marginalized places are less obstructive to new regulatory institutions than heavily 
industrialized places (Scott 1988, 17). For instance, while in Prato disintegration of production was 
embraced by most of entrepreneurs and workers, mass closures of Foridst plants in places such as Detroit 
would be unthinkable with the presence of strong trade unions. 
In order to conceptualize the characteristics of this Post-Fordist regime of flexible accumulation, Storper 
(1997, 42) proposes a model of “regional worlds of innovation and production” to explain the 
agglomerations of flexible SMEs. Based on empirical studies in Silicon Valley and Hollywood, he argues 
that it is the regional based conventions and institutional structure that make a community of knowledge 
sharing and arm-length transactions possible. In particular, he theorizes the concept of “untraded 
interdependency” to explain the phenomenon in which firms and laborers’ responses to price are 
conditioned by local conventions and interpersonal relations in order to reduce uncertainties during 
transaction (Storper 1997, 44).  In an ideal model built by Paul Krugman (1991), if there are two 
industrial districts with increasing returns that are results of path dependency, there is only one 
equilibrium point for both districts to sustain. Any other composition of resources will necessarily result 
in the polarization of one district and the impoverishment of the other—labor and firms will flock into 
one of them. This result is obviously unacceptable when we have so many industrial districts competing 
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with each other even within one small country like Italy. With untraded interdependency however, for 
laborers as well as for firms, not every cost can be quantitatively measured. There are all sorts of non-
market connections which make the seemingly uneconomic location strategy reasonable. 
This argument of a paradigm shift was also perceived as an exaggeration of the consistent logic of 
capitalist accumulation by a number of scholars. Ann Markusen (1996) asserts that the applicability of 
Marshallian industrial districts is limited by its geographical confines and specialized sectors.  “Although 
the presence of Marshallian industrial districts, even the Italianate version, can be confirmed in a number 
of American instances, the claims made for the paradigmatic ascendancy of this form of new industrial 
space (Scott’s rubric) do not square with the experience of most rapidly growing agglomerations in 
industrialized and industrializing countries” (Markusen 1996, 307).  A number of possible regimes of 
accumulation including the Fordist mass production persisted and even prospered in many other regional 
economies of the world.  Moreover, she critiques the stereotype of ID in which harmonious cooperation 
dominates. Although authors such as Berger and Piore (1980, 8), and Scott (1988, 14) realized the 
possible polarization of the society through which a secondary ensemble of sectors is created with lower 
wage and less job security, “in most regional accounts, networks are presented generically and extolled 
without examining the motivations of participants, mapping who might be included and excluded, 
analyzing unequal power relationships among members or gauging the durability or fragility of 
relationships” (Markusen 1999, 877).  Similar arguments have also been posed by Amin and Thrift (1992) 
who saw the contemporary capitalism as “still a world of corporate power” (574), and argued that the IDs 
have to be integrated into the global network in one way or another. 
More critical evaluations come from Marxist influenced geographers.  Doreen Massey’s earlier work 
(1979; 1984) on the British regional economies can be viewed within this line of critique. She argues that 
each form of distribution of value corresponds to a specific form of production, and the uneven 
development of the regions is a necessary and “useful” outcome of capitalism to maintain the rate of 
accumulation (Massey 1979, 241–2).  This prepares the way for her later conception of power-geometry 
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which emphasizes the unevenness created by the differentiated mobility of different groups of people and 
capital (Massey 1991).  David Harvey (1991, 195) took one step further by arguing that the flexible 
accumulation boasted by industrial districts of SMEs in certain places of the world is no more than yet 
another spatial fix to the over-accumulation of capital.  Because of the cycles of over-accumulation, crisis 
and subsequent devaluation are inevitable to capitalism, and because some forms of capital such as 
constant capital invested in infrastructures are less mobile than other forms such as finance capital, 
devaluation is more likely to be place-specific on less mobile capital.  “The continuous re-structuring of 
spatial configurations through revolutions in value must again be seen, however, as a normal feature of 
capitalist development” (Harvey 1982, 426).  Based on this theorization, Harvey questions the very 
existence of such a paradigmatic shift of the regime of accumulation: “I do not see this shift to alternative 
systems of labour control (with all its political implications) as irreversible, but interpret it as a rather 
traditional response to crisis” (1991, 192). 
This body of literature leads to a number of important questions directly related to my case in Prato. It 
shows that the prosperity of Italian IDs came out of a specific historical moment in which over-production 
of standardized goods reached its limits, and diversifying demands for fast selling consumer goods were 
not met by contemporary producers.  Therefore, the path dependency made older Fordist companies 
alongside the regions where they concentrated less competitive than these previously marginalized 
regions such as industrial districts in Italy.  However, as many have asked (Amin and Thrift 1992; 
Markusen 1996), what if external demands for consumer goods shifted again? What if the vertically 
integrated producers once again became more competitive and responsive to the markets?  Actually, as 
we discuss in Chapter 3, this is exactly what has been happening to the textile market since the 1990s, and 
has imposed unbearable difficulties to Prato’s textile industry  (Becattini 2001, 130; Dei Ottati 2009).  As 
Prato’s textile industry kept declining and its apparel industry kept prospering, a number of questions 
emerge. Do Chinese apparel firms constitute a parallel ID or are they an integrated part of the Italian one?  
I show in the Chapters 4 and 5 that this may not be an either-or question and the relations between 
39 
 
Chinese and Italian industries in Prato are more complicated than we might expect.  The second question 
(and a more interesting one) is that: if Chinese firms organize in more or less the same way that Italian 
ones organize, what factors make the Chinese apparel wax, while the Italian textile wane?  Do the limits 
of this regime of flexible accumulation also apply to the Chinese firms in Prato?  What are the 
institutional forces that define the conditions of possibility for the Chinese apparel industry in Prato? 
These are more empirical and difficult questions that I have to tackle with in the later chapters. 
2.2. Global Value Chains 
The commodity chain research was initiated by Hopkins and Wallerstein who define a chain as “a 
network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity” (Hopkins and 
Wallerstein 1986, 195).  As a part of world system analysis (Wallerstein 2004), the primary purpose of 
studying commodity chains is to reveal the ways in which surplus value is produced by labor and 
distributed across the world. It’s origins in Marxism meant that many of the first commodity chain studies 
focused on the history of capitalist globalization, trying to analyze the weak points in these chains which 
necessarily engendered cyclical crises (Bair 2008, 15). Historically focusing on the colonial period, these 
first chains studies did not directly speak to the contemporary development issues of the developing world. 
Therefore, a number of scholars who were less convinced by the Marxist framework during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s decided to conduct more empirical and operational researches.  
Following the collapse of colonial empires after WWII, the new wave of globalization has been 
dominated by transnational corporations which distribute their production networks across the world. As 
a consequence, the newly industrialized countries (NICs) in East Asia received a succession of industries 
outsourced from the West, the process known as the “Global Shift” (Dicken 2011). Based on years of 
empirical studies of the apparel industry in Latin America and East Asia, Gary Gereffi developed the 
theory of Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) (1994) which laid the ground work for most of the current 
chain studies.  The initial question for Gereffi is why certain countries, e.g. Japan and South Korea, 
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sustained strong development and continuous industrialization by exporting, while others, especially 
those in Latin America, failed to do so (Gereffi 1999, 38). The original paper of GCCs was quickly 
developed into a literature of Global Value Chains (GVCs) to “ask questions about the winners and losers 
in the globalisation process, how and why the gains from globalisation are spread, and how the number of 
gainers can be increased” (Gereffi et al. 2001, 2). 
The literature of GVCs basically deals with two inter-related themes of industrial development: the 
organizational conditions and paths of industrial upgrading. As opposed to the world system studies that 
primarily focus on industry as a whole, this  literature aims to offer a theoretical framework which focuses 
on activities of the firms, and tries to connect the micro with the macro processes in the global economy 
(Bair 2008, 8).  Typically, for these authors, organizational conditions can be conceptualized into a 
limited number of forms of governance structure (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1993; Gereffi 1999). The 
concept of governance structure focuses on who the drivers of a chain are and how these drivers 
appropriate or distribute value along the chain.  For Gereffi (1999, 43), there are two distinct types of 
governance structure: the producer-driven commodity chains (PDCC) as in the case of capital intensive 
industries such as automobiles, and the buyer-driven commodity chains (BDCC) in the case of labor 
intensive industries such as apparel.  Throughout the development path of NICs, BDCCs have had much 
more importance than the PDCCs, since the “global shift” of production from the West to the East was by 
and large organized by big American and European retailers in response to rising labor cost in their 
homelands.  Nearly all of the NICs began their industrialization by joining the BDCCs, especially the 
textile and apparel chains, including Japan in the 1950s, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 
1970s, and China in the 1980s (Gereffi 1999, 45).  Firms learned the knowledge about sourcing, 
producing and marketing step by step through the “organizational succession” of global buyers from 
discount chains to higher status brand names. The aggregate effect of this organizational learning is what 
Gereffi defines as industrial upgrading: “a process of improving the ability of a firm or an economy to 
move to more profitable and/or technologically sophisticated capital- and skill-intensive economic niches” 
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(Gereffi 1999, 51).  However, what is the relationship between forms of governance structure and paths of 
upgrading? How do different chains result in different types of upgrading? 
The question was picked up by followers and later developed into a complex matrix of forms of 
governance structure and types of upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Gereffi, Humphrey, and 
Sturgeon 2005). Four types of upgrading are identified: process (being faster and more efficient), product 
(being more sophisticated and diversified), functional (acquiring new functions) and inter-sectoral 
(expanding into related sectors) (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002, 1020). Upgrading of production processes 
was also important, from CMT (Cut and Make, assembly), OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing), 
ODM (Original Design Manufacturing), OBM (Original Brand Manufacturing) through service providers.  
Five governance structures were also identified to reflect the continuum of intermediate forms based on 
the complexity of transactions, codifiability of information and capacities of the supply base (Gereffi, 
Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005). Different forms of governance structure entail different degrees of power 
asymmetry. Based on this framework, they offer a systematic way to study forms of inter-firm relations 
and correlated types of upgrading in a variety of countries and sectors (Bair and Gereffi 2001; Cattaneo, 
Gereffi, and Staritz 2010). 
Tab. 2.1: Types of governance structure (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005, 87) 
 
Types of 
governance 
structure 
Complexity of 
transaction 
Ability to codify 
transaction 
Capabilities of 
supply-base 
Degree of explicit 
coordination and 
power asymmetry 
Market Low High High Low 
Modular High High High  
Relational High Low High  
Captive High High Low  
Hierarchy High Low Low High 
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Tab. 2.2: Stages of upgrading in the textile and apparel industry (Cattaneo, Gereffi, and Staritz 2010, 
199–200) 
 Functional capabilities Governance 
structure 
Weaknesses and 
upgrading 
Skills acquired 
CMT 
Assembly 
The focus of the supplier is on 
production alone; suppliers 
assemble imported inputs 
following buyers’ 
specifications. 
Captive or 
market 
Lack capital, 
expertise, direct 
access to buyers, 
local inputs. 
Process or product 
upgrading 
Local firms learn 
foreign buyers’ 
preferences, 
including 
international 
standards for price, 
quality and delivery. 
OEM 
Original 
Equipment 
Manufact-
uring 
The supplier takes on a broader 
range of tangible, 
manufacturing related 
functions, such as sourcing 
inputs and inbound logistics in 
addition to production.  
Captive or 
market 
Lack design 
capabilities and 
strong managerial 
and technical 
skills. 
Functional 
upgrading to 
logistics and 
coordination 
Production expertise 
increases over time 
and spreads across 
different activities. 
Suppliers learn the 
upstream and 
downstream segments 
of the chain from 
buyers. 
 
If the ability to codify 
transactions increases and 
supplier competencies remain 
high, degree of explicit 
coordination decreases 
Modular  Can lead to 
Substantial backward 
linkages in the 
domestic economy. 
ODM 
Original 
Design 
Manufact-
uring 
Supplier carries out part of the 
preproduction processes, 
including design or R&D 
 Lack direct access 
to foreign 
consumers and 
marketing skills. 
Functional and 
product upgrading 
Innovative skills 
related to new 
product 
development 
If in collaboration with buyer Relational   
If buyer attaches its brand to a 
product designed by the 
supplier 
Captive or 
modular 
  
OBM 
Original 
Supplier acquires 
postproduction capabilities and 
is able to fully develop products 
 Knowledge Innovative skills 
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Brand 
Manufact-
uring 
under its own brand names. changing 
 
 
related to marketing 
and consumer 
research 
If maintains relationship with 
and develops brands with buyer 
Relational Functional 
upgrading 
 
If no longer relies on buyer for 
any functions and establishes 
own distribution channels 
Lead firm Channel and 
functional 
upgrading 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1: Historical succession of the textile and apparel industry (Cattaneo, Gereffi, and Staritz 2010, 205) 
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The literature of GVCs has also provoked a number of important theoretical developments from 
geographers. One of the problems remains in the GVCs is that the production process is metaphorized as 
a chain, which precludes more complex connections between the chains (Henderson et al. 2001, 440).  In 
particular, the geographical context and institutional/social embeddedness are largely ignored in the GVC 
literature. “[C]ommodity chains link not only firms in different locations, but also the specific social and 
institutional contexts at the national (sometimes sub-national) level, out of which all firms arise, and in 
which all - though to varying extents - remain embedded” (Henderson et al. 2001, 441).  Based on their 
earlier works on the “global shift” and industrialization of NICs, the so-called “Manchester School” of 
economic geography thus emerged with the concept of Global Production Networks (GPNs), which they 
argue can integrate the biggest possible amount of the theoretical insights offered by chains studies and 
accommodate the complexity of real world geography (Henderson et al. 2001; Coe, Dicken, and Hess 
2008). Although the literature of GPNs highlights the importance of spatial pattern, institutional contexts 
and relational thinking, I agree with Bair that in practice, their empirical work “does not differ greatly 
from analyses of global commodity chains in terms of methodological approach” (Bair 2008, 4).  
Therefore, in my dissertation, I would use the terms of GCC, GVC and GPN as interchangeable. At the 
same time, I follow the advocates of the GPN studies to pay more attention to the social/institutional 
embeddedness which defines the firm behaviors beyond purely economic rationalities. 
To sum up, the literature of GVCs is important in three ways. First, complementary to the literature of 
industrial districts, the GVC schools pay more attention to the external relations of industrial clusters and 
specify the ways in which smaller firms are involved in production networks organized by lead firms.  
More importantly, it helps me to position the case of Prato into a global context of multinational 
corporations which both Italian and Chinese firms have to face.  How can we evaluate the competitive 
advantages of the Chinese apparel and Italian textile in Prato in terms of its organizational forms and 
internal power structure?  What are the domestic/global markets for Chinese apparel produced in Prato?  
These questions can be asked in concrete and systematic ways in the framework of GVCs. 
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Second, this literature seeks to offer practical methodologies for empirical studies and for making the 
comparison between cases structured and systematic. In particular, forms of governance structure, types 
of upgrading and degrees of power asymmetry are useful tools for studying processes of outsourcing, 
inter-firm relations and the possibilities of upgrading, and thus directly apply to my research in Prato.  By 
breaking down the labyrinth of the local production networks in Prato, concepts such as functional 
capability and governance structure help me pinpoint the roles of different actors on the chain and the 
complex relations between them.  Meanwhile, the GVC tools for assessing weaknesses and paths of 
upgrading become indispensable, if one asks why the synergetic relations between Chinese apparel and 
Italian textile are so far impossible.  The difficulties for upgrading in the Chinese apparel industry are 
quite different from those faced by Italian firms. 
Third, from the beginning, the conception of GVCs always highlights the role of state policies and 
government institutions (Gereffi 1994, 100). However, as the advocators of GPNs argue, followers of the 
GVCs usually do not pay enough attention to the impacts exerted by social and political institutions (Coe 
et al. 2004).  Although this argument is true to a certain degree, if one has carefully studies the genealogy 
of GVCs, it is easy to find that one of the original purposes for GVCs was to move beyond the 
institutional stories repeated in the literature of industrial districts and turn the focus to firm-level 
behaviors (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002, 1019). Therefore, both IDs and GVCs provide rich and 
complementary “tool-boxes” for me to understand the institutional contexts in Prato.  In particular, I show 
in Chapter 6 that the social embeddedness of the pronto moda needs to be understood through the 
conflicts between the rationality of capital and the rationality of government. 
Finally, as Gereffi and his followers confirm in a number of cases, this body of literature is meant to be 
policy oriented (Gereffi 1999, 37; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002, 1808). This is actually a double-edged 
sword for those who want to use their methodology. On the one hand, students of the GVCs are usually 
more capable of offering down-to-earth insights of a specific industry in a specific place.  It also makes 
the research mundane enough to be understood by policy makers.  On the other hand, thinking from the 
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position of policy makers, usually the nation-states, people who use the GVCs tend to assume the status 
quo and deprive their researches of critical power (Bair 2008, 29; Bair and Werner 2011a, 1000). 
Hopefully, speaking to the ongoing tensions between Chinese and Italians in Prato, I am able to make my 
research meaningful for both policy makers and critics. 
2.3. Confluence of the two traditions 
Although I have presented the two bodies of literature in different sections, I do not mean to suggest that 
they developed separately, without interactions.  Actually, many of the original researches were direct 
outcomes of the conversation between the two traditions.  For instance, the literature on industrial 
upgrading through GVCs was supposed to be a critique of the Third Italy as “containing the full range of 
activities required to produce finished products for the world market” (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002, 
1020).  Recent attempts to bridge the two traditions have been made by practitioners from both groups, 
and they can be summarized in 3 general directions. 
First, stimulated by the substantial transformations in Italian IDs over the past two decades, scholars of 
the Third Italy have realized that there are growing connections between SMEs in the IDs and 
multinationals from the outside. Many studies have been intended to show the internal diversities among 
Italian IDs. Second, geographers are particularly interested in the spatial and institutional contexts of the 
ID and use GVC theories to connect firm-level activities with broader regional and national economic 
performance. In particular, issues of foreign migrant workers are now playing a more important role in the 
development of IDs than any time before.  Finally, dissatisfied by the lack of critical power in the GVCs 
literature, some scholars are seeking ways to bring back the critical tradition of regional studies in 
economic geography and have done genuinely path-breaking works. 
Since the early 1990s, traditional Made-in-Italy products such as textile and apparel have been facing 
increasingly intensive competition from the Asian NICs. The stagnation of the Italian GDP growth was 
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accompanied by the downturn in per capita productivity, and gave birth to the question whether or not the 
model of Marshallian IDs was still viable for long term development (Dunford 2006b, 2; Rabellotti, 
Carabelli, and Hirsch 2009, 19).  Despite constant suspicions about the future of IDs from scholars such 
as Amin and Thrift (1992) and Dunford (2006a), many scholars, especially Italian scholars, have argued 
for their sustainability.  Among others, Corò and Volpe were the first to use the theory of GVCs to 
explain the fragmentation and outsourcing of productions in the IDs (Corò and Volpe 2006). In particular, 
they argue that the outsourcing process of ID firms is actually not much different from the process 
organized by bigger transnationals in terms of the ways in which value is distributed along the chains. The 
importance of value chains is also recognized by Roberta Rabellotti and her followers who have done 
pioneering work on the consequences to ID firms when participating in GVCs (Rabellotti 2004). 
Although firms within ID still enjoy better performance than those outside, by joining the GVCs they 
have to give up all other functions except for production, accepting functional downgrading (Rabellotti 
2004, 22–3).  Depending on their size and specific sector, in order to remain competitive in the global 
market, the ID firms have to choose between pure exports, outsourcing and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in response to competition from the outside, and so far, outsourcing to the Eastern European 
countries (EECs) has been the most popular strategy among SMEs (Rabellotti, Carabelli, and Hirsch 2009, 
28–9). 
In fact, there are diversities among Italian IDs. Belussi and Sedita (2009) have shown that Italian IDs 
have very different origins and follow diverse evolutionary paths. Although the original conception of an 
ID by Marshall highlights the endogenous innovative power, many Italian IDs actually originated from 
exogenous impacts such as the entry of foreign multinationals or specific policies of local institutions 
(Belussi and Sedita 2009, 509).  Moreover, in the age of globalization, Italian IDs are increasingly open to 
global production networks and rely on knowledge input that is produced by distant firms outside the IDs 
(Belussi and Sammarra 2010; Camuffo and Grandinetti 2011; Belussi and Sedita 2012). Therefore, while 
some IDs might suffer a structural crisis, many others are still able to maintain to be competitive. 
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There have also been a number of researchers who have focused on the different development paths of 
Italian regional economies that cannot be subsumed under the conception of Marshallian industrial district 
(Bellandi and Sforzi 2003). Among others, Dunford and Greco have done one of the most thorough 
critiques on the Third Italy model and surveyed various forms of regional economies in Italy (Dunford 
and Greco 2006). There are two points most important in his research.  First, they argue that a more viable 
regional theory requires connecting firm and inter-firm level researches, with sub-regional and regional 
statistics (Dunford and Greco 2006, 42–54). In particular, methodologies offered by the GVC literature 
are powerful in terms of showing complicated relations between forms of organization and paths of 
upgrading at not only firm level but also regional level (Dunford and Greco 2006, 46). Similar to what 
Markusen (1996) has claimed, they also contend that vertically integrated companies may still play 
important roles even in the traditional sectors such as apparel, and regional performance very often can be 
traced back to the performance of these lead firms (Dunford 2006a; Dunford and Greco 2006, 9). Second, 
like many other economic geographers, they point to the important role of national politics and 
institutional contexts in shaping the organizational structure of firms and inter-firm relations (Dunford 
and Greco 2006, 76–8). Issues such as taxation, national development plans and labor laws have 
significant impacts on the performance of Italian firms and regions throughout the postwar history 
(Dunford and Greco 2006, 95–100). 
These two critiques of the Third Italy literature are in fact not unusual in economic geography.  By 
studying the garage factories in Bulgaria, Begg et al. (2005, 154) show that the Third Italy model of 
regional development is geographically limited and has not yet taken into account historical contingencies 
and institutional complexities in post-socialist states.  Parallel cases in other EECs (Sellar 2007; Smith et 
al. 2008) and Southeast Asia (Arnold and Pickles 2011) also show that national institutions are 
particularly important in shaping the local production networks which rely on migrant workers, because it 
is always the governments who design immigration policies and regularize (either successfully or not) 
labor force. These ways of incorporating migrant workers in local production networks are also 
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comparable to my case of the Chinese apparel industry in Prato. However, my case differs from Sassen’s 
(1990) argument that migrant workers are “pushed and drawn” by multinational capital: in Prato, not only 
migrant workers, but also migrant entrepreneurs with their own capital are involved in the industry. This 
leads to a question about the globalization of Chinese economy as well (Henderson, Appelbaum, and Ho 
2013). With an expanding Chinese economy, Chinese people and firms are increasingly encouraged to go 
abroad (Zhu and Pickles 2014).  In what ways does the Chinese apparel industry in Prato rely on the 
Chinese economy and Chinese capital? Why do they bring workers overseas instead of manufacturing in 
China? These questions can be answered by studying the firm- and inter-firm level of organizational 
conditions. 
One of the recent developments in the GVC literature is the critical turn initiated by a group of feminist 
scholars. Borrowing the concept of articulation from the British cultural studies and surplus population 
from Harvey, Bair and Werner (2011b, 989) argue: “the commodity chains approach tends to downplay, 
if not ignore, the fact that changing geographies of global production reflect moments of inclusion and 
exclusion” (original highlights). In their empirical research of a Mexican ID specialized in producing 
jeans, they found two important facts (Bair and Werner 2011a). First, the expansion of GVCs should not 
be taken for granted, because GVCs may withdraw from a certain place if markets and/or institutional 
contexts change. Second, the exclusion or disarticulation of firms and labor is a necessary process of 
GVCs and continuously reproduces forms of inequality among firms and laborers.  I agree with them that 
“Processes of devaluation, for example, are an inherent dynamic of capitalism, but they cannot be reduced 
to the logic of capital. For one thing, capital alone does not determine whose labor will be exploited and 
where” (Bair and Werner 2011b, 991).  In other words, since an economy consists of thousands of actors, 
a prosperous industry does not necessarily mean prosperity for all.  Actually, many preceding scholars 
such as Massey (1984, 67), Harvey (1982, 425) and Markusen (1999, 877) have pointed out long before 
that inequality and uneven development are necessary outcomes of the capitalist accumulation and very 
often contribute to the contingent social and institutional contexts.  By drawing upon the works of critical 
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geographers, I hope to contribute to this broader revival of the critical power of the GVC studies and put 
the current situation of Chinese apparel industry in Prato under critique. 
2.4. Conjuncture and conjunctural analysis 
Derived from the context of British society in the 1970s and 80s, a number of scholars including 
Raymond Williams (1997) and Stuart Hall (1978; 1988) founded the school of cultural studies in order to 
understand the contemporary socioeconomic crisis in the 1960s. In particular, inspired by the Gramscian 
conception of hegemony (1971) and Althusserian over-determination (2001), Hall and his followers 
(1978) first used the term conjuncture to analyze the British racism in the late 1970s, and successfully 
show a complicated map of economic, social and political forces that connected to racist discourses. For 
Hall, “[a] conjuncture is a period during which the different social, political, economic and ideological 
contradictions that are at work in society come together to give it specific and distinctive shape” (Hall and 
Massey 2010, 57).  Therefore, conjunctural analysis is designed for empirical research and attempts to 
transcend the existing disciplinary boundaries toward a synthetic understanding of social crises. There are 
two slightly different conceptions of conjuncture in cultural studies. Williams uses the term as a general 
method to analyze “culture”. For him, any crisis must be studied in a conjunctural way in which not only 
economic, but also social, political and cultural forces need to be considered (Williams 1997). Unlike 
Williams who tends to generalize the use of conjuncture, Hall uses the term as a historically specific 
moment in which “a number of contradictions at work in different key practices and sites come together – 
or ‘con-join’ – in the same moment and political space and, as Althusser said, ‘fuse in a ruptural 
unity’ ”(Hall 2011, 9).  
In fact, economic geographers are not unfamiliar with this argument, since the cultural/critical turn in our 
discipline has been trying to knock down these boundaries for more than 30 years (Sheppard 2011).  As 
discussed in Chapter 6, I argue that the tensions between Chinese firms and Italian society must to be seen 
as conjunctural.  The economic conflicts between Chinese and Italian communities are necessarily 
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entangled with social and political tensions.  In this sense, my use of conjuncture seems to lean toward 
Hall’s conception in which there are multiple crises condensing in Prato and potentially giving birth to a 
new historical conjuncture. Based on conjunctural analysis, I want to study the peculiar articulations of 
these different forces and present a more contextual picture of the Chinese apparel industry in Prato. 
Fortunately, scholars such as Bair and Werner (2011a) have made first attempts to bring together 
conjunctural analysis and regional studies, and so pioneered this way for me. 
The other feature of the conjunctural analysis is its concern with the contingency and possibilities.  The 
debates of industrial districts have led me think of Prato as a contingent assemblage of socioeconomic 
forces over a specific period of time.  The concept of “conditions of possibility” was first introduced by 
Kant (1955) and later reframed by Foucault in a much different way (1982). For Foucault, the concept 
refers to the boundary of human knowledge at a given historical moment in which certain things became 
“sayable” and “seeable” while others did not.  The articulations between “sayable” and “seeable” are by 
no means necessary and are subject to historically contingent events (Deleuze 1988). In other words, if we 
think it in terms of “the conditions of possibility”, the current socioeconomic circumstances in which 
Chinese and Italian firms organize their production are no more than one incarnation out of many other 
possibilities.  Two implications can be inferred from this argument.  On the one hand, to analyze the 
current structure of production networks in Prato requires a survey of the historical conditions that have 
made this structure occur. On the other hand, the current difficulties and tensions in these production 
networks also provoke me to think of other possibilities that may change the status quo.  Lawrence 
Grossberg’s (2010, 57) declaration for cultural studies is therefore very relevant in my research: 
“Instead, in my view, cultural studies has a more modest commitment to producing 
knowledge that illuminates the conjuncture and explores the possibilities of changing it; thus, 
it always presupposes a reconstitution of imagination in the context of its own analysis.  It 
aims to give people an understanding of the contingency of the present.  If the present 
context did not have to be this way, if it was not guaranteed in advance, then it could have 
been otherwise, and it can be something different in the future. It inquires into the 
possibilities for the future disclosed in the present.” 
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I would like to see myself as practitioner of cultural studies in a broader sense, since I indeed agree with 
Grossberg that conjunctural analysis offers a theoretical framework to understand historical contingency 
and conditions of possibility. It constantly reminds me that the situation does not necessarily have to be in 
the way it is. 
  
53 
 
References 
Althusser, Louis. 2001. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Amin, Ash, and Nigel Thrift. 1992. “Neo-Marshallian Nodes in Global Networks.” International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research 16 (4): 571–87. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.1992.tb00197.x. 
 
Arnold, Dennis, and John Pickles. 2011. “Global Work, Surplus Labor, and the Precarious Economies of 
the Border.” Antipode 43 (5): 1598–1624. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00899.x. 
 
Bagnasco, Arnaldo. 1979. Tre Italie: la Problematica Territoriale dello Sviluppo Italiano. Milan: Il 
Mulino. 
 
Bair, Jennifer, ed. 2008. Frontiers of Commodity Chain Research. Stanford University Press. 
 
Bair, Jennifer, and Gary Gereffi. 2001. “Local Clusters in Global Chains: The Causes and Consequences 
of Export Dynamism in Torreon’s Blue Jeans Industry.” World Development 29 (11): 1885–1903. 
 
Bair, Jennifer, and Marion Werner. 2011a. “The Place of Disarticulations: Global Commodity Production 
in La Laguna, Mexico.” Environment and Planning A 43 (5): 998–1015. doi:10.1068/a43404. 
 
———. 2011b. “Commodity Chains and the Uneven Geographies of Global Capitalism: A 
Disarticulations Perspective.” Environment and Planning A 43 (5): 988–97. 
 
Becattini, Giacomo. 1978. “The Economic Development of Tuscany: An Interpretation.” Economic Notes, 
2–3. 
 
———. 1979. “Dal Settore Industriale Al Distretto Industriale. Alcune Considerazioni Sull’unità Di 
Indagine Dell’economia Industriale.” Rivista Di Economia E Politica Industriale 1 (1): 8. 
 
———. 2001. The Caterpillar and the Butterfly. Florence: Felice Le Monnier. 
 
Becattini, Giacomo, Marco Bellandi, and Lisa De Propris. 2010. “Critical Nodes and Contemporary 
Reflections on Industrial Districts.” Regional Responses and Global Shifts: Actors, Institutions 
and Organizations–p 3. Accessed on July 7, 2013. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.169.7925&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 
Becattini, Giacomo, Marco Bellandi, Gabi Dei Ottati, and Fabio Sforzi, eds. 2003. From Industrial 
Districts to Local Development: An Itinerary of Research. Illustrated edition. Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
 
Begg, Robert, Poli Roukowa, John Pickles, and Adrian Smith. 2005. “Industrial Districts and Commodity 
Chains: The Garage Firms of Emilia-Romagna (Italy) and Haskovo (Bulgaria).” Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences: Problems of Geography 1 (2): 153–65. 
 
Bellandi, Marco, and Fabio Sforzi. 2003. “The Multiple Paths of Local Development.” In From Industrial 
Districts to Local Development, edited by Giacomo Becattini, Marco Bellandi, Gabi Dei Ottati, 
and Fabio Sforzi, 210–26. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
54 
 
Belussi, Fiorenza, and Alessia Sammarra, eds. 2010. Business Networks in Clusters and Industrial 
Districts : The Governance of the Global Value Chain. London ;New York: Routledge. 
 
Belussi, Fiorenza, and Silvia R. Sedita. 2012. “Industrial Districts as Open Learning Systems: Combining 
Emergent and Deliberate Knowledge Structures.” Regional Studies 46 (2): 165–84. 
doi:10.1080/00343404.2010.497133. 
 
Belussi, Fiorenza, and Silvia Rita Sedita. 2009. “Life Cycle vs. Multiple Path Dependency in Industrial 
Districts.” European Planning Studies 17 (4): 505–28. doi:10.1080/09654310802682065. 
 
Berger, Suzanne. 1994. Convergence or Diversity? : National Models of Production and Distribution in a 
Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Industrial 
Performance Center. 
 
Berger, Suzanne, and Michael Piore. 1980. Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Brusco, Sebastiano. 1982. “The Emilian Model: Productive Decentralisation and Social Integration.” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 6 (2): 167. 
 
———. 1990. “The Idea of the Industrial District: Its Genesis.” Industrial Districts and Inter-Firm Co-
Operation in Italy. 
 
Camuffo, Arnaldo, and Roberto Grandinetti. 2011. “Italian Industrial Districts as Cognitive Systems: Are 
They Still Reproducible?” Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 23 (9/10): 815–52. 
doi:10.1080/08985626.2011.577815. 
 
Cattaneo, Olivier, Gary Gereffi, and Cornelia Staritz, eds. 2010. Global Value Chains in a Postcrisis 
World: A Development Perspective. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications. 
 
Ceccagno, Antonella. 2007. “Compressing Personal Time: Ethnicity and Gender within a Chinese Niche 
in Italy.” Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies 33 (4): 635–54. 
doi:10.1080/13691830701265495. 
 
Chiarvesio, Maria, Eleonora Di Maria, and Stefano Micelli. 2010. “Global Value Chains and Open 
Networks: The Case of Italian Industrial Districts.” European Planning Studies 18 (3): 333–50. 
doi:10.1080/09654310903497637. 
 
Coe, Neil M, Peter Dicken, and Martin Hess. 2008. “Global Production Networks: Realizing the 
Potential.” Journal of Economic Geography 8 (3): 271. 
 
Coe, Neil M, Martin Hess, Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, Peter Dicken, and Jeffrey Henderson. 2004. 
“‘Globalizing’regional Development: A Global Production Networks Perspective.” Transactions 
of the Institute of British Geographers 29 (4): 468–84. 
 
Corò, Giancarlo, and Mario Volpe. 2006. “Local Production Systems in Global Value Chains: The Case 
of Italian Industrial Districts.” In Global Value Chains Workshop on Industrial Upgrading, 
Offshore Production, and Labor, November, 9. Durham, NC: Social Science Research Institute, 
Duke University. 
 
55 
 
Dei Ottati, Gabi. 1996. “Economic Changes in the District of Prato in the 1980s: Towards a More 
Conscious and Organized Industrial District.” European Planning Studies 4 (1): 35–52. 
doi:10.1080/09654319608720328. 
 
———. 2003. “Exit, Voice and the Evolution of Industrial Districts: The Case of the Post‐World War II 
Economic Development of Prato.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 27 (4): 501–22. 
doi:10.1093/cje/27.4.501. 
 
———. 2009. “An Industrial District Facing the Challenges of Globalization: Prato Today.” European 
Planning Studies 17 (12): 1817–35. doi:10.1080/09654310903322322. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles. 1988. Foucault. 1st ed. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press. 
 
Dicken, Peter. 2011. Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy. 6th ed. 
London: The Guilford Press. 
 
Dunford, Michael. 2006a. “Industrial Districts, Magic Circles, and the Restructuring of the Italian 
Textiles and Clothing Chain.” Economic Geography 82 (1): 27–59. 
 
———. 2006b. “After the Three Italies the (internally Differentiated) North-South Divide: Analysing 
Regional and Industrial Trajectories.” Accessed on March 21, 2011. 
http://www.geog.susx.ac.uk/research/eggd/ege/pdf/annales07.pdf. 
 
Dunford, Michael, and Lidia Greco. 2006. After the Three Italies: Wealth, Inequality and Industrial 
Change. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1982. The Archaeology of Knowledge, and the Discourse on Language. 1st Pantheon 
pbk. ed. New York: Pantheon. 
 
Gereffi, Gary. 1994. “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S. Retailers 
Shape Overseas Production Networks.” In Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, edited by 
Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, 95–122. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
 
———. 1999. “International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chain.” Journal 
of International Economics 48 (1): 37–70. 
 
Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey, Raphael Kaplinsky, and Timothy J. Sturgeon. 2001. “Introduction: 
Globalisation, Value Chains and Development.” IDS Bulletin 32 (3): 1–8. 
 
Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey, and Timothy J. Sturgeon. 2005. “The Governance of Global Value 
Chains.” Review of International Political Economy 12 (1): 78–104. 
 
Gereffi, Gary, and Miguel Korzeniewicz. 1993. Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism. West Port, 
CT: Praeger Paperback. 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers Co. 
 
Grossberg, Lawrence. 2010. Cultural Studies in the Future Tense. Durham, NC: Duke University Press 
Books. 
 
Hall, Stuart. 1978. Policing the Crisis : Mugging, the State, and Law and Order. London: Macmillan. 
56 
 
 
———. 1988. The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left. London: Verso Books. 
 
———. 2011. “The Neo-Liberal Revolution.” Cultural Studies 25 (6): 705–28. 
 
Hall, Stuart, and Doreen Massey. 2010. “Interpreting the Crisis.” Soundings 44 (1): 57–71. 
 
Harvey, David. 1982. The Limits to Capital. Updated. New York: Verso. 
 
———. 1991. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Henderson, Jeffrey, Richard P. Appelbaum, and Suet Ying Ho. 2013. “Globalization with Chinese 
Characteristics: Externalization, Dynamics and Transformations.” Development and Change 44 
(6): 1221–53. doi:10.1111/dech.12066. 
 
Henderson, Jeffrey, Peter Dicken, Martin Hess, Neil M Coe, and Henry Wai-Chung Yeung. 2001. 
“Global Production Networks and the Analysis of Economic Development.” Review of 
International Political Economy 9 (3): 436–64. doi:10.1080/09692290210150842. 
 
Henderson, Jeffrey, and Khalid Nadvi. 2011. “Greater China, the Challenges of Global Production 
Networks and the Dynamics of Transformation.” Global Networks 11 (3): 285–97. 
doi:10.1111/j.1471-0374.2011.00326.x. 
 
Hopkins, Terence K., and Immanuel Wallerstein. 1986. “Commodity Chains in the World-Economy Prior 
to 1800.” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 10 (1): 157–70. 
 
Humphrey, John, and Hubert Schmitz. 2002. “How Does Insertion in Global Value Chains Affect 
Upgrading in Industrial Clusters?” Regional Studies 36 (9): 1017–27. 
doi:10.1080/0034340022000022198. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. 1955. The Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, John 
Miller Dow Meiklejohn, and James Creed Meredith. London: Encyclopædia Britannica. 
 
Krugman, Paul. 1991. “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography.” The Journal of Political Economy 
99 (3): 483–99. 
 
Lipietz, Alain. 1987. Mirages and Miracles: Crisis in Global Fordism. New York: Verso Books. 
 
Markusen, Ann. 1996. “Sticky Places in Slippery Space: A Typology of Industrial Districts.” Economic 
Geography 72 (3): 293–313. doi:10.2307/144402. 
 
———. 1999. “Fuzzy Concepts, Scanty Evidence, Policy Distance: The Case for Rigour and Policy 
Relevance in Critical Regional Studies.” Regional Studies 33 (9): 869–84. 
 
Marshall, Alfred. 1890. Principles of Economics. 8th Edition. Charleston, SC: Nabu Press. 
 
Massey, Doreen. 1979. “In What Sense a Regional Problem?” Regional Studies 13 (2): 233–43. 
doi:10.1080/09595237900185191. 
 
57 
 
———. 1984. Spatial Divisions of Labour : Social Structures and the Geography of Production. London: 
Macmillan. 
 
———. 1991. “A Global Sense of Place.” Marxism Today 35 (6): 24–29. 
 
Piore, Michael, and Charles Sabel. 1986. The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities For Prosperity. New 
York: Basic Books. 
 
Rabellotti, Roberta. 2004. “The Effect of Globalisation on Industrial Districts in Italy: The Case of 
Brenta.” In Local Enterprises in the Global Economy: Issues of Governance and Upgrading, 
140–73. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Accessed on Oct 7, 2012. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.2737&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 
Rabellotti, Roberta, Anna Carabelli, and Giovanna Hirsch. 2009. “Italian Industrial Districts on the Move: 
Where Are They Going?” European Planning Studies 17 (1): 19–41. 
doi:10.1080/09654310802513914. 
 
Sassen, Saskia. 1990. The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor 
Flow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Scott, Allen. 1988. “Flexible Production Systems and Regional Development: The Rise of New Industrial 
Spaces in North America and Western Europe.” Center for Urban and Community Studies 
Research Paper, no. 168 (December). Accessed on Dec 6, 2012. 
http://www.citiescentre.utoronto.ca 
/Assets/Cities+Centre+Digital+Assets/pdfs/publications/Research+Papers/168+Scott.pdf. 
 
Scott, Allen, and Michael Storper. 1986. Production, Work, Territory: The Geographical Anatomy of 
Industrial Capitalism. Allen & Unwin Pty., Limited (Australia). 
 
Sellar, Christian. 2007. “The Relationship between the Processes of Outsourcing of Italian Textile and 
Clothing Firms and the Emergence of Industrial Districts in Eastern Europe”. Doctoral 
Dissertation, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
 
Sforzi, Fabio. 2003. “The ‘Tuscan Model’ and Recent Trends.” In From Industrial Districts to Local 
Development, edited by Giacomo Becattini, Marco Bellandi, Gabi Dei Ottati, and Fabio Sforzi, 
29–61. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
Sheppard, Eric. 2011. “Geography, Nature, and the Question of Development.” Dialogues in Human 
Geography 1 (1): 46–75. doi:10.1177/2043820610386334. 
 
Signorini, L. Federico. 1994. “The Price of Prato, or Measuring the Industrial District Effect.” Papers in 
Regional Science 73 (4): 369–92. doi:10.1111/j.1435-5597.1994.tb00620.x. 
 
Smith, Adrian, John Pickles, Milan Buček, Robert Begg, and Poli Roukova. 2008. “Reconfiguring ‘post-
Socialist’ Regions: Cross-Border Networks and Regional Competition in the Slovak and 
Ukrainian Clothing Industry.” Global Networks 8 (3): 281–307. doi:10.1111/j.1471-
0374.2008.00196.x. 
 
Storper, Michael. 1997. The Regional World: Territorial Development in a Global Economy. The 
Guilford Press. 
 
58 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2004. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press Books. 
 
Williams, Raymond. 1997. Problems in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays. New York: Verso 
Books. 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophische Untersuchungen = Philosophical Investigations. Translated 
by Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, Peter Michael Stephan Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. 
Rev. 4th edited by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Zhu, Shengjun, and John Pickles. 2014. “Bring In, Go Up, Go West, Go Out: Upgrading, Regionalisation 
and Delocalisation in China’s Apparel Production Networks.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 44 
(1): 36–63. doi:10.1080/00472336.2013.801166. 
 
  
59 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: When Wenzhou meets Prato 
 
“A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, 
intermezzo.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 25) 
 
There are a number of reasons a chapter devoted to the historical background of the Chinese migration to 
Italy and the industrial district of Prato is worthwhile. Although Chinese migration to the Prato ID only 
began in the late 1980s, their trajectories since the early 20th century prepared the necessary conditions for 
the encounter. On the one hand, the Chinese migration to Italy has been a consequence of historical 
contingencies since 1914.  Besides wars and revolutions during this period, there have been a series of 
Italian and Chinese national policies including diplomatic treaties, amnesties and laws that imposed direct 
or indirect effects on the number, composition and occupational patterns of the Chinese migration to Italy.  
Even though the biggest wave of Chinese immigrants arrived after 1990, many of the contemporary 
features of Chinese migration to Italy were actually formed as early as during the WWI. On the other 
hand, as Becattini (2001, xii–xiii) makes clear, the industrial district of Prato was produced and constantly 
reproduced during the longue durée. Pratese people have always been proud of their great tradition in 
textile production and have been suppliers of Avignon and the Vatican since the 1400s (Origo 1957). 
Although this tradition prepared for later industrialization, it was not until the 1950s that the model of 
industrial district started to emerge. Since then, the Prato ID adapted itself to a series of economic and 
social crises. The current crisis of the textile industry in Prato to a certain extent reflects a number of path 
dependencies that have been left over by previous economic cycles. In particular, the emergence of the 
Chinese apparel industry in Prato has been conditioned on the crisis of the Pratese textile industry since 
the 1980s, the Italian immigration policies, and the waves of Chinese migration to Italy.  In this chapter, I 
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probe into the history and investigate the potential ways in which social and economic forces in Prato 
were articulated with Chinese migration. 
3.1. Two myths about Chinese migration 
There have been two long-standing “myths” about Chinese migration in migration studies. First, as 
Skeldon (2003; 2007) argues, Chinese transnational migration and its diasporas have always been studied 
as an exception from common migration theories. In particular, there has been a tendency to fetishize the 
organization of Chinese migration surrounding the notions such as kinship and guangxi. By so doing, 
Skeldon (2007) warns, the Chinese migration becomes a mystified process in which everything can be 
explained by the exceptional Chinese “culture”.  In order to contextualize the Chinese migration, many 
scholars such as Ong and Nonini (1996) have attempted to disenchant the “cultural aura” of Chinese 
diasporas and fit the migration into the bigger picture of colonial empires and capitalism.  
Because of the dramatic growth of the Chinese economy in recent years, this attempt to contextualize 
Chinese migration in terms of capitalist globalization seems even timelier. Chinese outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) increased from US$0 in 1979 to US$378 billion in 2008 (UNCTAD 2009). In 2008, 
Chinese OFDI stock in Italy reached US$133.6 million, and in terms of China’s some 2 trillion foreign 
exchange reserves and the country’s official ‘Go Out’ strategy, it is believed that bigger investments may 
be coming soon (Buckley et al. 2007; Pietrobelli, Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo 2010).  Recent evidence 
suggests that new Chinese investments may seek to make use of the existing network of Chinese firms in 
Italy (Pietrobelli, Rabellotti, and Sanfilippo 2010).  This recent trend also contradicts Saskia Sassen’s 
(1990) migration model in which migrant workers are “pushed” and “drawn” by transnational capital and 
by and large lost their autonomy.  Instead, in Prato Chinese entrepreneurs play the central role of 
organizing the production and diverting capital to different places.  All these phenomena point to my 
argument that Chinese migrants, both workers and entrepreneurs, are becoming more autonomous in the 
games of capitalism and respond to social and institutional barriers in their own ways.  I agree with 
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Sandro Mezzadra (2004) in that in similar ways to Italian migrant workers who sabotaged the production 
in factories, recent migrant workers mostly from the Third World also sabotage the national borders 
which try to manage the labor migration in favor of the needs of capitalist (developed) countries.  
However, as I show in this chapter, while the Chinese migrant workers reworked the legal and social 
borders in their own ways, they have actually collaborated with the Chinese capital and actively 
participated in the capitalist accumulation of the Chinese pronto moda.   
The other myth about Chinese migration particularly popular in the Italian mass media is to depict their 
global presence as a strategic plan by the Chinese government. There has been a political tradition in Italy 
since the 1990s that immigrants are criminalized and marginalized out of the existing social categories by 
a process Dal Lago (2009, chap. 2) calls “the fear machine”.  In Prato, this fear machine has been widely 
enacted on TV programs and publications, and is nicely summarized by Pieraccini (2010, chap. 5).  Such 
anti-Chinese sentiment has been increasingly articulated within the broader anti-China discourse of the 
mass media especially during the clash between Italian police and Chinese entrepreneurs in Paolo Sarpi of 
Milan in 2007 (Cologna 2008; Tarantino and Tosoni 2009). In fact, my research shows that the encounter 
between Chinese migrants and the Prato ID was by no means planned.  The development of the Chinese 
apparel industry in Prato has been so disordered that it has also inflicted fractures within the Chinese 
community, as I show in Chapters 4 and 5. However, suspicion about Chinese migration was not entirely 
unreasonable. During the 2007 riot in Milan and many other protests, Chinese migrants often lined 
themselves with the Chinese consulate and inadvertently represented the power of the Chinese capital, 
and behind it, the Chinese nation-state (Cologna 2008, 12). 
In the remainder of this chapter, I briefly introduce the history of Chinese migration to Italy in the 20th 
century and pinpoint a number of important events that shaped the migration in specific ways. Beyond 
facts and numbers, I want to analyze the social mechanism that these institutional events enacted and 
discuss their long-term impacts on the Chinese community in Italy. 
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Early history, 1914 - 1978 
 
Fig. 3.1: Wenzhou in China 
One of the primary problems associated with Chinese migration has been the very definition of “the 
Chinese migration”.  Scholars have been arguing that the conception of Chinese migration may have been 
so diverse that any generalization of the Chinese migration would be empirically difficult (Thunø 2007).  
The problem is even more pertinent in Europe than elsewhere for two reasons. On the one hand, each 
European country has received a distinct composition of Chinese people from mainland China and 
Chinese diasporas all over the world. On the other hand, in many cases, one group of Chinese people 
might have settled in a number of European countries and share transnational linkages more than with 
other Chinese groups in the same country.  To deal with the complexity of Chinese migration to Europe, 
there has been an initiative to transcend the national borders when studying Chinese migration in Europe.  
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For instance, in her seminal work A History of Chinese Immigrants in Europe, Li Minhuang argues that 
focusing on Chinese communities in each European nation-state may obscure the fact that the majority of 
Chinese migrants are from a limited number of sending regions in China, and they have been frequently 
moving from one country to another and in different countries adopt different occupational patterns (Li 
2002, 49).  Ceccagno makes a similar argument that “[f]or the Chinese, Europe can also be seen as a 
chess board on which various family members move around to minimize the risks, take best advantage of 
the existing conditions and to grasp the best opportunities” (Ceccagno 2003, 194–195).  A more radical 
critique comes from Pieke (1998, 10) who is skeptical of the very validity of “A Chinese community” in 
Europe.  He argues that in fact even within a single receiving country, subgroups of Chinese migrants are 
so numerous that they cannot efficaciously cooperate with each other to form a common socioeconomic 
identity.   
Although to what extent the Chinese community in Italy is fragmented is still a question, there are at least 
two insights offered by this initiative. First, Chinese migration in Italy cannot be studied without 
considering its neighboring countries. In my case, the first group of Chinese immigrants in Italy actually 
came from France.  Even today, Chinese migrants’ preference for Italy is always conditioned by 
economic, social and political environments in other European countries. Second, the Chinese community 
in Italy is by no means a duplicate of the communities formed by the same origins in other European 
countries. The distinct history of Italian institutional contexts and its economic opportunities in the IDs 
has resulted in a distinct socioeconomic structure of Chinese communities in Italy. 
Although Europeans brought back a number of Chinese slaves or Catholic converts as early as in the 17th 
century (Li 2002, 60), Chinese migration to Europe en masse only happened in the early 20th century as 
war recruits and street peddlers.  Due to the severe labor shortage of the Allied Powers during the WWI, 
the British and French governments brought in about 160,000 Chinese workers through five labor bureaus 
in China (Live 1998, 98; Li 2002, 106). Among them about 50,000 died during the war, and 100,000 were 
expatriated immediately after. Only about 3,000 remained in France, mostly in and around Paris (Live 
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1998, 98; Li 2002, 116). Compared with war recruits, the story about the other group of Chinese migrants 
was more legendary.  In one of the most popular stories in 1890, a lucky merchant named Chen Yuanfeng 
from Qingtian, Zhejiang became very wealthy when he ran into a group of Europeans and managed to sell 
his Qingtian jade sculptures (Qingtian Shi) (Qingtian OCAO 2011, 4). With rumors spreading, his 
country folks fanatically joined the business and created one of the first migration channels to Europe.  
Although Li (2002, 98) doubts the authenticity of the story, she admits that the tradition of going to 
Europe probably began in those years and its symbolic value has persisted ever since.  Although the 
actual number of early street peddlers was never officially recorded, their presence was observed widely 
in the streets of France, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands between the 1920s and 1930s (Li 2002, 
95–96). 
In only a few years, people from Qingtian and soon from all over the broader Wenzhou area saturated the 
street markets in major French cities.7  Propelled by the pressure of competition, in the late 1920s some 
decided to move to Milan and created the first Chinese settlement in Italy (Cologna 2005a, 2). Since that 
point, the Chinese immigrants in Italy started to explore business opportunities in manufacturing sectors. 
These street peddlers quickly climbed up specific value chains to become manufacturers.  As early as 
1929, the first silk tie workshop headed by Chinese was established in Milan, which soon became 
extremely successful in the city’s street markets (Cologna 2005a, 2).  One interesting thing about the first 
generation of Chinese entrepreneurs was that unlike their later followers, they relied on their co-ethnic 
street peddlers as retailing networks but mainly hired Italian female workers (many would later marry 
with them) who had recently migrated from rural areas (Cologna 2005a, 2).  These manufacturers later 
diversified into markets of leather goods and garments.  Joined by more and more family members from 
China, many migrants began to move southward between the world wars, first to Bologna and Florence, 
and then to Rome after WWII (Carchedi and Ferri 1998, 262).  The size of settlements remained quite 
                                                          
7 Although Qingtian County now belongs to Lishui City which is adjacent to Wenzhou City, it was historically a 
part of Wenzhou until 1963. Therefore, Qingtian people have more familial, vernacular and cultural links with 
Wenzhou than with Lishui. 
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limited until much later.  In Prato, based on my own interviews, the first Chinese workshop appeared in 
the late 1980s when certain national and international circumstances changed.8 
Only after 1978 when China began its reforms and relieved its emigration control did large-scale Chinese 
migration revive, both internally and externally.  The huge income gap between China and Italy was one 
of the most important reasons for the Wenzhouese people to reawaken their European dreams.  However, 
economic motivation alone does not explain why Italy more than other EU countries became a popular 
destination for Chinese migrants.  In fact, the Chinese migration to Italy was not significant until certain 
social and institutional contexts changed in Italy in the 1980s. 
Italy: treaty and amnesties 
In 1985, Italy along with its western allies signed the diplomatic treaty with the recently reformed 
People’s Republic allowing citizens from one country to legally operate businesses in the other.  
Although not all industries were included in the treaty, it did encourage Chinese migrants to open 
companies in Italy.  For instance, statistics from Florentine Chamber of Commerce show an increase of 
Chinese businesses “from a few dozen in 1986-7 to about 190 at the end of 1991” (Carchedi and Ferri 
1998, 271).  However, after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the treaty was temporarily suspended, but 
returned to effect 9 years later in 1998 (Chang 2012, 184).  During this period, the number of Chinese 
migrants did not seem to be affected, with the number of resident permits issued to PRC nationals 
increasing from 1,824 in 1986 to 22,875 in 1993 (Carchedi and Ferri 1998, 264).  However, this change 
of institutional context affected the opportunities for Chinese entrepreneurship.  Many newly established 
Chinese businesses, apparel or leather workshops were forced to hire undocumented co-ethnic workers 
(Carchedi and Ferri 1998, 271). In fact, the Italian immigration policies have always intended to control 
the immigrants’ businesses to a limited degree, although the persistent growth of businesses headed by 
                                                          
8 The early history of Chinese Italians in Milan was mainly borrowed from the published works of and personal 
conversations with Daniele Cologna (2005b; 2008). 
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immigrants seems to disprove their original intention. However, as I discuss later, these policies did have 
unexpected impacts on the Chinese community in Italy. 
Tab. 3.1: Businesses headed by top 10 immigrant groups in Italy in 2011 (Caritas 2011, 283) 
Nationality 
No. of 
businesses 
% of total foreign 
businesses Primary sector 
% of businesses in 
the primary sector 
Morocco 37,574 16.44 Commercial 70 
Romania 35,060 15.34 Construction 78 
China 33,593 14.7 Manufacturing 42.9 
Albania 23,752 10.39 Construction 82.9 
Bangladesh 9,838 4.3 Commercial 69.8 
Egypt 9,674 4.23 Construction 52.8 
Senegal 9,527 4.17 Commercial 89.2 
Tunisia 8,914 3.9 Construction 67 
Ex-Yugoslavia 8,045 3.52 Construction 65.9 
Pakistan 5,027 2.22 Commercial 53.5 
 
 
Fig. 3.2: Number of Chinese nationals in Italy by year (Pedone 2013, 1). 
Traditionally famous as a country of emigration to Northern Europe and the Americas, Italy became a 
migration receiving country only in the 1990s. Many reasons caused this transition. First, after about 40 
years of postwar development, Italy became one of the most industrialized countries in the world.  Similar 
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to other industrialized countries, Italy faced serious problem of soaring labor costs since the 1980s.  
Moreover, in 1990, Italy had the lowest fertility rate among the EU countries and it has remained low 
since despite large-scale immigration (Eurostat 2010).  Compared with its European neighbors, Italy 
adopted more proactive policies to encourage immigration which resulted in a series of amnesties in 1986, 
1990, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2012.9  These amnesties were beacons for the Chinese both in China and in 
other European countries (particularly Northern countries such as the Netherlands) as many entered the 
country without legal papers hoping for the next amnesty (Ceccagno 2003, 189–190).  Although frequent 
amnesties partially solved the labor shortage in the receiving country, they also created many unintended 
consequences.  As Ceccagno argues, unlike regularization policies in France or Germany, the Italian 
amnesties were mainly aimed at bringing in low-skilled labor force, which in turn created unresolvable 
hostilities from the unemployed and trade unions (Ceccagno and Rastrelli 2008, chap. 6).  In Chapter 4, I 
show that this particular form of regularization also has also shaped the specific apparel value chains that 
Chinese immigrants articulated. 
Social norms in the Chinese ethnic enclave 
It is a very interesting contrast if we compare the labor choice of Chinese entrepreneurs in the 1990s with 
the migration in the 1920s that tended to hire local workers. There are a number of reasons for why 
Chinese apparel workshops decided to take the risk of using undocumented co-ethnic workers instead of 
locals.  One obvious explanation could be that in the 1990s, the wage gap between China and Italy was 
much higher than it was 70 years ago.  According to the World Bank report (2012), in 1990, the GDP per 
capita (PPP based on constant 2005 international US$) in Italy was $23,746, whereas in China it was only 
$1,100.   
                                                          
9 In the meantime, similar regularizations were announced in a few other European countries. They were France 
(1981, 1992 and1997), Spain (1986, 1991 and 2000) and Portugal (1992-3, 1996 and 2001) (Li 2002, 493–5; 
Levinson 2005). Although in terms of the number and scale of amnesties, Italy was ahead of its neighbors, a detailed 
comparative research of immigration policies, especially their consequences on Chinese migration, is still lacking. 
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As Cologna (2012, 1–2) points out, entrepreneurship for Chinese migrants is a “very down-to earth result 
of a trail-and-error process”. Working in the ethnic sector provides the best and fastest way towards self-
employment and long-term security.  First, in most cases, migrants have to pay for their migration. For 
the person who has no strong familial connection in Italy, she or he usually have to be undocumented for 
the first few years and pay a significant amount of money to the human traffickers or the snakehead 
(shetou).  In the early 2000s, this amount was between 120,000 yuan and 150,000 yuan (circa between 
12,000 and 15,000 euro at the time).  As Cologna (2012, 2) indicates, compared with other immigrant 
groups who came to Italy with no money, Chinese immigrants normally came with a large amount of debt. 
Second, the ethnic sector ensures a more familiar and secure place for migrants who have limited 
language skills and have legal barriers (i.e. those without legal papers) to transition into the host society.  
In fact, not only for Chinese but also for all other immigrant groups, working in the ethnic enclave is very 
common, such as for the Latinos in the US (Waldinger 1984; De Genova 2005).  Potential racism and 
anti-Chinese sentiments might exacerbate this economic segregation and block immigrant’s opportunities 
outside the ethnic economy. 
Finally, and more importantly, working in the ethnic sectors helps newcomers to accumulate their social 
and financial capital which will be crucial for their own entrepreneurship in future. In most cases, the first 
business of a Chinese migrant worker is always co-funded by a former employers and more successful 
relatives.  Therefore, it is important for one to show loyalty in the first few years and not to change jobs 
too often.  Normally, four or five years after arriving in Italy, migrants know enough people to build her 
or his own social network and raise one’s startup funds.  One of the most common ways of fundraising 
for Chinese in Italy is to hold a wedding and invite former employers, family members and friends to give 
their support. They are supposed to show their wishes by giving the new couple money, usually in cash. 
“We (Palazzo Brancaccio, one of the most expensive restaurants in Rome*) began to have 
Chinese customers in 2000. Their number increased very fast, and now we have at least one 
(wedding) every month… They are somewhat weird as we said, but they are very good 
customers. What makes us curious is that everything can be missed except for that reception 
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table, collecting gifts from guests: all these envelopes with cash inside. Some people even 
give cash without envelopes. The return is a cigarette or silk blanket… After the money is 
collected, it will be put in the office under surveillance. Attending such a wedding one has to 
give at least 500 euro. 200 guests then could contribute some 200 thousand euro. With 150 
euro deducted from the wedding cost for each guest, there is still much money for their own 
startup in future… The couple usually in their 20s does not know more than half of their 
guests. But they are the beneficiaries, and so they keep bowing to the guests.” (Oriani and 
Stagliano 2008, 157–8) *My explanation. 
 
“(Talking about two Fujianese friends who are going to have wedding) Have they really 
decided to have a wedding? They are not going to make money out of it. They have very few 
friends, and they never worked in one place longer than 3 months. If they are to have 
wedding, I bet they will actually lose money.” 
  Cheng, 32, apparel worker, interviewed in Prato on 3/20/2012 
 
China: reforms and the era of migration 
Before 1978, migration of any kind was minimal in China.  Domestic migration was discouraged by a 
planned national economy and a strict Hukou system. International migration was forbidden especially 
during the Cultural Revolution.  As a result, despite existing links between Wenzhou and Italy, there were 
only a small number of migrants before 1978.  Between 1949 and 1978 in Qingtian, only 752 people were 
allowed to leave the country (Qingtian OCAO 2011, 85), and in Wencheng, only 42 (Zhu 2002, 3). 
With reforms, Wenzhou was among the first regions to respond.  Not only did it already have migration 
channels to Europe, Wenzhou was also a sending region for domestic migration within China.  
Historically, because of limited arable lands, young men from villages surrounding Wenzhou city were 
forced to migrate across China as peddlers and craftsmen.  This  migration tradition in Wenzhou even 
managed to survive the Cultural Revolution when covert migrant groups continued to travel across the 
country usually as carpenters and cotton workers and to a certain extent helped to maintain an 
underground market (Xiang 1999, 218–9). Therefore, when market capitalism emerged in the early 1980s, 
Wenzhou people had already created a national network of information, and their entrepreneurs were the 
first to know where the demand was.  Wenzhou had a second advantage which had been a disadvantage 
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just few years ago.  As a coastal region with few natural resources, the city was one of the least invested 
regions by the state.  Lacking state-owned enterprises, people in Wenzhou had no other choice but to 
develop their own businesses.  Small and medium sized enterprises in clothing and leather industries, in 
many ways similar to Italian industrial districts, thrived and eventually created a “Wenzhou model” of 
economic development (Lombardi 2009). 
These two conditions are important for understanding the situation in Prato.  First, research has shown 
that internal and international migrations from Wenzhou people bear more similarities than usually 
thought (Pieke 1999, 12–3).  Many Wenzhouese entrepreneurs in Italy had been migrating in China 
before they decided to go abroad. As peddlers and craftsmen, many of them had already acquired basic 
skills for clothing or leather industry.  Second, during the early era of industrialization in Wenzhou, many 
potential migrants had learned a certain level of entrepreneurship.  On the one hand, basic knowledge 
about how to run a small business had been dispersed even among rural areas through family networks 
(sometime could be quite extended).  On the other hand, rapid growth in the urban area of Wenzhou 
created what Li calls “relative deprivation”(Li 1999, 184): that is, compared with people in the city, 
young people in rural areas surrounding Wenzhou had less education and social capital or guangxi which 
are crucial for a successful business in China.  Provoked by this uneven development, they found that 
going to Europe was the easiest way for them to realize their entrepreneurship.  Therefore, although they 
were probably not the poorest group of people in China, they became the most motivated migrants to 
Europe. 
“Before coming to Italy, I was doing a small business of auto parts with a couple friends in 
Jiangsu and Hunan. My friends and I were all about 20s and we got contracts through one of 
my friends’ family. Profits were ok at the moment but as young men we lived an extravagant 
life, drinking, eating and gambling—you’ve seen how our Wencheng people are living here. 
Exactly the same life style. Soon after a while, when we faced hardship, the business had to 
be closed down. As a son of peasants, I didn’t have any other chance to start a new business 
in China and so my family thought going abroad would be good for me. Then I was 
contacted by my younger sister here in Italy and was asked to come over to help. You know 
what, I was so lucky that I came in 1999 and got a resident permit in the last amnesty 
through my sister. I know there are many who came later but are now still workers since 
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they don’t have permits. Since 1999, I’ve settled in Prato first working for an apparel 
workshop and in 2009 started my own workshop.” 
Hua, 37, owner of apparel workshop, interviewed in Prato on 4/7/ 2012 
The (undocumented) migration routes 
 
Fig. 3.3: Migration routes (undocumented) from China to Italy in the 2000s 
Source: Author’s illustration based on interviews with Chinese migrant workers in Turin and Milan from 
December, 2011 to January 2012. 
“In around 2002, it cost about 120k yuan to smuggle into Europe. It was the price at the 
moment. I spent 14 months via Russia, Ukraine, Slovenia, Czech Rep., Germany and France. 
I still remembered that night on the snowy mountain on the border between Russia and 
Ukraine we had to bribe the border police to cross unless we wanted to die in freezing cold. 
We were caught twice on the way. Once in Slovenia, the second time in Czech Republic. 
The police there offered an opportunity to us through their translator: we could stay there for 
from 4 months to 1 year and then get a residence. It was in 2004 or around that point when 
these two countries were about to join the EU. We were told that once we got the residence, 
we were free to move across the EU countries, to Italy and to anywhere. All of us (at the 
moment we still had 14 people) declined, since we were so determinant [for Italy]. Now I 
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know how silly we were at the time, but we didn’t know. To come to Italy was everyone’s 
faith. When we arrived in France, another chance came in. We could decide either to go to 
the UK or to Italy. Since the UK route was much more dangerous- we needed to seal 
ourselves under the trucks- I decided to come to Italy. Now I think the UK might offer a 
better chance, but who knows. All in all, it was the history. No one do this now. The new 
comers usually have family union visa. They would never suffer this anymore.” 
Cheng, 32, apparel worker, interviewed in Turin on 12/21/2011 
“Then I paid 120k yuan to the snakehead and spent another 30k on the road. I was kind of 
luckier than others since I did not spend months in the sea or on the mountains. I applied for 
a tourist visa and travelled from Hong Kong and other places all the way through Italy. But 
then I realized that I wasn’t that lucky. The last amnesty was in 2002, but I arrived in 2004. 
The family worker permits were open for application in 2008 but I didn’t get one. Now I still 
had to work for Chinese workshops.” 
Mu, 30, apparel worker, interviewed in Turin on 12/23/2011 
Between the 1990s and 2000s, Economic opportunities and potential regularization in Italy encouraged a 
significant number of undocumented immigrants from China. The number of the undocumented has been 
debated by scholars (Smyth and French 2009). Based on her research in Prato, Ceccagno (2004, 117) 
estimates between 15% and 20% of the Chinese immigrants in Italy did not have resident permits in 2003. 
Her research also shows that in 2003, “in many small firms run by Chinese, often one or two out of eight 
to ten workers are irregular”, whereas in the early 1990s, usually only the employer possessed the resident 
permit (Pieke et al. 2004, 117).  The number of Chinese immigrants without paper thus continuously 
declined in the past decade. Cologna (2012, 4–5) observed a similar trend that the increase of Chinese 
immigrants has slowed down since 2003, while more immigrants were able to obtain resident permits in 
the late 2000s. He thus hypothesizes that this trend is the consequence of the diminishing income gap 
between China and Italy. When the Italian economy stagnated over the past decade, the Chinese economy 
(in particular the Zhejiang Province is part of China’s most vigorous economic zone of the Yangtze River 
Delta) continued to grow rapidly (Cologna 2012, 9). 
Economic motivations may explain the initial surge and subsequent decline of the number of 
undocumented workers from China. However, as my research shows, it is the changing institutional 
contexts of European countries that determine the routes of (undocumented) migration. My interviews 
show that at least in the early 2000s, the migration route clearly navigated along the least “securitized” 
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borders in Europe as shown in the Fig. 3.2. Although I do not have exact numbers, I hypothesize that the 
enlargement of EU might contribute to the initial surge of irregular migration to Italy. Typically, migrants 
found that the border control of new EU members such as Slovenia and Czech Republic was more porous 
than Western European countries. But since the internal border within EU has been abolished, these new 
members became important entry points for undocumented migrants. However, very few of Chinese 
migrants stayed in these new EU members based on my interviews. Most of the migrants stopped in 
Slovenia and Czech Republic en route to Italy, France, Spain, and the UK. 
A particular regulatory system in Italy coinciding with a particular group of Chinese migrants generated 
unexpected outcomes. So far I have explained where the migration motivations came from and why Italy 
became a popular destination, but why did Wenzhouese entrepreneurship succeed in apparel and not in 
any other industry? And why is it in Prato not elsewhere that a Chinese apparel industry emerged?  I 
argue that the economic and spatial structure of the Pratese ID prepared the conditions for this industry. 
As the industrial district was undergoing a transition, the Chinese apparel industry emerged in a right 
place at a right time. 
3.2. Prato: an industrial district as an adaptive system 
Becattini (2001, 3) divides the modern history of the Pratese textile industry into two general stages. 
From 1945 through 1973 was the period which he calls the “metamorphosis” and “classic development” 
of the Marshallian industrial district (Becattini et al. 2003, 3). From 1974 through 1993 there was a period 
in which Prato was under a different set of national and global pressures. It was on the eve of the massive 
arrival of Chinese apparel firms in Prato that Becattini (2001, 162–3) detected the potentials of Chinese 
immigrants. Based on works of Dei Ottati (2003c; 2009b; 2009a) and others (Smyth and French 2009), I 
identify a third stage (1993 onwards) in which the Chinese apparel industry began to emerge as in the 
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Pratese economy. Each of the stages left significant legacies in the local production networks which in 
turn constituted the conditions of possibility for Chinese firms to emerge in the 1990s.10  
Formation of the industrial district: 1945-1973 
Although Pratese textile dates back to the medieval age when local merchants were famous for supplying 
wool cloth to popes and cardinals (Origo 1957), the modern history of Prato’s textile industry took off 
after the second World War. Becattini (2003, 16–20) summarizes three major reasons for the initial 
development of the Pratese industrial district immediately after the war. First, postwar national 
reconstruction plans built highway networks in northern and central Italy which for the first time made an 
Italian national market possible. In particular, the Autostrada del Sole (Motorway of the Sun) was built in 
1962 and became the pivot of the country’s economy (Becattini 2001, 77). Neighboring Florence, Prato 
gained access to the Autostrada and highways connecting Tuscany with the industrial Po river basin in 
the north and markets of Rome and Naples in the south. Second, as a medieval center for textile 
production and trading, an artisan culture based on family workshops always existed in the area, 
alongside strong working ethic and open-minded entrepreneurship. This tradition persisted to the modern, 
and even in the prewar period, sharecroppers in the rural areas had already worked in family textile 
workshops on an irregular base. Sharecroppers who migrated to Prato after the war provided a qualified 
labor market for Prato’s initial industrialization. 
Finally, social and political conditions in the postwar period provided a favorable environment for 
industrialization. On the one hand, there was a bottom-up movement in which locals and recent 
immigrants (first from surrounding areas in Tuscany, and later from the South) created a number of 
associations. Based on these associations, a formalized mechanism of social cooperation gradually 
became a tradition in Prato. As I show later, this mechanism proved to be very effective and efficient for 
reaching a “consensus” during times of economic crisis. On the other hand, there was a top-down process 
                                                          
10 This part of the chapter is heavily relied on the secondary works of the Florentine school led by Becatttini (2001; 
2003) and Dei Ottati (2003c; 2009b; 2009a). In particular, Becattini’s seminal work on the postwar history of Prato 
The Caterpillar and The Butterfly (2001) is a rich mine for my historical research here. 
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in which local governments played important roles. As the battlefield of guerilla wars, Prato like most of 
Tuscan cities became the stronghold of the Partito comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party, PCI) 
after the WWII. Throughout the postwar years, the PCI cooperating with local powerful families 
successfully maintained a moderate relationship between labor and capital, and so avoided the mass 
strikes that occurred in Turin and Milan. In other words, a Gramscian hegemonic bloc was successfully 
created and well maintained by the efforts (or compromises) of the PCI.  
All these internal conditions did not necessarily lead to the emergence of the industrial district. Actually 
at least until 1951, Prato’s textile industry was still dominated by a group of vertically integrated 
producers (Dei Ottati 1996, 36). It was a number of changes happening outside the ID that kicked off the 
process of what Becattini calls the “flexible integration”  (Becattini 2001, 44). First, since the 1950s, the 
global textile market underwent substantial transformations (Becattini 2001, 30–34). Global textile 
markets began to diversify rapidly after the 1950s; in particular, demands for new synthetic fibers such as 
nylon and polyester soared, while the demand for traditional fibers such as wool declined. Second, some 
traditional markets such as South Africa, Middle East and India who were then the major markets for 
Made-in-Italy products all adopted protectionist policies (Dei Ottati 2003c, 503–4). The late 1940s also 
saw the first wave of worker’s movement in Italy. National trade unions successfully lobbied for new 
labor laws which imposed stricter regulations on bigger plants (Dei Ottati 2003c, 506–7). 
All these made vertically integrated textile companies so unprofitable that the owners decided to close the 
plants and subcontracted less profitable phases such as spinning and weaving to smaller companies. The 
logic behind this was that by subcontracting phases out, the company reduced its fixed capital costs and 
became more flexible and versatile in global markets (Becattini 2001, 46). It was at this point that the 
Italian industrial district emerged. Former workers who had just been laid off had already attained some 
of the skills and aspirations needed to open their own businesses. These workers were now encouraged by 
their former employers (usually their relatives) who invested in their machinery and established with them 
relatively stable subcontracting relations. In such a way, bigger firms reduced their managerial costs and 
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turnover time, while former workers’ became entrepreneurs in a tightly networked association of small 
producers, which in turn boosted productivity. These former workers, who used to be sharecroppers in the 
rural areas, had learned the know-how of organizing production through their experience working in the 
factories. While workers borrowed the start-up money from their former employers and then became 
subcontractors, their former employers became the organizer of the production and only specialized in the 
final phase of the textile production. 
As Beccatini shows, the initial break-down of the production networks resulted in chaotic competition 
between new subcontractors and their ex-employers. The PCI and other leftist groups emerged and helped 
the associations such as Confederazione nazionale artigianato pratese (Pratese Artisans’ Association) to 
operate in collective bargaining negotiations with bigger firms who organized around the Unione 
industrial pratese (Pratese Industrialists’ Association), as well as mitigating tensions among its members. 
Therefore, we have the two most important characteristics of ID: (1) division of labor between 
subcontractor firms that specialize in one phase of production and lead firms that design the products and 
coordinate the production, and (2) the social and political mechanisms for alleviating competition.  
The first crises: 1974-1993 
After a period of almost 30-years of uninterrupted growth, Prato faced its first crisis in the mid-1980s. 
Carded woolen textiles, either from original wools or from used rags from other industrialized countries 
(or materia prima as locals call it), had always been the major product of the district (Becattini 2001, 62). 
In 1951, Pratese carding spindles accounted for about 30% of the national total, while in 1981, it 
accounted for more than 60% (Dei Ottati 1996, 37). However, during the period of economic takeoff in 
Prato, the global market in traditional textiles shrunk substantially from 15% of total trade volume in 
1953 to less than 5% in 1992 (Becattini 2001, 31). Prato was among the most severely affected as the 
demand for carded wool declined by about 40% between 1985 and 1989 (Dei Ottati 1996, 39). The 
difficulty was worsened by a number of other factors including competition from newly industrialized 
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countries in Asia, competition from big textile producers mostly from the US and Japan, and the 
depreciating US dollar against Italian lira. 
Dei Ottati (1996, 41–6) identifies a number of strategies that were most commonly used to counteract the 
crisis. Catering to the changing market, lead firms reacted in three ways. First, in order to diversify the 
product lines, final firms (firms that specialize in finishing phase) began to source intermediate materials 
from outside the ID. Second, they quickly upgraded the fashionable quality of their products which were 
at the moment still oriented toward mass market. Third, many of them sought to outsource production to 
Eastern Europe or to Asia. Moreover, some of the most powerful families reorganized the production 
network around them. They exited manufacturing and created a holding company which owned the real 
estate of their sibling companies. As Dei Ottati (1996, 45) points out, these strategies reduced the self-
sufficiency of the ID and rearticulated the power structure among companies. Firms with financial and 
familial ties formed closer alliances than those without, and the holding companies gradually gained more 
power over their siblings.  
Transformation: 2001-present 
The crisis since the 1980s substantially transformed the Pratese ID. Textile production grew in 1991, 
while the number of textile producers declined by about 30% (Dei Ottati 1996, 41). The Artisans’ 
Association gradually compromised and ceased in their attempts to regulate the sourcing prices. Instead, 
they turned to regulate the behavior of the companies and finally gave birth to the Gentlemen Agreement 
in 1997 (Dei Ottati 2003c, 515–6). On the one hand, in response to lower prices outside of the ID, this 
agreement partially abandoned the collective agreement between subcontractors and lead firms, allowing 
prices to float freely.  On the other hand, in order to foster upgrading, it required written contracts to 
replace traditionally vocal contracts and specified technical standards for the production processes in the 
contract.  In short, very different collective strategies were adopted by companies in the name “of 
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rationalization and growth for the district as a whole” (Gentlemen’s Agreement, 1997; quoted from Dei 
Ottati 2003a, 202). 
The most important event for the global textile market was the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement in 2005. 
The phase-out of MFA resulted in the dramatic growth of textile and apparel production in East Asia, 
especially China (Cattaneo, Gereffi, and Staritz 2010).  This competition affected Italy in a specific way. 
Rabelloti et al. (2004) show that instead of losing market share to newly industrialized countries, Italian 
producers simply left the lower end of the market.  Based on the trade data between Italy and China, Prodi 
(2011) argues that in the textile market, Italy’s share of carded and worsted wools, of which Prato 
produced a large portion, went down only slightly after 2005, while the volume and value of it continued 
to plummet. Therefore, it was not that NICs took over Italy’s share in wool market. NICs alongside mass 
producers in developed countries were simply pushing forward the fashion trend of cotton and synthetic 
textiles which squeezed the demand for wools. The problem was aggravated by the transition from lira to 
euro as Italy now lost its ability to depreciate their currency against dollar (Dei Ottati 2009b, 1819). 
During this period, massive closures of spinning and weaving phase firms occurred, while lead firms that 
had upgraded into high-end markets decided to acquire more competitive subcontractors and outsourced 
less profitable phases to Eastern Europe and China (Dei Ottati 2009b, 1826).  Firms that survived also 
sought to diversify their businesses into textile related services such as computer supports and designing. 
Based on these new phenomena, Dei Ottati (2009b, 1828) concludes that “[E]vidence suggests a possible 
transformation of Prato from a manufacturing district to a local system in which the outputs of the core 
activities are mainly intangible as in design, fashion, coordination, marketing or distribution.” 
3.3. Lead firms vs. subcontractors 
One of the main division in the production network of the Prato ID (and other IDs as well) is between the 
lead firm (final firms) and subcontractors (phase firms). Originally, the final firms were those who used to 
be the vertically integrated producers but later broke down the production phases into separate companies. 
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These firms now specialized only in finishing phase of the textile production but were still the organizers 
of the production.  They were also responsible of buying raw materials and designed the models of 
products.  Phase firms instead were those who specialized in only one intermediate phase of the 
production such as sorting of rags, spinning and weaving.  Phase firms were usually supported by the 
final firms through the process of “interlinking transaction”, in which the owner of a final firm loaned the 
material and initial capital to a phase firm and by so doing secured the prices of the intermediate products 
that phase firm produced for it (Dei Ottati 2003b). Typically, these transactions were made through 
family networks. However, although phase firms usually owed credits to the final firms, final firms did 
not exert direct control of the management in phase firms. Instead, phase firms were allowed to receive 
contracts not only from their “parent” firms but also any other firm who might even be the competitor of 
the “parent” firm (Becattini 2001, 46). In such a system, know-hows and the latest information of fashion 
were transmitted freely among firms, and formed what Becattini (2001, 49) calls the “imitative 
resonance”.  Original ideas of one final firm were quickly learned by other final firms through their 
subcontracting phase firms, and feedbacks would later transmit back to the original firm. Becattini (2001, 
49) argues that this process created a mechanism of “collective intelligence” in the ID and helped the ID 
compete with mass producers outside. I show in Chapter 4 that similar “imitative resonance” has now also 
dominated the Chinese apparel production in Prato. 
Besides final firms, the role of the putter-out (terzista) and broker (impannatore) was also important in 
the local production network (Becattini 2001, 47; Piore and Sabel 1986, 215). Usually these were the 
people who had connections with both buyers outside and producers inside the ID. Therefore, these 
brokers formed the channels of market and technological information between global markets and the ID. 
As brokers accumulated his or her own capital, they would eventually become “final firms” in a real sense 
(Dei Ottati 1996, 38). 
Textile production in Prato was thus fragmented among thousands of phase firms which created a 
labyrinth-like network that no outsider could easily navigate. Many have argued that this is precisely the 
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reason why the ID on the one hand encouraged knowledge sharing inside, but on the other hand encrypted 
the knowledge that the ID firms produced from multinational producers (Rabellotti, Carabelli, and Hirsch 
2009). The model of Foreign Direct Investment in most cases simply did not work in the ID, since usually 
few foreign firms were able to insert themselves into the family networks. This complicated network of 
firms and brokers also built distinct retailing channels across Italy from the North to the South. These 
usually personalized retailing channels which relied on small independent retailers in fact created a “non-
tariff barrier” against foreign producers in the Italian domestic market (Becattini 2001, 36).  
As shown in Chapter 4, this typical distinction between final and phase firms along with this mechanism 
of “imitative resonance” was inherited by the Chinese immigrants and grafted to their apparel production 
with some important modifications. 
 
Fig. 3.4: Number of establishments in the textile industry in Prato, 1991-2001 (Dei Ottati 2009b, 1822) 
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3.4. Government and social institutions 
As indicated in Chapter 2, such a system of SMEs could not be practically imagined without mechanisms 
to somehow control the competition. In fact, what has made Prato so different from other IDs was that it 
created a formalized system of collective negotiation at the beginning of its formation. This system 
comprises institutions representing three different interests in Prato: (small and big) entrepreneurs, 
workers and the local governments. 
Entrepreneurs 
One of the characteristics for industrial district is the widespread entrepreneurship among its population. 
During the heyday of Prato’s industrialization in the 1950s, not only owners but also newly migrated 
sharecroppers worked “day and night” sorting rags, spinning, weaving and dyeing (Becattini 2001, 45). 
Violations of labor and environmental regulations were very common among these early enterprises, to a 
degree similar to what Chinese firms were doing later (Becattini 2001, 162). Such intensive competition 
among phase and final firms theoretically should have led to mass closures and vertical integration during 
the crises. However, Prato’s textile industry has shown strong resilience during past crises, and mass 
closures of phase firms only happened much later in the 1990s. What constituted this resilience? What 
kinds of mechanisms helped Prato overcome the previous economic crises?  
At the core of this resilience were social organizations of entrepreneurs that played an important role in 
mitigating the tensions between producers and buyers in the ID. There are three industrial associations 
dominating Prato’s business world. On the one side, there are the Confederazione nazionale artigianato 
pratese (Pratese Artisans’ Association for left-wing artisans) and Confartigianato (Catholic Artisan’s 
Association for right-wing artisans) who represent the interests of smaller producers who are mostly 
phase firms. Both are branches of nationwide organizations founded in the 1940s. On the other side, it is 
the Unione industrial pratese (Pratese Industrialists’ Association) who represents the interests of bigger 
industrialists and traders, usually the owners of final firms. UIP is also the branch of Confindustria at the 
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national level which was founded in 1910. These three associations have been the central actors in the 
Pratese economy since the 1950s. 
In 1958, an informal regulation of subcontracting was discussed and eventually put into effect through 
negotiations between associations.11 The regulation worked as “a complex table of rates” (Becattini 2001, 
51) that secured the minimal prices of intermediate products and was aimed to protect profits for both 
artigianati and industriali. In particular, this agreement had two functions. On the one hand, for 
industriali, it was to maintain the competitive advantage of costs over the producers outside the ID and 
guaranteed the overall quality of products. On the other hand, for artigianati, the agreement was to ensure 
“the preservation and reproduction of consensus” that secured market positions for its members. As 
Becattini (2001, 52) claims, through this first postwar agreement, “a sense of belonging” was thus 
constructed and formed the “institutional core” of the Prato ID. Since that point, these associations have 
proven to be very adaptive in each of the crises. During the major crisis in the 1990s, another 
Gentlemen’s Agreement was reached between these associations. However, this time in response to 
intensifying external pressures, associations agreed to liberate the prices of intermediate products but 
standardized the quality of intermediate products (Dei Ottati 2003c). By so doing, they became the major 
promoters for the ID’s upgrading. 
Workers 
Italy has always been a country with strong unionist tradition. At the national level, there are two trade 
unions, the Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro (CGIL) which stands for the left, and the 
Confederazione italiana sindacati lavoratori (CISL) which stands for the right. In Prato as well as in 
many other IDs, the Consiglio nazionale dell'economia e del lavoro (CNEL) is also influential for its 
stance with the small businesses. Although all these national unions have branches in Prato, their roles 
have been ambiguous in the history of Prato. 
                                                          
11 For a detailed record of negotiations one can read Becattini (2001, 51–3). 
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In fact, the birth of the Prato ID produced one of the major failures of organized workers’ movement in 
Prato. When the massive closures of vertically integrated companies occurred in 1950, strikes were 
organized by trade unions in order to stop the layoffs (Dei Ottati 2003c, 503–4). However, owners and 
workers eventually reached an agreement outside the purview of trade unions. By loaning the machines 
and financially investing in ex-workers’ enterprises, owners downsized their companies even with 
protests from the unions. During the following years, trade unions continued to be less powerful than the 
associations of entrepreneurs.  
 At the same time, trade unions seemed to also lose their popularity among migrant workers in Prato. 
Between the 1950 and 1970s, the population of Prato increased by 50% from 120,000 to 180,000 (ISTAT 
2012).  Among these new Pratese, the majority came from the South, in particular, the two cities of Panni 
and Bovino in the region of Puglia (Becattini 2001, 63).  Similar to the Chinese migrants, these Southern 
migrants arrived with families and formed their own organizations based on their places of origin. There 
are three major associations organized by the southerners. While the ICAS (Southerners’ Association of 
Prato) is the biggest one, the Cultural Association of Friends of Panni and the Cultural Association of 
Friends of Bovino organized cultural festivals every year (Becattini 2001, 63). These associations were 
able to maintain good relations with the local communist government and actively joined the 
entrepreneurs’ associations, since many of the first generation southerners became firm owners 
themselves. As Becattini (2001, 64) argues, one major reason for which Prato by and large avoided 
violent antagonisms between capital and migrant labor as happened in northern industrial metropolis was 
the mediation of these self-organized migrants’ associations. The problem of migrant labor was thus 
digested by the production network of Prato ID and transformed into the relations between final and phase 
firms, while the role of trade unions was replaced and circumvented by the entrepreneurs’ associations. 
Research institutes 
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When the first postwar crisis hit Prato in 1983, a group of textile entrepreneurs (mostly young 
entrepreneurs) formed the group and called themselves Pratofutura (Future Prato). According to its 
website, the mission of Pratofutura is to build “the cultural awareness of its members” and discuss “issues 
relating to the corporate culture, awareness of the advantages and nodes of an industrial district, the 
individual maturity together with the confrontation and debate, the experiences of a collective, the deep 
knowledge related to the business administration” (PratoFutura 2012). Therefore, a cultural identity of 
Prato ID was vigorously constructed by the PratoFutura through their series of meetings and research 
projects collaborating with local academics and activists on development issues of Prato. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, PratoFutura has become a major actor in dealing with the local tensions between Chinese and 
Italian companies, and designed a number of research and social projects which may open up potentiality 
of cooperation. 
Universities and schools are also important in the reproduction process of the ID. The Polo universitario 
"città di Prato" or Pin was the Prato campus of University of Florence as well as a society of local 
scholars. It was founded in 1992 also as an effort to stimulate innovation and “open to dialogue with 
companies and institutions that is desired by all” (Pin 2012). In practice, the Pin offers vocational courses 
to local entrepreneurs and gave classes on local issues to students at University of Florence. As discussed 
in Chapter 6, Pin was involved in the Tuscan-Zhejiang project and became a think-tank for local decision-
makers. The other major research institution is the Istituto tecnico industriale statale Tullio Buzzi di Prato 
(The Buzzi Technical School) which was the high-school equivalent research institute for textile 
technologies. These two institutions thus became the center for reproducing not only a new generation of 
entrepreneurs and textile workers but also the “cultural identity” of the industrial district.  
Local government 
Between 1950 and 1992 Italian politics was divided between the Democrazia Cristiana (Christian 
Democratic Party) and Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party). As a consequence, the 
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Italian electoral map comprised la zona bianca (the white zone of DC) and la zona rossa (the red zone of 
PCI) and did not change a lot until 1992 when political scandals and the collapse of Soviet Union 
dissolved the two parties and rearticulated the national hegemony. To a certain degree, this political map 
reconfirms the regional unevenness of the Italian economy in which la zona bianca represents the 
interests of northern industrial capitalists and the Catholic church while la zona rossa represents 
entrepreneurs of SMEs in the central part of the country including Prato.12 
Unlike their counterpart in neighboring countries such as France and Germany, the PCI was less 
concerned with a directly revolutionary program than what Beccattini (2001, 83) calls the “pragmatism” 
of Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna. This “constructive participation” became PCI’s leitmotif during WWII 
when guerillas had to seek supports from local entrepreneurial families (Becattini 2001, 78). Therefore, in 
return, during the postwar years, PCI was more like a mediator between labor and capital than the leader 
of proletarian revolution.13 “Luckily, between the pressure from ‘below’ and the rush of new problems, 
the rulers of Prato limited themselves essentially to ‘helping events along’ and avoided for the most part 
trying to force them against the grain of their uncomprehended logic” (Becattini 2001, 83). Even though 
after the Comune of Prato was won by the right wing in 2009, both the provincial and regional 
governments were still controlled by the left-wing coalition surrounding the Partito democratico della 
sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left, PDS). However, this pragmatic attitude towards the local 
development engendered many side effects. One of the main side effects was that Prato as a city was 
never carefully planned, and its urban space was composed by myriad of dead ends and one ways 
designed by individual companies. I show later that this particular spatial pattern has shaped the 
production network of the Chinese apparel firms in important ways. 
                                                          
12 For a detailed discussion of the changing red and white zones in the Italian politics see Agnew and Shin  (Agnew 
2002, chap. 5; Shin and Agnew 2008). For a comprehensive research on the economic unevenness of Italian regions 
and how that shaped Italy’s political economy, see Dunford and Greco (2006). 
 
13 This was partially the reason why radical workers did not agree with PCI and decided to form their own groups 
such as Autonomia (Lotringer and Marazzi 2007). 
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In short, there has been a network of social and government institutions that actively participated in the 
development of the Prato ID. Without their involvement, Prato’s ID could have ceased to exist during the 
various economic and social crises.  The Gentlemen’s Agreements saved Prato from malicious internal 
competition; associations of southern migrants relieved it from class war; a variety of research institutions 
constructed the local identity; and the leftist government was pragmatic towards economic issues.  
Although all these institutional contexts have contributed to maintaining Prato’s textile industry, an 
important question was whether they would continue to work as Chinese apparel firms emerged in Prato? 
In particular, for entrepreneurs’ associations, how do they recruit Chinese members and exert their 
influence in the apparel production? Are there going to be similar associations of migrants which mediate 
between Chinese immigrants and local community? How do research institutions perceive the current 
tensions in Prato and what suggestions have they given to local companies and authority? And finally, 
facing a foreign population which has yet been integrated, how do local governments “help things along” 
this time? These are important questions that I have to deal with in the later chapters. 
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Chapter 4: Production teams of the pronto moda 
“Fashion is a bubble. I’m not saying the design itself but the commercial part of fashion is a 
bubble.” 
Owner of a sourcing company, interviewed in Prato on March 23, 2012 
 
“Our model is actually no different from ZARA in terms of the model of business, but we 
are smaller and have no support from the capital market. We never have external support.” 
Wholesaler, interviewed in Rome on March 28, 2012 
 
This chapter asks: what makes the Chinese apparel industry in Prato survive the competitions from peer 
producers in other European countries and in China? GVC theories of industrial upgrading have shown 
that the apparel industry has the lowest requirement for capital and technology, and therefore is highly 
sensitive to costs, in particular, labor costs (Gereffi 1999). Developed countries including Germany and 
Japan were textile and apparel producers at the beginning of their industrialization, but in time rising 
labor costs squeezed local production (Gereffi and Frederick 2010). Chapter 3 showed that although the 
structure of the industrial district (ID) to some extent protected the textile production in Prato, Pratese 
textiles also faced the same cost pressures. Facing competition from newly industrialized countries, the 
Pratese textile industry has been contracting since the 1980s. Local textile companies had to either 
upgrade to high-end value chains supplying for high fashion brands, or they had to exit the industry. In 
fact, not only in Prato, but also in many other Italian IDs, different types of upgrading have been seen as 
one of the necessary ways to keep the manufacturing process in Italy (Rabellotti, Carabelli, and Hirsch 
2009). The Chinese apparel industry in Prato runs counter to this predominant story of industrial 
upgrading in a number of ways. 
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Since the apparel produced by Chinese in Prato are low-value products, several scholars have suggested 
that the emergence of the Chinese apparel industry might reflect a downgrading of the Pratese ID (Dei 
Ottati 2009a; Toccafondi 2009). Although the emergence of such low-value apparel might ruin the 
reputation of Made-in-Italy products, the phenomenal growth of Chinese apparel in Prato over the past 
decade seems to demonstrate the viability of this “downgrading” as a strategy for managing cost pressures. 
How could companies based in one of the most developed countries succeed in the cut-throat competition 
of the global apparel market? How could these companies keep their labor costs low enough to offset the 
high costs of other inputs such as rent and utilities necessarily incurred by producing in Italy? Is cheap 
labor the only reason to explain their success?  
The proliferation of apparel produced in Prato is even more surprising if we compare the Chinese apparel 
producers in Prato and those in China. Since the end of the Multi Fiber Agreement in 2004, China has 
become the biggest apparel exporter in the world (Gereffi and Frederick 2010). Driven by cheap labor and 
relatively well-constructed infrastructure, “the China cost” has been seen as the benchmark for sourcing 
companies. Therefore, why do Chinese entrepreneurs invest in manufacturing companies in Prato instead 
of in China? Is it because the apparel produced by Chinese in Prato is even cheaper than apparel produced 
in China? If not, is there any other reason that makes the Chinese apparel firms in Prato outcompete their 
colleagues in China at least in certain niche markets? What are the niche markets for Chinese apparel 
produced in Prato? As the studies in Eastern and Central Europe by Pickles et al. (2006) reveals, beyond 
labor costs, there are multiple institutional and spatial contexts determining the advantages of textile and 
apparel industry in one particular country and strategies of one particular firm.  A similar case of lower-
value apparel production in Haskovo, Bulgaria shows that local economic conditions and specific regional 
lower-value niche markets allow a clustering of some 2,000 garage firms prospered even under the 
competitive pressures of Chinese and Turkish imports (Begg et al. 2005; Pickles et al. 2006, 2317). 
Parallel to these cases, I try to investigate to what extent this is also the case in Prato. 
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I argue that the rise of the pronto moda is a unique response to the rise of fast fashion and the demand for 
regionalized production in Europe.  As many scholars have shown, the end of the MFA did not result in 
complete eradication of apparel production in higher-cost regions of the world (Abernathy, Volpe, and 
Weil 2006; Pickles and Smith 2011).  Because the new trend of fast fashion requires more fashion designs, 
faster replenishment, and smarter inventory control, some European apparel brands such as ZARA have 
retained a significant portion of their manufacturing in Europe and nearby regions (Tokatli 2008; Tokatli 
and Kızılgün 2009).  I argue that the business logics of the Chinese pronto moda in Prato are in fact very 
similar to these European fashion brands.  Meanwhile, as Becattini (2001, 13–4) argues, fashion market 
should be seen as a spectrum of highly segmented and diversified markets, and each niche market targets 
to very different groups of consumers.  He argues that studies of fashion industry should focus on how 
each niche market is created and defended against other niche markets. If this is right, then the Made-in-
Prato apparel might not actually compete with the either European fashion brands or Made-in-China.  
Instead, we should ask what specific niche market it occupies between the two. In this chapter, I argue 
that the rise of the Chinese pronto moda in Prato in fact supplements a particular gap between higher cost 
European fashion brands and lower cost Made-in-China imports.  To achieve this, the Chinese pronto 
moda depends on not only Chinese production teams in Prato, but also a horizontally integrated network 
of Chinese migrant traders across Europe.  In this chapter, I shall investigate the production teams in 
Prato, while in the next chapter I shall analyze its trade network across Europe. 
This chapter is divided into four parts. First, I briefly review the origin of apparel production in Prato. 
Unlike textile production, the apparel industry in Prato was not a major sector until the arrival of the 
Chinese. Chinese immigrants were first subcontractors of Italian apparel firms in the 1990s and gradually 
upgraded into final firms in the early 2000s. 14  Second, I introduce the production teams of the Chinese 
apparel industry in Prato. I focus on the different types of firms and actors involved in pronto moda and 
the ways in which they contract with each other. 
                                                          
14 For differences between phase firms and final firms, please read Chapter 3. 
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4.1. The origin of the pronto moda 
Although the textile industry has been dominant in the Pratese economy, there has always been an 
auxiliary, apparel industry which sourced local textile (Dei Ottati 2009a). The apparel industry in Prato 
gradually grew during the 1980s absorbing capital and workers from recently closed textile firms 
(Toccafondi 2009, 77–8). In the early 1990s, a small cluster of apparel firms emerged in the south of 
Prato. Compared with the Pratese textile industry which was upgrading quickly during the period, the 
apparel industry in Prato took off in a very different path from the beginning. Many of these Italian 
apparel companies survived by sourcing cheap, sometimes left-over textile from local textile 
manufacturers and produced for lower-cost markets in Europe. In fact, the term pronto moda was first 
invented by these Italian firms (Toccafondi 2009). The term is literally translated as “ready to wear” and 
reflects the nature of this business model to cater to the ever shortening turnover time in the fashion 
market. 
In many ways, the pronto moda system resembles the labor division between final firms and 
subcontractors in the Pratese textile industry. In pronto moda, final firms receive contracts from buyers 
outside the ID and subcontract production phases to different specialized firms. Similar to the Pratese 
textile industry, final firms are the organizers of the pronto moda value chains. In contrast to the textile 
industry, apparel manufacturing has fewer production phases. Operations such as stitching are simpler, 
and usually require less capital and technical skills. Apparel production in general can be divided into 4 
major phases: design, cutting, stitching and dyeing. In pronto moda, design and cutting are controlled by 
the final firms, while stitching and dyeing are subcontracted to other firms. Although phases such as 
cutting and dyeing have been automatized, productivity of stitching remains low, requiring more hours of 
manual labor. Stitching workers have to sit in front of a sewing machine and spend hours to produce a 
few hundred pieces of apparel. Indeed, stitching is so repetitive and tedious that very few young Italians 
now would like to work. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the low fertility rate and youth’s preference for 
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service sector has aggravated the labor shortage in Prato’s apparel industry, making Chinese labor a very 
good substitute for Italian apparel firms in Prato, particularly in their start-up phase. 
It took about two decades for Chinese immigrants to upgrade through the apparel value chains and to be 
on a par with the local textile industry as a major player in the Pratese economy. As Ceccagno (2007b) 
indicates, almost all of the first Chinese immigrants in Prato worked as stitchers for Italian apparel firms 
when they first arrived at Prato. Later when they acquired skills and enough capital to purchase sewing 
machines, some set up their own workshops. In just a few years between 1993 and 2001, the number of 
businesses registered by Chinese in Prato increased from 212 to 1,392, many of which were stitching 
workshops (Ceccagno 2003, 202). Thus, the Chinese pronto moda was a recent phenomenon which did 
not occur until the 2000s. Based on my own interviews, the first final firm headed by Chinese was 
founded in 2000, while the first Chinese dyeing company was founded in 2006. Since then the number of 
Chinese final firms has grown quickly. In 2001, there were already about 100 Chinese final firms 
(prontisti in Italian) working in the Chinese pronto moda (Ceccagno 2003, 203). According to Dei Ottati 
(2009a), Chinese apparel companies upgraded within the existing apparel value chains organized by 
Italian firms in favor of different types of Italian firms at each stage of their upgrading—that is, as 
migrant workers, they were welcomed by the Italian stitching workshops, and then as owners of stitching 
workshops, they were welcomed by the final firms. In the end, Dei Ottati and Toccafondi (2009a; 2009) 
argued, when they became direct competitors of the Italian apparel industry, no one is able to wipe them 
out. I agree with them that Chinese apparel firms inherited the general structure of the pronto moda from 
Italian precedents. However, as I show in the next section, the Chinese pronto moda is distinct in many 
ways. A number of new features were invented by Chinese entrepreneurs to accommodate the changing 
trends in the fashion market and the changing Italian regulations. The structure of the Chinese apparel 
production network therefore came out of the interaction between Chinese entrepreneurship and Italian 
institutional contexts. 
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4.2. Structure of the Chinese pronto moda 
The Chinese pronto moda is generally constituted by three types of companies: the final firms (caijian 
gongsi in Chinese, literally cutter firms), stitching firms/workshops (buyi gongsi in Chinese) and dyer-
washer (ranxi gongsi in Chinese), and they form the production teams in Prato. Final firms are organizers 
of the production and responsible of designing, cutting and wholesaling. Based on my interviews, there 
were between 700 and 800 Chinese final firms in Prato in 2011, about 20% of the total Chinese 
establishments (3,489) in the apparel sector (Camera di Commercio di Prato 2012). The number of 
Chinese dyer-washer was more limited. My interviews show that by the end of 2011, there were only 8 
dyer-washers headed by Chinese entrepreneurs. The main part of the Chinese apparel industry comprised 
thousands of stitching firms. Most of these were small- and medium-sized enterprises hiring less than 10 
workers. Beyond these three types of companies in the pronto moda, there are two other important types 
without whom the pronto moda would be impossible: the textile suppliers and buyer-wholesalers. While 
textile producers can be either in the ID or from the outside, the buyers usually come from all over Europe. 
In this chapter, I focus on the production teams in Prato but leave the textile suppliers and buyer-
wholesalers to the next chapter. 
Final firm 
Final firms are at the leader of the production teams and manage the most technical and value-added 
phase of the apparel production—designing. Since not every final firm is capable of designing their own 
model, their approach of innovation in many ways resembles that of the Pratese textile industry, the 
process Becattini (2001, 49) calls “imitative resonance” by which SMEs not only copy each other but also 
add their own piece of innovation into the design and technology. Early in March, some of the most 
established firms begin to bid the fashion of the coming summer. Information is collected through a 
variety of channels such as buyers, business partners and family members. In general, they imitate the 
designs of French and Italian high-fashion brands. More established firms who have relatives or business 
98 
 
partners in Paris and Milan will be able to obtain the clues in the fashion weeks or through “trend books” 
published by European fashion brands. Those companies who have no channel to collect fashion 
information will have to wait and see what most established colleagues produce. Those models that are 
proved to be best sellers on the market will be quickly imitated by these smaller companies with minor or 
no revisions. Besides “imitative resonance”, smaller companies can also produce some of the older 
models from the past year. From late February to early March, since no one knows the exact fashion trend 
of the summer, firms are producing in very small quantities (usually 100 to 200 pieces) for each design 
and each color, and constantly shifting from one model to another based on what other companies sell as 
well as on their own feedbacks from buyers. 
Although design is always important for the Chinese pronto moda, most of Chinese final firms do not 
have their own brands. As many claim in the interviews, even though some firms did own brands, their 
customers normally did not care. Some buyers might even explicitly ask for their orders unbranded. There 
are two reasons for Chinese final firms to be brand-less. First, since most of the final firms produce for 
lower-cost market, brand-name has little value and therefore is simply not a concern of their customers. In 
my interviews, brand names were usually regarded as less important than price and lead time by Chinese 
entrepreneurs. Second, because many of these companies imitate the designs of French and Italian lead 
firms, being brand-less is also a common way to avoid legal issues for their buyers. Therefore, while these 
firms have qualified themselves OEM and ODM, most of them are not OBM. Probably, the only 
exception is Giupel headed by a successful Chinese entrepreneur Xu Qiulin, who is the first and so far 
also the only Chinese member in the Unione Industriale Pratese (UIP) (La Nazione 2011).  However, my 
interview in 2013 showed that his company has quit the fast fashion market and transformed into a trader 
importing garments from China (Interview in Prato on 11/4/2013). 
The other production phase for final firms is buying and cutting fabric. Again, timing is important for this 
phase. Usually, when wholesalers all over the Europe close at 5 or 6 pm, they will contact the final firms 
and provide feedbacks on the models they bought. Based on feedbacks, final firms will revise their design 
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and prepare the next bundle of products. Given the intense competition of this market, they have to 
respond immediately. Normally, revised new designs will be ready by 7 pm. If revision is minor, final 
firms will use the existing storage of fabric. During the peak season, cutting can go overnight to make 
sure the clothes of the new design are received on the day after. 
In order to fulfill these two functions, final firms need a specific composition of workforce. Each final 
firm usually hires one designer who in most cases can be a family member of the owner or a shareholder 
of the company. In some cases, the designer is the owner him/herself.  Besides designer, the company 
also needs one or two cutters. Most of the Chinese final firms do not have computerized laser cutting 
machine and so require their cutters have manual cutting skills. In addition to the skill requirement, 
cutting cloths usually happens at night and requires extremely long hours of work. For these reasons, 
cutters are usually paid a lot more than other manual workers in the pronto moda. Larger final firms also 
have to hire one or two driver-helpers who are responsible of shipping, loading and arranging final 
products. For new established final firms these tasks are usually carried out by the owner and his/her 
family. 
In terms of their spatial pattern, Chinese final firms are mainly located in warehouses or former textile 
mills in the area of Macrolotto 1 to the southwest of the city. Abandoned by the Pratese textile companies, 
these warehouses are often more than 40,000 square feet in area and therefore are able to house an office, 
design room, at least one cutting machine, rolls of textile and final products. This area also has convenient 
access to the Autostrada 1, the major expressway traversing the country between Milan in the north and 
Naples in the south.  Fast delivery thus can be guaranteed.  I will discuss the spatial arrangement of the 
production teams in Chapter 6. 
Stitching firm 
Implied by its name, a stitching firm does nothing but sew clothes. Because the requirement for opening 
stitching firms is low, competition among stitching firms is more intense than among final firms. 
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Depending on its size, each final firm can partner with between 2 and 10 stitching firms. When final firms 
receive feedbacks from wholesalers in the late afternoon and make the new designs, owners of its 
partnered stitching firms will already get together at its front door and wait for the orders. Physical 
presence is a prerequisite for winning this competition. Normally, stitching firms evenly divide up the 
orders, with each stitching firm working on a few hundred garments. Again, timing is also important for 
the stitching phase. Between February and April, the owner of the stitching firm can decide either to work 
overnight or to work the day after. During the peak season however, most of stitching firms have no 
option but to work overnight in order to get the contract done by the next day. 
The size of the stitching firm varies more than the final firms. The average size of stitching firms seems to 
have increased in the past few years. Ceccagno (2003, 201) discovered that in 2002, firms which hire 10 
to 15 workers were considered to be large. Based on my interview, a medium-sized stitching firm 
normally has 8 to 10 workers while the biggest ones can have more than 50. There are in general three 
types of workers in the stitching firms: stitching workers (buyi gongren in Chinese), trimming workers 
(shougong in Chinese) and miscellaneous workers (zagong in Chinese). Stitching workers are indeed the 
foundation of the stitching firms and the entire pronto moda system. The majority of the workforce in 
stitching firms would be stitching workers. Although compared with the works of designers and cutters, 
stitching does not require many skills, the training of a qualified stitching worker normally takes one to 
two months, depending on the worker’s intelligence and determination. What is unique to stitching 
workers is that they are the only ones in pronto moda who are paid by pieces. For each piece stitched, a 
worker makes 0.5 euro, while the owner of the stitching firm makes the other 0.5 euro. During the heyday 
of pronto moda between 2002 and 2009, a diligent worker could easily make 2,000 to 3,000 euro in the 
peak season, i.e. between April and June. The stitched clothes often have broken knots and mismatched 
seams. These defects become very common particularly during the peak season when speed is the top 
priority for stitching. In these cases, the firm needs trimming workers to repair defected clothes. Based on 
my interviews, trimming requires even fewer skills than stitching and so is usually paid less than stitching 
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workers on a monthly base. Moreover, not every stitching firm needs trimming workers. For smaller 
firms, the owner and owner’s family would themselves work as trimming workers since it does not 
require too many skills. The last sort of work in the stitching firm belongs to miscellaneous workers. 
Their tasks also include indirect work, such as cooking, cleaning and sometimes shipping. Again, only big 
stitching firms are able to hire such workers. One of my interviewees claimed that he once worked for a 
big stitching firm with about 100 workers; to cater all the workers the firm had to hire a professional chef 
who worked for 12 hours a day. For smaller stitching firms, these miscellaneous works are also the 
responsibility of the owner and his/her family. 
By the nature of its intensive work, the stitching firm is usually a combination of home and workplace. 
Workers do not pay for food and lodging, although the quality of both sometimes may be considered low. 
Because they do not need a large space, these stitching firms are primarily located in the Macrolotto 0 
areas to the west of the walled medieval city of Prato. In most cases, the owner’s family would live 
together with workers and engage in the production with no visible privilege. It has been argued that this 
work ethic has been very common among Chinese businesses either in China and overseas, and creates a 
familial aura between the owner and workers, and thus mitigates the tensions between capital and labor in 
the workplace (Wright 2003; Lee 2009; Chen and Randolph 2009). 
Dyer-washer 
Being technology and capital intensive, these dyer-washers occupy an un-substitutable position in the 
production teams of pronto moda.  Depending on the design, clothes should either be dyed before or after 
being sewed. However, even though clothes have been dyed before sending to workshops, technically 
they still have to be washed before going back to the final firms.  Therefore, the work of dyer-washers 
guarantees the final quality of the products.  Once the clothes have been stitched, owners of stitching 
firms send the clothes directly to the dyer-washer, and here, clothes will be dyed and washed according to 
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specific requirements of the final firms. Normally the capacity of one dyer-washer can support the outputs 
of more than 5 final firms. 
The position of dyer-washers in the pronto moda is unique in two ways. First, compared with both final 
and stitching firms, dyer-washer requires much more technology and capital inputs. Therefore, until 
recently, most of dyer-washers were still owned by Italians. The first Chinese dyer-washer did not open 
until 2006 when an Italian dyer was accidentally involved in debts and reluctantly sold his company to a 
Chinese entrepreneur. By the time of my interview, there were 8 dyer-washers owned by Chinese, most of 
which opened in the past 2 years. Second, because of its skill requirements, dyer-washers were much 
more selective on their recruitment.15 Based on my interview, the biggest one headed by Chinese had 60 
to 70 workers including 8 Italians. Normally, final and stitching firms only hire Chinese workers, and 
only the most successful final firms, such as Giupel, have reasons and are able to enroll Italian designers. 
On the contrary, for dyer-washers, Italian technicians are claimed to be indispensable for the 
sophistication of dying formulas. Even for less skilled positions, dyer-washers are more selective than 
their colleagues. In one of the dyer-washers, Chinese workers were not hired in Prato as final and 
stitching firms normally do. Most of their Chinese workers were recruited through labor agencies directly 
from China. By so doing, the quality of skilled workers are ensured, while the labor cost was controlled. 
Textile producer 
In 2011, there were 219 Chinese textile producers in Prato.  Compared with 2,694 Italian-headed textile 
companies, the scale of the Chinese textile industry in Prato was still quite small. Similar to what happens 
to dyer-washers, the know-how and capital requirement for machinery have so far excluded Chinese 
entrepreneurs from this sector.  I do not intend to investigate the internal structure of the textile industry 
in Prato. Instead, I focus on its relations with the Chinese apparel industry in the city. As discussed in 
                                                          
15 For a detailed study of the Chinese labor market in Prato, one must read Fladrich (2009). I also analyze the 
contribution of this peculiar labor market to the competitive advantage of the Chinese apparel industry in Prato later 
in the next section. 
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Chapter 1, there has been a debate on whether or not a synergistic relation exists between the Chinese 
apparel industry and the Italian textile industry in Prato. Based on my interviews, such synergistic relation 
seems not to be the case for most firms.  
“We source both locally and from China. Recently Turkish textiles become very popular and 
have good price-quality ratio. As of our company, we source local textile for winter clothes 
but mostly imported textile for summer.” 
Chi, about 40, owner of a final firm, interviewed in Prato on March 23, 2012  
“It (using Italian textile) is very difficult. One time when a government commission from 
Zhejiang came, as a gift for local community, they said they would like to buy something 
that Italian governments suggested. In Toscana, they recommended wine and textile. Wines 
were good and the Zhejiang government was able to make companies to buy them up. 
However, for textile, no one willed to buy, because Italian textiles are way too expensive for 
them. On the one hand, China now produces the most diverse textiles in the world by huge 
quantity. On the other hand, even though the quality of Italian textile is relatively higher, 
high quality is not necessary for our market. Textiles made in China are good enough for our 
companies in Prato. This is why many companies here import textiles from China.” 
Su, in one of the Chinese associations, interviewed in Prato on February 22, 2012 
Further interviews confirm the gap between the Chinese pronto moda and Italian textile manufacturers in 
Prato (Author’s interviews Nov. 2013).  Most of the informants claimed that about 70% of their fabrics 
were made in China.  Even though some of them source from the Italian textile companies in Prato, most 
of the fabrics sold by Italian traders are also imported from China.  Only between 20% and 30% of their 
fabrics are actually manufactured in Prato.  In recent years, companies have also begun to source Turkish 
fabrics, although the percentage of Turkish fabrics is still small comparing to Made-in-China. While the 
majority of Pratese textiles supply high fashion brands such as Prada and Gucci, the Chinese-made 
apparel mostly go to street markets in Europe (interviews at UIP on March 16, 2012). 
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Tab. 4.1 Internal structure of the Chinese pronto moda (Source: compiled from author interviews) 
 Function(s) Workforce Skill requirement Value added 
Final Firm Designing 
and cutting 
5 to 10, mostly Chinese. In rare 
cases, Italians are hired as 
designer. 
Medium Large 
Dyer-Washer Dyeing and 
washing  
50 to 70, mostly Chinese. Italian 
technicians are always required 
for making dyeing formulas. 
High Large 
Textile Producer Supplying 
textile 
Varies from 10 to 100, see 
Chapter 3. 
High Medium 
Stitching Firm Sewing 8 to 50, all Chinese. Low Small 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Production teams in the Chinese pronto moda (author’s interviews 2011-2013) 
 
4.3. Competitive advantage of the production teams 
It is misleading to ask why Chinese apparel produced in Prato is competitive in the global market. In fact, 
its success is always partial and conditioned on a number of limits in the fashion markets. Here, 
Becattini’s (2001, 13–14) theorization for Prato’s textile industry can also be applied to the Chinese 
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apparel industry in Prato. He adopts a Marshallian concept of niche markets which sees every producer to 
a certain degree works in its own specific niche market. In particular in the fashion markets, there could 
be thousands of niche markets available for highly variegated products. Therefore, Becattini argues, 
instead of thinking competition as one product swallowing up shares of others, the correct way of 
conceptualizing fashion markets has to take account of the degree of diversification and the way in which 
niche markets are created and defended. In another word, whenever we ask what makes the Chinese 
pronto moda competitive, we always need to ask competitive in what specific context and against whom. 
Based on a variety of literature and my own research, there are at least four advantages of the Chinese 
apparel production network in Prato:  low labor costs, untraded interdependency, its fashion elements and 
niche markets (Ceccagno 2009; Dei Ottati 2009b). In this chapter, I focus on the first two but leave the 
rest to the next chapter.  
Labor 
The most apparent advantage of pronto moda is the low cost of labor. Dei Ottati (2009b, 1829) asserts 
that the success of Chinese pronto moda relies on an labor market that is cheap and flexible but exclusive 
to the Italian companies.  But there are questions that remain to be answered. Why is this labor so cheap 
and flexible? Why it is exclusive to the Italian employers? Why is it Prato not anywhere else which 
allows such a Chinese labor market of such a scale to exist? To what extent is cheap labor a competitive 
advantage of the Chinese apparel produced in Prato? Finally, if its labor is indeed comparatively cheap, 
whose labor do we compare it with? 
I discuss in Chapter 3 that the institutional contexts, i.e., the ban on self-employment for Chinese until 
1998 and constraints on resident permits thereafter have produced and still keep producing a distinction 
between documented and undocumented workers. The effect of institutional contexts is reinforced by the 
preexisting social norms within the Chinese community which define the optimal, upgrading path of 
individual immigrants. Under both external (from the Italian regulatory institutions) and internal (within 
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the Chinese community) pressures, Chinese migrant workers are locked in a disadvantaged position in the 
ethnic economy, and have to make themselves both cheap and flexible. I have analyzed in Chapter 3 how 
the cultural mechanisms in the Chinese migrant community offer better opportunities for individual 
entrepreneurship for Chinese migrant workers. Here, I would like to dig into this process and ask why 
Chinese workers prefer to work in the ethnic enclave, while Chinese employers prefer to hire Chinese 
workers. 
First, some of Chinese workers are willing to stay in the ethnic enclave because there are more 
possibilities for their own entrepreneurship in future. Even though they want to work for Italian 
employers, the major obstacle for them to work outside the ethnic enclave is a resident permit. Without 
resident permits, migrant workers are not allowed to be employed by Italian employers. 
“It is very normal to work for more than 14 hours and only sleep for 2 hours (for apparel 
workers in Prato). I used to work just like that. I believe people (undocumented workers) in 
America have a much humanitarian working hours, right? Now since I got the resident 
permit, I only work for Italians. But Italians have already known how Chinese people work. 
We used to work eight hours per day (for Italian firms) but now they ask for 12 hours. They 
paid a little bit more for overtime hours, though... If I could not find a job here in Turin, I 
will go back to Prato soon.” 
Stitching worker, interviewed in Turin on December 23, 2012 
 
“A residence permit in Italy usually costs 20,000 euro for Chinese, and if there’s another 
Chinese who plays as intermediate in the deal, another 5,000 euro would be paid to this 
intermediate. Since amnesties are now hopeless, (…) it is usually through domestic worker 
program.” 
Owner of a stitching firm, interviewed in Turin, January 11, 2012 
For a diligent worker who worked for a successful workshop during the heyday of the early 2000s, she or 
he could make more than 2,000 euro a month. Thus, a resident permit usually amounts to their one-year’s 
saving, let alone the money they paid to snakeheads (organizers of human trafficking) on their way to 
Italy (normally 120,000 yuan or approximately 12,000 euro between 2002 and 2008). Even though 
Chinese migrant workers, in particular the newer generation, increasingly prefer to work for Italian 
employers for better pay and working conditions, the barrier to get a resident permit is often unbearable 
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for them. Based on my interviews, most of Chinese immigrants, entrepreneurs and workers alike, 
obtained their resident permits by borrowing money from their more established family members in Italy. 
The current economic crisis in Italy makes the situation even worse. On the one hand, because of the 
economic downturn, apparel workers now can only make about 1,000 euro in 2011 and 2012, half the 
salary of the early 2000s (remember, stitching workers are paid by piece). It would take longer for them to 
accumulate sufficient funds to purchase a permit. On the other hand, the Italian government has reduced 
the number of resident permits issued since 2008 and thus made the price of a permit increase (see 
Chapter 5 and 6). 
The way that Chinese labor is made cheap and excluded from the mainstream economy is, in this sense, 
similar to what happens to the Mexican labor in American cities (De Genova 2005). As De Genova 
argues, by continuously creating the social and economic boundary between legal and illegal, and by 
confining the illegal in specific sectors and positions, the migrant workers are successfully devalued and 
made disposable (Wright 2003).  What makes my case in Italy different is that unlike the Mexican 
laborers who found no job opportunities except for those in the low-skilled service sectors, Chinese 
migrant workers in Italy are pushed into the manufacturing sector that their co-ethnic entrepreneurs have 
built.  These Chinese workers are luckier than the Mexicans in the US in the sense that they are offered a 
defined upgrading path, no matter how blurred it has become in the recent years. Therefore, Chinese 
migrant workers prefer to work in the Chinese ethnic enclave, while Chinese employers prefer to hire 
Chinese workers who are cheaper and more flexible than Italian workers.  
This exclusion of Chinese labor from the mainstream economy is less obvious in other Italian cities than 
in Prato. As Cologna (2012) reveals, particularly in Milan, more and more Chinese immigrants have left 
the manufacturing sector and diversify themselves into service sectors such as bars and barber shops. 
Indeed, the gloomy working conditions of apparel sweater shops are undesirable for any human being, 
and so many a Chinese immigrants want to leave the apparel industry if they ever have a chance. Cologna 
argues that by joining the more socially and spatially “open” service sectors, Chinese immigrants have 
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more chances to be familiar faces to the locals, and therefore enjoy better degree of social integration. In 
Milan, many of the second generation have indeed left the ethnic economy and successfully joined the 
mainstream economy.  
Why is this process not happening in Prato? Why does Prato keep attracting Chinese apparel workers? 
Why does the Chinese economy in Prato fail to diversify its sectors? My research shows that there are 
four main reasons that make such transformation less likely in Prato. First, in Italy, institutional contexts 
make some industries less possible, if not impossible, for foreigners than others. Indeed, this is part of the 
reason why the diversification of the Chinese occupations came late even in Milan. It is true that in the 
past decade Italian economic policies have been liberalized and more sectors have been opened to foreign 
nationals including Chinese.  For instance, there used to be restrictive requirements for foreigners to open 
a wholesaling business in Italy, but these limitations were removed only in 2007. Many wholesalers 
whom I interviewed indicated that this was the major reason for a surge in the number of Chinese 
wholesalers nationwide after 2007. On the contrary, the businesses such as gas station were still under 
restriction as of 2011, and so there still could not be any Chinese gas station. The current economic crisis 
was supposed to accelerate the process of liberalization under the pressure of European Central Bank. To 
“boost competition”, in 2012, the Monti government released a number of new licenses for taxi drivers 
but faced massive protests across the country (Hornby 2012; Emsden 2012). Even today, a Chinese taxi 
driver in Italy is legally impossible. 
Second, the Pratese economy simply does not offer many opportunities beyond the manufacturing sector. 
Based on Prato Chamber of Commerce statistics (2012), in 2011, there were in total 33,176 businesses 
registered in Prato among which 9,307 were in the manufacturing sector. Thus even for local Italian 
people, manufacturing companies were still the biggest employers. As for businesses registered by 
Chinese immigrants, 3,954 out of in total 5,209 were manufacturers. As discussed earlier, beyond apparel 
manufacturing and related commerce, there were institutional barriers for Chinese in other sectors. 
Moreover, it is not only because Chinese immigrants lack capital and skills as in the case of the textile 
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industry, but also because in other industries Chinese have not created “untraded interdependencies” and 
thus have to pay much higher entry costs. For instance, in 2011, there were 1,240 construction companies 
registered by foreign nationals in Prato, among which only 32 were headed by Chinese. On the contrary, 
544 construction firms were run by Albanians and 285 by Romanians. I do not intend to study the 
differentiated privileged sectors for different immigrant groups in Prato. Why this differentiated 
occupational pattern among immigrant groups occurred in Prato remains a question. Instead, I only want 
to show that there are both institutional and social (interracial) costs for Chinese immigrants to enter into 
certain industry. The differences between the number of Chinese businesses and total businesses by 
sectors in Prato clearly show the pattern (below). While the concentration in the manufacturing sectors 
was significant in the Pratese economy, this concentration for Chinese immigrants was even more 
aggravated. 
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Fig. 4.2: Predominant role of manufacturing sectors in Prato 
Source: Author’s illustration of data from the Prato Chamber of Commerce 
Third, by its rapid development in the past two decades, Prato gained its reputation as “the first stop for 
Chinese immigrants in Italy”. Because of the low skill and language requirement for working in the 
apparel sector, since the 1990s newly arrived Chinese immigrants nearly always headed to Prato for their 
first job. According to Cologna, this was also part of the reason why the social hostility toward Chinese 
was most visible in Prato.16 Upon arrival at Prato these Chinese migrant workers typically had little 
knowledge about the Italian culture or even the urban culture in general (in China, they were migrant 
workers/petite entrepreneurs from rural areas). Their personal habits such as spiting on the street were 
widely criticized by local Pratese people. My interviews also confirm that nearly all of my Chinese 
interviewees lived and worked in Prato for a while as their first stop. Although the actual situation of job 
opportunities in Prato has changed a great deal since 2010, this reputation and associated symbolic value 
as “the easiest place to find a job” (Ma, interviewed on December 23, 2012) still persists. Many of the 
                                                          
16 Personal conversation with Daniele Cologna in Milan on January 12, 2012. 
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unemployed Chinese immigrants go back to Prato to find a job as apparel worker, despite the generally 
low wages available to them. To a certain extent, Prato has become the first and last resort for Chinese 
immigrants in Italy. 
Finally, the cheap labor in pronto moda also comes from the self-exploitation of the business owners. In 
Chinese apparel firms, stitching firms and final firms alike, owners and their family often contribute a 
large amount of labor into production. As Ceccagno (2007a) argues, both workers and owners have been 
sacrificing their family time in return for longer work hours. My research also confirms that particularly 
in stitching workshops, owner’s family always works side by side with workers. In addition, stitching 
workshops normally provide free food and lodging for workers even when there is no contract. By so 
doing, owners are able to create a paternalistic aura within the workshop and so stabilize the workforce. 
Previous research has shown that this work ethic is in fact very common in Chinese businesses either in 
China (Wright 2003) or overseas (Lee 2009). It has been reported that the limited overhead for manager 
salaries is one of the most important competitive advantages of overseas Chinese companies compared 
with western companies, such as the cases of construction companies in Africa (Pheng and Jiang 2003). 
All these conditions contribute to a labor market that is cheap and large enough for the Chinese apparel 
industry in Prato. As 10 of 10 owners of Chinese apparel firms confirm, labor cost is indeed one of the 
most important competitive advantage for their business. I have analyzed why the Chinese migrant labor 
in Prato is cheaper and more flexible than the Italian labor. However, it would be unrealistic to argue that 
the Chinese labor in Prato costs less than the Chinese labor in China, or even the Chinese labor in other 
European countries. If the Chinese labor in Prato is actually more expensive than that in China, why is the 
apparel produced by Chinese in Prato still more competitive than those from China in niche markets? If 
labor cost is cheaper in countries such as Spain and Hungary, why do Chinese companies still adhere to 
Prato? To answer these questions, more dimensions have to be brought into our analysis. 
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Untraded interdependency 
In fact, the Chinese apparel industry does not solely rely on cheap labor. Its particular structural pattern 
also contributes to its competitiveness. By structural advantages, I refer to a set of advantages generated 
by the internal structure of the Chinese production network in Prato. In particular, these advantages 
include transaction cost, flexibility of production and power of innovation. I show that this structural 
pattern and its advantages resemble the Pratese textile industry in many ways, and that is the reason why 
the Chinese apparel producers in Prato are able to outcompete producers in other parts of Europe. 
In the Chinese apparel industry in Prato transaction costs are successfully controlled by the “untraded 
interdependencies” among producers. As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key concepts for the 
Florentine school of industrial district is contextual or un-codified knowledge as opposed to systematic or 
codified knowledge (Becattini 2001, 9). The un-codified knowledge includes those skills, transactions and 
innovations that are shared among ID workers and entrepreneurs but cannot be easily taught through 
textbooks. The sharing of such un-codified knowledge relies on the mutual trust among players which in 
most cases means the spatial proximity among players. To conceptualize the importance of spatial 
proximity and local conventions in regional economies, Storper (1997) introduced the notion of untraded 
interdependency which subsumes all the uneconomic stickiness between actors in a regional economy. In 
my case, untraded interdependencies plays an important role in creating the mutual trusts between 
immigrants and thus reducing the uncertainty of transactions. 
Two types of untraded interdependency exist in the Chinese pronto moda between workers and employers, 
and between ID companies. First, there is mutual trust between Chinese workers and Chinese employers. 
My research also shows there usually is no written labor contracts between employers and employees in 
the Chinese pronto moda, in particular, in the stitching firms. Whenever there is a labor dispute in the 
Chinese business, workers are easily disadvantaged with no external supports. Then what guarantees the 
mutual trust between the labor and capital in the Chinese pronto moda? I argue there are two main 
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reasons: one inside the Chinese community and one outside. As I discussed earlier, there is a social 
mechanism in the Chinese community that allows immigrants to quickly accumulate their capital and 
themselves become entrepreneurs. In short, new immigrants agree to work for their employers for a 
certain period of time with low pay, in return for their employer’s financial supports later when workers 
pay off their debts and want to set their own business. This process normally takes 3 to 5 years during 
which uncertainty always looms. Thus, for most workers, at least during the first 3 to 5 years, they are 
willing to trade off part of their labor rights for a potential opportunity of becoming self-employed. This 
mutual trust is also maintained by the employer who usually tries to create a familial milieu in the 
workplace. The owner’s family (normally he, his wife and sometimes adult children) almost always work 
and eat amid workers with little feeling of privilege. Workers are usually taken care of as members of the 
family. Although as I show in Chapter 5 that the labor relations in the Chinese pronto moda are far from 
harmony, the open cases in which workers broke up with their employers were not very frequent based on 
the number of workers and businesses in Prato. The following words from an owner of a stitching firm 
are convincing: 
“It is not good for them (workers) to change boss too often. I myself worked in the same 
stitching firm for the first 5 years and then got enough funds to open my own company. 
Workers who changed their jobs too often will have difficulties to find another job. Because 
our jobs are mostly seasonal, many workers have to leave the company during the summer. 
Depending on the market, our workforce will be adjusted throughout the year. Therefore, 
only the most loyal workers are kept all the time. If one changed jobs too often, her/his 
friends would be reluctant to recommend her/him to new employers, and employers would 
question her/his loyalty to the company. Those who are not loyal will be the last to be 
employed even during the peak season. Also, since we are immigrant’s business, we all 
don’t want to bring in trouble makers. So I always tell these ‘kids’ (xiaohaizi, referring to the 
workers) to be loyal and this is good for them as well.” 
Owner of an apparel firm, interviewed in Prato on 1/16/2012 
At the first glance, it might contradict to the fact that more Chinese workers are now willing to work for 
Italian employers as I mention earlier, as indicated by Cologna (2012) and Ceccagno (2009). However, I 
want to argue that in fact these workers who now prefer working for Italians were no longer those who 
preferred staying in the ethnic sector. On the one hand, in recent years, the possibility of upgrading for 
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Chinese apparel workers has shrunk as the markets of pronto moda were quickly saturating (Ceccagno 
2007b). In particular, since the Italian debt crisis beginning in 2010, it has been less likely for workers to 
open their own firms, when existing apparel firms started facing a hard time and many have closed down. 
The number of apparel firms has dropped from 4,476 in 2010 to 4,338 in 2012 (Camera di Commercio di 
Prato 2012). On the other hand, as Cologna (2012) rightly points out, new immigrants from China are 
becoming less submissive and less willing to take drudgeries such as apparel stitching. After dramatic 
economic growth in the past two decades, both Zhejiang and Fujian have become the most developed 
provinces in China. Going back to China has become an option much more viable than before. My 
research shows that at least in the spring of 2012, many workers indicated their hesitation about whether 
or not staying in Prato. Many employers were also worried about an upcoming labor shortage in the Fall. 
For these new workers, working for Italians means better wage and work condition. The traditional social 
mechanism for upgrading in the Chinese Italian community simply no longer worked for them. All these 
factors are undermining the untraded interdependency between workers and employers in the years of 
crisis. 
The second untraded interdependency exists between contracting companies in the Chinese pronto moda. 
If the first interdependency explains why Chinese workers are willing to trade off short-term income for 
long-term financial supports, this second interdependency tries to explain why Chinese companies are 
more willing to (sub)contract with co-ethnic companies if contracting with Italian companies means 
higher payback. It does not necessary mean that all Chinese companies only contract with co-ethnic 
companies. In fact, some of the most successful final and stitching firms have been working for Italian 
fashion brands for many years, as shown by Ceccagno (2007b). However, even though Italian fashion 
brands pay much more for their orders, there are still many Chinese companies willing to stay with co-
ethnic partners. In another word, they are willing to trade off a portion of their profit in favor of 
something else. What do they want in this seemingly irrational strategy? Among other factors, my 
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research finds that many Chinese companies are concerned with the uncertainties of the Italian contracts 
and their disadvantaged position whenever dispute occurs. The following story is telling in this sense: 
“Working for Italian apparel firms means two things at the same time. Italian firms usually 
pay much more, but in the increasing number of cases, they are prone to delay the payment. 
Delay may last as long as 6 months and after that, the company may simply declare 
bankruptcy. They know that Chinese usually pay no taxes, use undocumented labor, and so 
are reluctant to sue them. Therefore, working for Italian firms also means to bear more risks.” 
Owner of a stitching firm, interviewed in Prato on 1/16/2012 
There could be other reasons for why Chinese firms prefer to subcontract with Chinese firms, such as 
many Chinese stitching companies not having sufficient skills to meet the quality requirement of Italian 
brands. However, in my interview, these reasons have been identified as less important, since stitching 
does not require high skills. Still, I do not want to exclude other reasons and will leave this question for 
future research. 
The interdependency among Chinese labor and companies not only guarantees the low cost of Chinese 
apparel produced in Prato, but also makes it adaptive the market tastes in terms of its fast turnover time. 
Mutual reliance between Chinese workers and their employers allows companies, in particular stitching 
companies, to work much longer and much more flexibly than potential Italian competitors. Some 
scholars have reported the extra-long hours that apparel workers work in Prato (Chen and Randolph 2009). 
My research shows the work-day for stitching workers can be as long as 12 hours a day and 7 days a 
week during the peak season such as April and September. This certainly violates the Italian labor law 
which determines the working day should not exceed 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week (Act n.196/1997, 
Sect. 13) (Matteis, Accardo, and Mammone 2011). But interviews with workers also indicate that many 
stitchers agree to these long hours in order to make more money. Comparing with Italian stitching firms 
that pay monthly wage disregarding the individual output, the Chinese stitching firms pay by piece and 
thus motivate the workers much better. Although in the end workers may receive a worse per piece rate, 
they nevertheless make more monthly wage by producing more output. Based on this extremely flexible 
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and adaptive labor, the Chinese pronto moda is able to deliver new designs much faster than its 
competitors. 
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Chapter 5: Trade network across Europe 
In the previous chapter, I have shown how the production teams work in Prato.  Based on low-cost (and 
sometimes irregular) labor and close connections between stitching workshops and final firms, the 
production teams in Prato are able to deliver new fashion designs much faster than their competitors 
elsewhere.  In this chapter, I continue to explore the competitiveness of the pronto moda.  In particular, I 
show that the competitive advantage of the pronto moda depends on a horizontally integrated network of 
Chinese traders living across Europe. These migrant traders offer the manufacturers latest fashion trends, 
immediate market feedback, and an expanding wholesale network in a number of Western and Southern 
European countries.  Although the pronto moda does not have a renowned brand, its business model is in 
a sense very similar to that of ZARA and other fast fashion brands. 
Based on data provided by the Prato Chamber of Commerce (Camera di Commercio di Prato) (2012), I 
shall explore the major markets of the Chinese pronto moda and the sources of the textile inputs to pronto 
moda.  The Prato Chamber of Commerce provides international export and import data between Prato and 
foreign countries: http://www.po.camcom.it/servizi/datistud/index.php. However, there are two major 
problems in this dataset. First, it does not record domestic trades between Prato and other Italian 
provinces. Therefore, in this chapter, I only focus on the transnational imports/exports. Meanwhile, the 
trade data does not distinguish between the apparel produced by Chinese firms and by Italian firms. To 
cope with this problem, my hypothesis is that because about 83% of the apparel firms in Prato were 
registered by Chinese in 2011, the performance of the Chinese apparel from Prato is equivalent to the 
performance of the Pratese apparel. I do not deny the potential problems with this hypothesis. For 
instance, although small in number, the 731 Italian apparel firms might be supplying higher-end markets 
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and thus contribute more value in trade. Limited by data availability, I have to leave this question to 
future research. 
This chapter is divided into three parts.  Section 1 continues to discuss the competitiveness of the pronto 
moda but from the perspective of its trader network across Europe.  I argue that a large part of the 
competitiveness of the pronto moda in fact lies outside Prato.  Section 2 questions how this trade network 
impacts the ways in which apparel firms in Prato source fabrics, while Section 3 analyzes how it support 
the exports of Made-in-Prato garments to other European countries. 
5.1. Competitiveness outside Prato 
My research shows that the buyers of pronto moda are located across all major European countries, and 
some of the most successful final firms even claim to have exported to Canada and the US. More 
importantly, the wholesale networks are increasingly controlled by ethnically Chinese migrants. This is in 
line to what Ceccagno (2007b) shows, in 2006, many Chinese entrepreneurs in Italy moved to places such 
as Spain and Greece and transformed into export-import wholesalers for Chinese apparel. Many 
informants claimed that more than 50% of their buyers in France and Spain were in fact Chinese migrants.  
These Chinese traders have not only controlled the apparel wholesaling of the low-end fast fashion in key 
cities such as Paris and Madrid, some of them have also begun to develop their own retail chains.  As one 
of the informants claimed, “now even if you go to those little French towns, you can find Chinese apparel 
stores here and there” (Interviewed in Wenzhou, 6/13/2011). 
There are in general two kinds of Chinese wholesalers that people sometimes conflate. The first kind is 
those who specialize in importing finished apparel from China. In Italy, there are two clusters of these 
Chinese importers: Milan and Rome. Based on my interviews, Milan used to be the center of the 
wholesaling of Chinese goods, although its position was replaced by Rome recently because of the 
unfavorable business environment in Milan and its long distance to main harbors.  The enforced 
renovation of the area of Paolo Sarpi and subsequent clashes between Chinese entrepreneurs and local 
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police in 2007 accelerated the decline of Milan as a trading center for Chinese goods (Cologna 2008). 
Instead, Rome benefiting from its closeness to Naples (one of the main harbors in Europe for Chinese 
goods) and its friendlier environment became the largest center for Chinese wholesalers in the 1990s.  
Most of these wholesalers frequently travelled back to China and placed orders only after face-to-face 
meetings with manufacturers in Zhejiang and Guangdong. Only a small number of wholesalers own 
factories in China. In fact, many of my interviewees indicated that owning factories in China was not 
always a good option due to its management costs and fixed capital inputs. Because of the unstable 
demands of the European fashion market, wholesalers would rather trade off a portion of profit for more 
flexibility. These wholesalers in Milan and Rome usually do not source apparel from Prato and 
sometimes are even in direct competition with the Chinese pronto moda. I compare their competitive 
advantage with the Chinese producers in Prato in the next section. 
The second kind of wholesaler is those based in other European countries. Different from those based in 
Italy, these wholesalers source apparel both from Prato and from China. For them, there is a hierarchy 
among cities. Usually, Rome and Prato are identified as the first tier. Rome is the main sourcing place for 
Made-in-China apparel while Prato is the place for Chinese Made-in-Italy.  A number of European capital 
cities serve as the second tier centers for their regional markets. For instance, Paris and Madrid serve as 
the major centers for Chinese apparel sold in France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal, while Budapest serves 
as the center for Eastern European countries (Ceccagno 2007b). Under these cities, there are national 
centers for smaller countries and subnational centers. For instance, Lisbon is the center for Chinese 
wholesalers in Portugal. In general, a wholesaler at each level would source products from their 
respective higher level centers. In one of my interviews, a Chinese wholesaler based in Lisbon has to 
make monthly visits to Madrid, Paris and Prato in order to keep her repertoire up to date. These 
wholesalers are the ones who send regular feedbacks to the Chinese final firms in Prato and are arguably 
the major buyers for the Chinese apparel produced in Prato. 
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Fashion 
Flexibility of Chinese firms and their closeness to European fashion centers make their products more 
fashionable than their competitors elsewhere. I introduced Becattini’s (2001) concept of the “imitative 
resonance” in the previous chapter. Similar to what happens to the Italian textile industry in Prato, the 
final firms of the Chinese pronto moda adapt to the most up-to-date fashion by imitating each other. This 
is one of the biggest advantages that the Chinese pronto moda possesses. Compared with producers in 
China, or even in other less developed countries close to Europe, the Chinese apparel producers based in 
Prato have faster and more effective channels to learn the newest fashion at least in the European market. 
Their location in Italy thus plays a central role here. Spillover effects of the Italian fashion industry 
sometimes even directly contribute to the innovation power of the Chinese pronto moda. As I mentioned 
before, many Chinese final firms and stitching firms are still supplying Italian fashion brands. New 
designs and fashion trends are thus learned by these direct subcontractors and subsequently copied by all 
other participants in pronto moda.  
We need to go back to the division between codifiable knowledge and un-codifiable knowledge. Becattini 
(2001, 12) is right that Prato’s success has by and large depended on its innovation of un-codifiable 
knowledge which can only be presented and learned by participating in local-based production, that is, 
only in Prato. Here, the un-codifiable knowledge includes not only the technology and the genuine way of 
organizing production through small firms, but also the very idea of what is fashionable and what is not. 
In fact, as many pointed out in my interviews, Prato has never been a place where large scale R&D 
occurred and large amount of research capital concentrated. Local scholars also admit that Prato’s 
innovation is “soft”: Pratese producers might have pioneered a particular style of weaving and a new 
complication of different fibers, but never actually invented a new weaving machine or a type of new 
synthetic fiber (Author’s interview at the Buzzi School in Prato on March 21, 2012). Meanwhile, many 
scholars (Rabellotti 2004; Rabellotti, Carabelli, and Hirsch 2009) have argued that the production 
network of Italian IDs has so far been impenetrable by foreign capital precisely because its way of 
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innovation and its closure to outsiders. This then leads to a necessary question: to what extent can the un-
codifiable knowledge be learned by Chinese migrants? 
“(Talking about cooperation with Chinese apparel firms in Prato) It turned out to be very 
difficult because the Italian entrepreneurs are actually very afraid of such cooperation of 
technology with the Chinese. Among innovations, they are most afraid of the cooperation of 
fashion innovation. So I don’t know if they really made the right decision.” 
Leader of the Prato Futura, interviewed in Prato on 2/15/2012 
Italian entrepreneurs may be right to have worries. My research indeed suggest that fashion can be 
learned. Although back in these migrants’ hometown, Wenzhou, a similar model of regional economy has 
been developed based on small and medium-sized enterprises in the past three decades, many of the 
characteristics of the Chinese pronto moda are in fact inherited from the Italian production network. 
Moreover, by participating in the Italian apparel value chains, fashion as one of the most intangible 
knowledge has been “learned” and incorporated into their production practices by Chinese designers. 
However, we have to be careful about what learning means here. In the pronto moda, Chinese companies 
merely learn what has been announced and procured by the Italian brands, but so far, there is no evidence 
that these companies have been able to define new fashions. Even Chinese entrepreneurs themselves 
admit this: 
“You probably have heard that we Wenzhouese people were famous by copying even in 
China. One company’s best seller can quickly be copied by others, and all the sudden, 
everyone is producing the same product.” 
Owner of a stitching firm, interviewed in Prato on 1/18/2012 
Therefore, the concern among Italian entrepreneurs that they may be undercut by local Chinese apparel 
firms may be exaggerated.  To date no Chinese company in Prato is able to initiate or change the fashion 
trend in Italy or anywhere. They are followers; but followers of whom? Although I do not have a clear 
answer, Dunford’s research (2006) on the magic circle may be instructive. Dunford argues that the power 
of the Italian industrial districts has been exaggerated in the past, and that, in fact, the most important 
apparel value chains in Italy are controlled by big, multinational corporations based in Milan. If he is right, 
the position of the Chinese pronto moda within the apparel value chains might seem clearer now. At least 
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in terms of information flows, both Chinese and Italian textile and apparel companies are in fact subject to 
the same value chains that are dominated by companies outside the ID. This does not necessarily mean 
these multinational corporations are outsiders. Actually, many of the most renowned fashion brands have 
their roots in Tuscany, and in some cases, exactly in Prato, such as Prada.  
Niche markets 
Beyond the flexible production teams in Prato, the flexible business model of the pronto moda is also 
enabled by effective communications between producers in Prato and wholesalers across Europe. As 
indicated earlier, final firms receive feedback every day from their buyers and are able to adjust their 
design immediately overnight and deliver new orders less than a week. Moreover, they are particular 
friendly toward smaller buyers, normally Chinese wholesalers all over the Europe. Because Chinese 
wholesalers tend to have much smaller capital and less market influence than European fashion chains, 
they have to adapt to the newest fashion as fast as fashion chains while also maintaining their stocks as 
small as possible. Because of the fluidity of demand, a 30-euro skirt may be worth less than one euro after 
a week. Therefore, many Chinese wholesalers only stock 100 garments for each color of each model. Not 
every producer is willing and able to cater to such fast, very diverse and low-volume demands, but the 
Chinese pronto moda in Prato can. In fact, both final firms and wholesalers identify this flexibility as one 
of the most important competitive advantages for the Chinese pronto moda in Prato. 
“Our major advantage is being fast. It takes 3 months for apparel produced in China to arrive. 
For us, it takes just a few days.” 
Owner of a final firm, interviewed in Prato on 3/23/2012 
“I come to Prato every month or half month. Clothes made here have many advantages over 
clothes from China. They change fast, have more diverse models and colors, and could 
adjust to buyer’s taste. Just tell them what you want, and they will do the magic for you. 
Since they produce right here in Europe, they are fast. Containers from China usually take 45 
days to arrive, and models (of Made-in-China) are quite limited. If you need a specific color 
or size, you have to buy an entire box. That means a large quantity of leftovers if you made a 
wrong decision. These Italian goods are more flexible, instead. You pick only one or two 
hundred pieces for each model. If they are welcome, you come back to order more with 
particular color and size. In this way, storage is minimized and turnover is much faster. This 
is unique in Italy.” 
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Wholesaler based in Lisbon, interviewed on 2/25/2012 
My research shows that most of the Chinese apparel producers in Prato aim for lower-cost markets. In 
particular, they focus on women’s summer clothes which are technically unsophisticated but fashionably 
sensitive. Cheap cost and extreme flexibility make the Chinese pronto moda very competitive in this 
specific niche market. In many respects, the business model of the Chinese pronto moda in Prato is 
similar to the celebrated model of fast fashion chains such as ZARA (Tokatli 2008). They all focus on 
limiting storage and accelerating turnover rate. The only difference between the petite producers in Prato 
and these major fashion brand names is that the latter have massive financial support and can to a certain 
extent foresee the upcoming fashion. Positioned in very different price categories, the Chinese apparel 
produced in Prato do not directly compete with these brand names. However, as the debt crisis loomed in 
a number of EU countries, some conditions changed. As one of the Chinese entrepreneurs reasoned, the 
crisis might boost the demand for the Chinese apparel produced in Prato because more and more working 
class people could not afford the brand names and had to turn to Chinese-Pratese products which have 
similar fashion elements but priced much less (Interviewed in Prato on 2/3/2012). This seemingly 
surprising outcome is also predicted by Gereffi (2010) who has suggested that since apparel is in a sense a 
rigid demand for consumers, the crisis may simply force consumers in developed countries to buy cheaper 
clothes. Indeed, although the decline in the number of apparel establishments has occurred, many of the 
remaining firms I interviewed had not felt the effects of the crisis. 
“We began to feel crisis last October (of 2011). The demand declined by 30%. But we older 
businesses did not have very big problems. Many of us invested in China and other sectors. Only 
those new final firms were hit a big time. Many Chinese people found it much more difficult to 
do business than before.” 
Owner of a final firm, interviewed in Prato on 2/23/2012 
“Although the first half of 2012 was indeed difficult for us, the latter half of 2012 was 
surprisingly good. In the end, our revenue of 2012 was only a bit less than that of 2011.” 
Owner of a stitching firm, interviewed through phone on 2/20/2013 
In the next section, I would show some statistics and try to analyze the real performance of the pronto 
moda in the past ten years. 
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Tab. 5.1: Competitive advantages of the Chinese pronto moda compared with potential competitors 
 Pronto moda in Prato Italian fashion chains Made-in-China 
Labor cost Medium Depends on specific sourcing 
strategy: high - low 
Low 
Flexibility High Medium Low 
Fashion Medium Fast Slow 
Major 
products 
Women’s summer 
clothes 
Men and women, all sorts. More standardized clothes, 
e.g. T-shirts and jeans 
Niche markets Mostly European Global Global 
Source: compiled from author interviews 
 
5.2. Upstream – textile sourcing 
In the previous chapter, I have shown that the Made-in-Prato fabric only accounts for a small portion of 
the sourcing of the pronto moda. Chinese final firms tend to source textile from China not only because 
they need Made-in-China lower-value textile, but also because they are able to get preferable price and 
have mutual trusts with Chinese textile importers.  The efficiency of the sourcing channels contributes to 
the competitiveness of the pronto moda, as indicated in Fig. 5.1. 
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Fig. 5.1: Textile imports by Prato and Italy 
 
Source: author’s illustration based on data from Prato Chamber of Commerce (2012). 
 
One has to note that the textile imports may include intermediate yarns for Italian textile producers in 
Prato.  However, even with the portion for the local textile industry, the data tell us three realities.  First, 
the textile imports from Europe were gradually replaced by the imports from Asia, particularly from 
China.  It may be partially because of the general decline of the European textile industry as a whole.  But 
the rise of the Chinese pronto moda and its demand for lower-value textile could be an important factor.  
Comparing the Pratese data with the national data, we can see a clear impact of the Chinese pronto moda 
on Prato’s textile import.  At the Italian national level, although there has also been a shift from European 
to Asian textiles, the change was much more moderate, and the share of Asia was still smaller than 
Europe.  Therefore, the changes in Prato appear to be due to the Chinese business networks rather than a 
general sourcing shift. 
My interviews also confirm this.  Most of the informants claimed that about 70% of their fabrics were 
made in China.  Even though some of them source from the Italian textile companies in Prato, most of the 
fabrics sold by Italian companies are also imported from China.  Only between 20% and 30% of their 
fabrics are actually manufactured in Prato.  In recent years, companies have also begun to source Turkish 
fabrics, although the percentage of Turkish fabrics is still small comparing to Made-in-China and Made-
in-Prato.  
Meanwhile, there was a decline of imports from both Europe and Asia between 2006 and 2009.  Since it 
happened right before the economic crisis but right after the end of MFA, it seems difficult to explain.  
Many Chinese traders indicated that it could be an ironic outcome of the end of the MFA.  They claimed 
that between 2006 and 2009, the Italian customs imposed additional tariffs and inspections which 
severely delayed their goods at several Italian ports.  The real impact of the end of MFA in fact occurred 
four years later.  This is in line with many scholars who argued that the end of MFA does not mean the 
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withering away of any kind of import quota (Abernathy, Volpe, and Weil 2006; Pickles and Smith 2011).  
In fact, the EU and the US continued to impose import quotas to the countries that did not sign favorable 
trade agreements with them.  These post-MFA quotas might also affect the textile imports even after the 
official quotas were removed. 
 
5.3. Downstream – apparel exports 
Scholars have shown that the Chinese communities in different European countries are well connected 
and form a unified transnational community (Pieke et al. 2004; Thunø 2007).  Relying on this 
transnational Chinese community across Europe, the pronto moda has created a parallel value chain of 
fast fashion alongside European brands.  Focusing on women’s clothes, particularly summer clothes 
which are technically less sophisticated but highly fashionable, the pronto moda gradually occupied a 
low-end niche market catering to working class consumers in a number of Southern and Western 
European countries. 
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Fig. 5.2: Apparel exports by Prato 
Source: author’s illustration based on data from Prato Chamber of Commerce (2012). 
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Fig. 5.3: Maps of the major markets for the pronto moda 
Source: author’s illustration based on data from Prato Chamber of Commerce (2012). 
 
There are two important points in these graphs.  First, compared to the Italian national exports in which 
Asia and America took a substantial share, Europe is the single most important market for the pronto 
moda.  Within Europe, France, Germany and Spain are the primary markets.  Why is it France and 
Germany that took the biggest market share?  Why did particular Southern European countries, such as 
Spain, have more market shares than bigger economies such as the UK?  Meanwhile, the economic crisis 
since 2008 seems to have no negative impact on the pronto moda.  Instead, the years following 2008 
witnessed the most rapid increase of the apparel export from Prato.  Was it because the expansion of the 
lower-value apparel markets in Europe due to the economic hardship?  Or was it because the expansion of 
a particular wholesaling and retailing network for the pronto moda?  The actual impacts of the 2008 crisis 
on pronto moda are more complicated than mere recession (also see Ceccagno 2012). 
Informants confirmed that France, Germany, and Spain were indeed the biggest buyers of the pronto 
moda.  Besides the size of these economies, a network of Chinese traders in these countries also played a 
very important role.  Many informants claimed that more than 50% of their buyers from these European 
countries were in fact Chinese migrants.  These Chinese traders have not only controlled the apparel 
wholesaling of the low-end fast fashion in key cities such as Paris and Madrid, some of them have also 
begun to develop their own retail chains.  As one of the informants claimed, “now even if you go to those 
little French towns, you can find Chinese apparel stores here and there” (Interviewed in Wenzhou, 
6/13/2011). 
This low-end fast fashion might already have existed long before the emergence of the pronto moda.  
Some scholars (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999) have shown that other immigrant groups, such as 
Indian and Pakistani, have been working in this niche market much earlier than the Chinese.  Informants 
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claimed that Pakistani traders had been working in this market segment at least since the 1980s.  However, 
what is distinct about the pronto moda is the development of a horizontally integrated production network 
from manufacturing to retailing.  Such process of integration is having complicated impacts on the non-
Chinese ethnic traders across Europe, as the following remarks of a Pakistani trader show: 
“My brothers run wholesaling shops in Germany.  Years ago there were only Pakistani and Indian 
traders in Germany, but now there are more and more Chinese traders…  We Pakistani entered into 
the apparel trading earlier than Chinese, but we never had our own manufacturing.  I think it is 
because the South Asian immigrants are mostly unskillful in apparel manufacturing…  In fact, I am 
making more profits with Chinese manufacturers than I did with Italian ones before.  I had no 
problem with Chinese in Prato at all.  They are very cooperative and very nice. They give you extra 
services and treat you like friend.  For example, they take me to the train station after I make the 
order.  We have worked in very friendly way…  However, I’m still worried that we may eventually 
be driven out of the market in the future, because I suppose Chinese traders can always get better 
prices from Chinese manufacturers than we get.” 
Pakistani trader, interviewed in Bologna, 11/10/2013 
Informants also claimed that the post-2008 crisis has had limited but complicated impacts on the pronto 
moda.  On the one hand, the number of apparel firms indeed decreased in 2010 and 2011.  Many new 
establishments, both stitching workshops and cutter-designers, have been facing bigger difficulties 
recently.  On the other hand, the business of more established firms, the cutter-designers in particular, 
seemed to be immune to the crisis.  When asked about why they maintained successful in the market, 
many cutter-designers and traders referred to a sort of “downgrading” of the apparel demand in Europe.  
In particular, the demand for cheaper clothes has actually increased, and over time, the firms have to 
reduce the average unit price.  For instance, in the winter of 2013, coats between 29 and 39 euro became 
more popular than the previous year, while those between 79 and 89 euro were no longer demanded 
(interviewed in Prato, 11/1/2013).  This downgrading of the apparel demand is consistent with trends 
observed elsewhere (see Gereffi and Frederick 2010). 
In short, from upstream to downstream, the growth of pronto moda in Prato has increasingly relied on the 
expansion of the ethnic-Chinese networks across Europe.  Although some institutional contexts such as 
custom policies and the current economic crisis might have made their businesses difficult from one 
moment to another, the expanding Chinese networks have given them stable access to lower-cost textiles 
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from China and a booming segment of low-end fast fashion market in Europe.  A major part of pronto 
moda’s competitiveness thus lies outside of Prato. 
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Chapter 6: Power asymmetry and spatial conflicts of the pronto moda 
“That everything is always said in every age is perhaps Foucault’s greatest historical principle: 
behind the curtain there is nothing to see, but it was all the more important each time to describe 
the curtain, or the base, since there was nothing either behind or beneath it.” 
(Deleuze 1988, 54) 
Power asymmetry is one of the most common characteristics of GVCs (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 
2005). The pronto moda in many ways resembles a typical buyer-driven value chain in which final firms 
are able to substitute stitching workshops easily and thus retain unchallengeable power over the entire 
system. Among consequences of this power asymmetry, I want to focus on the ways in which not only 
profits but also risks of using irregular labor are distributed in the pronto moda. I argue that the process of 
subcontracting risks of using irregular labor is in the center of the tensions between Chinese firms and 
local society. In particular, a conjunctural analysis of the economic, political, and cultural forces 
articulated in Prato is employed to unravel the complexities of these tensions. In the end, I want to show 
that the struggles around the working and living spaces ritually culminated in the annual dragon parades 
for the Chinese New Year. 
Literature on GVC-GPNs has found that the increasingly flexible demand for consumer goods contributed 
to the power asymmetry between Third-World suppliers and global buyers. Since the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the idea of just-in-time production and minimizing inventory has dramatically transformed the 
structure of retail market in the US and Western Europe (Gereffi 1994, 105; Gereffi 1999, 45). Retail 
chains began to be concentrated in a small number of big retailers who were able to meet ever shorter lead 
time and offer more diverse product lines. A consequence of this transformation is the transferring of 
economic insecurity to manufacturers in the Third World. For one thing, since retailers constantly chase 
the lowest labor cost across the world, local manufacturers in developing countries have to squeeze their 
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labor costs as much as possible to meet the requirements. Moreover, since the demand now fluctuates and 
diversifies more than any time before, manufacturers have to rely on a more flexible workforce that they 
can easily manipulate and dispose of whenever necessary. This trend has given birth to a proliferation of 
labor agencies who mediate between labor and capital and help reduce the burden of labor management 
for employers (Hughes 2001; Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011; Barrientos et al. 2012; Barrientos 2013). 
Although labor agency is largely absent in Prato, the Chinese pronto moda resembles this process in 
important ways. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I have shown that the rise of pronto moda responded to a specific niche market of 
fast fashion in Europe, and the end of the MFA did not necessarily eradicate apparel manufacturing in 
these higher cost regions (Pickles 2006).  Instead, regionalized apparel manufacturing has remained 
important in certain parts of Southern and Eastern Europe, in order to meet the demands of fast fashion, 
i.e. shorter lead time, faster replenishment, more designs, and minimized inventory (Abernathy, Volpe, 
and Weil 2006; Tokatli 2008).  While GVC-GPNs scholars have been primarily interested in the ways in 
which such a trend of “regionalization” of apparel production impacted the firm-level upgrading and labor 
organization (see the debates between Barrientos 2013 and Selwyn 2013), very few have paid attention to 
the complexity of social and political struggles in the affected regions.  In this chapter, I argue that the 
rise of fast fashion has been compounded with a number of social and political struggles in Prato and 
become what cultural studies would call a conjuncture. 
 First, since an internal negotiation process is fundamentally lacking within the Chinese pronto moda, the 
burden of flexible production has been unavoidably pushed down to the least powerful actors in the 
production network, i.e. the stitching workshops and their workers. Unlike their Italian counterpart in 
Prato, the relationship between Chinese final firms and stitching workshops is more rigid and asymmetric. 
According to the records of Becattini (2001) and Dei Ottati (2003), in the Pratese textile industry, 
although final firms were central organizers of production, smaller firms were not completely subordinate 
to final firms. Smaller firms were normally allowed to work for multiple final firms if their “team leader” 
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final firms did not have enough work to subcontract (Becattini 2001, 179; Dei Ottati 2003, 517). 
Empowered by associations of artisans (CNAP and Confartigianato, see Chapter 3), smaller 
manufacturers were able to defend their profits against final firms during each of the past crises (Dei 
Ottati 1996; Dei Ottati 2003). It is this mechanism of negotiation and compromise that has successfully 
kept at bay the collapse of industrial district. However, Chinese stitching workshops are normally locked 
in one production team organized by one final firm and are usually not allowed or not able to work for 
other teams even during less busy seasons. Therefore, in order to meet ever shorter lead time and lower 
cost in fast fashion market, final firms subcontract not only the least profitable phases but also precarious 
forms of work to stitching workshops. As a consequence, Chinese stitching workshops in Prato respond 
by using undocumented migrant workers and resort to under-standard working conditions, the most 
available strategy they have. 
Second, I argue that the Italian institutions in Prato have not been able to capture the irregular labor in the 
Chinese pronto moda.  In particular, while the Italian labor law strictly forbids any mixture between 
working and living spaces in a building (Skype interview with a local lawyer, 10/26/2012), the Chinese 
firms and workers tend to mix the factory with dorms for both economic and social reasons.  Facing 
pressures from both the final firms and Italian authority, stitching workshops have to hide themselves 
from the public to avoid legal risks while still maintaining profitable.  In fact, such a strategy is markedly 
similar to the ways in which manufacturers in the Third World respond to the cost pressures from global 
buyers.  While the Third-World manufacturers need to “hide” the irregular labor from both the global 
buyers and independent auditors (Hughes 2001, 400), Chinese stitching workshops that disperse across 
Prato and neighboring provinces need to “hide” their irregularities from the local society. The 
“hiddenness” of the pronto moda has thus become a central problem in Prato, and has gone far beyond the 
purely economic realm into social and political debates (see Pieraccini 2010). 
In this chapter, I borrow the concept of conjunctural analysis from the British cultural studies to analyze 
these spatial struggles in and around the pronto moda.  By so doing, I want to contribute to the literature 
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of social and institutional embeddedness in GVC-GPNs. One of the original purposes for GPNs was to 
bring back the social and institutional contexts that were somehow lost in the GVC studies (see Coe et al. 
2004).  This tradition has been reclaimed throughout the development of the GPN studies, and to a certain 
extent, Bair and Werner’s (2011; 2013) recent works on articulation can also be seen as a critique of the 
social and institutional embeddedness in the GVCs studies.  However, so far, very few research adopted a 
conjunctural view and used both discursive (e.g., interviews and videos) and non-discursive (e.g., actual 
spatial arrangements and photos) materials to decipher the complexity of the social crises around a 
particular production network. 
As Hall defined it, conjunctural analysis studies “a number of contradictions at work in different key 
practices and sites come together – or ‘con-join’ – in the same moment and political space and, as 
Althusser said, ‘fuse in a ruptural unity’ ”(2011, 9).  Drawing upon the conjuntural analysis, I argue that 
the economic transformation and associated social tensions in Prato should always be viewed in a bundle 
of “contradictions” including not only the economic gap between Chinese and Italian companies (see 
Chapters 4 and 5), but also the social tensions within the Chinese community in Prato and the political 
pressures from the Italian authority.  While some scholars have pointed to these internal tensions within 
Chinese community and Italian society (Ceccagno and Rastrelli 2008; Zincone 2006), none of them have 
ever “articulated” these contradictions together in a conjunctural way. More importantly, as Grossberg 
(2010) argues, conjunctural analysis offers a standpoint to see social reality as always historically 
contingent and always an “incarnation” out of multiple conditions of possibility. In this chapter, I survey a 
number of conditions of possibility for the spatial struggles in Prato and point to their historical 
contingency. 
Chapters 4 and 5 have shown that the rise of pronto moda is historically contingent upon a number of 
social and institutional contexts.  In particular, the ways in which apparel production is organized in Prato 
are (over-)determined by not only economic logics but also a number of social and political forces. In this 
chapter, I focus on one particular problematic: what of the apparel production can be seen and why? 
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According to Foucault, a problematic or “problematization” refers not to the problem itself but to the very 
mechanism that makes problem a problem (Grossberg 2010, 49). Based on this concept, I am less 
interested in whether or not the stitching workshops should hide themselves than why and how their 
visibility has become a problem for both the Italian government and Chinese companies alike. In 
particular, I do not intend to reveal “true” logics beneath the materials collected in my research. As 
quoted at the beginning of the chapter (Deleuze 1988, 54), I want to analyze exactly these materials as 
expression and content of the reality that is the pronto moda (Grossberg 2010, 37). The form of the 
expression “defines a field of sayability”, whereas the form of the content “defines a place of visibility” 
(Deleuze 1988, 47). It is what is sayable and what is seeable that really matters in this chapter. 
The chapter is divided into 4 sections. In the first section, I analyze the rationalities based on which 
certain phases of production are subcontracted to stitching workshops. I show that this is not only a 
consequence of capitalist accumulation, but also an outcome of cautious risk management. In the second 
section, I briefly review the history of urban planning in Prato which, I argue, has important ramifications 
in the current spatial organization of the pronto moda. Following this review, in section 3, I focus on a 
variety of irregularities in the buildings occupied by Chinese stitching workshops, and the project called 
fabbrica abitata advocated by a local employers’ association, Prato Futura. By juxtaposing different 
ways of thinking of and using space, I want to show how different rationalities of using space clashed and 
influenced each other. Finally, I pay attention to the dragon parades which have been held by local 
Chinese associations to celebrate Chinese New Year. I want to show that the evolving form of the parade 
in fact summarizes the ongoing struggles between the local government and the Chinese community. 
6.1. Subcontracting the visibility 
Having modeled on the pronto moda of Italian apparel firms, the Chinese pronto moda differs in two 
important ways. First, as immigrants’ businesses, Chinese companies have been able to enjoy a surplus 
labor that has so far been exclusively reserved for Chinese employers. In Chapter 3, I have shown how a 
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series of national and local circumstances have allowed Chinese firms to emerge in a particular sector and 
particular place with the support of an abundance of immigrant labor. Second, the particular hometown 
composition and path dependency in the Chinese immigrant community exacerbated inequality not only 
between labor and capital, but also between bigger and smaller firms. This power asymmetry precludes 
any possibility for the kind of internal coordination that has played a vital role in the Italian IDs. In this 
chapter, I want to show how power asymmetry has been created between final firms and stitching 
workshops in the Chinese pronto moda and how such asymmetry resulted in a particular way of 
managing “visibility” in pronto moda. 
Legitimacy problem of associations 
Although the Turco-Napolitano Law in 1998 eventually removed the ban of self-employment for Chinese 
immigrants in Italy (Zincone 2006, 356), the Italian immigration policy has continued to impose 
restrictions on the entrepreneurship in the Chinese community. A series of immigration policies were 
reinforced by the social norms in the Chinese immigrant community that confined a large number of 
Chinese immigrants in the ethnic sectors. The resulting abundance of surplus labor was the prerequisite 
for the pronto moda which relies on lower-cost markets (see Chapter 3). Since the municipal government 
began to put pressure on undocumented labor in 2009, it has been increasingly difficult for Chinese 
apparel firms to hire irregular immigrants (Fazzino 2010). However, as I showed in Chapter 4 and 5, the 
pronto moda emerged in a very specific niche market in Europe catering mostly to working class 
consumers, with low cost being universally seen by the owners of apparel firms to be their main 
competitive advantages (Author’s interviews). It is nearly impossible at least in short term to eliminate 
undocumented workers in pronto moda without eradicating the entire industry all together (some indeed 
have implied the need for this complete eradication , such as in Pieraccini (2010)). Therefore, the most 
pragmatic solution for Chinese firms has been to make undocumented labor invisible. But how do they 
make it invisible? Who is going to take the risk of hiring undocumented labor? This has become not only 
a question of economics but also of power. 
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As Becattini (2001, 179) shows, the Pratese textile industry is characterized by the balance of power 
between final firms and phase firms. Final firms are a small number of companies which mediated 
between its team of smaller manufacturers and external buyers; phase firms are smaller manufacturers 
that normally specialize in only one phase of production. Typically, a phase firm was allowed to work for 
more than one final firm and maximized its capacity whenever it could. Phase firms were able to confront 
the pressures from final firms not only because the uncodifiable knowledge of textile production required 
a high degree of mutual reliance, but also because there were a number of institutions that represented the 
interests of smaller manufacturers. Employers’ associations such as CNAP and Confartigianato 
effectively pronounced the interests of phase firms and forced the UIP who represented the final firms to 
compromise (Dei Ottati 2003). These have resulted in a series of Gentlemen’s Agreements that reduced 
noxious effects of competition and industrial upgrading (Becattini 2001; Dei Ottati 2003). 
A legitimate mechanism of internal negotiation has been missing in the Chinese pronto moda. On the one 
hand, sewing is a skill fairly easy to codify and learn. Based on my interviews, a new immigrant with no 
previous experience in apparel manufacturing can acquire excellent skill levels in less than two months. 
Low entry requirement for stitching workshops makes them highly substitutable for final firms. On the 
other hand, there has been no mechanism of negotiation and collective bargaining in the Chinese 
community in Prato. Although there have been a number of Chinese associations in Prato, most of them 
are organized based on hometowns and lack representative power even among their hometown people 
(Ceccagno and Rastrelli 2008, 136–140). Currently, there are four associations within the Chinese 
community in Prato: the Buddhist Society of Prato, the Chinese Trading Association, the Fujian 
Association and the Sino-Italian Friendship Association. Each of them supposedly represents the interests 
of a part of the community, although in fact, none of them has obtained legitimate rights among the 
represented. As Ceccagno and Rastrelli (2008, 137) show, none of the associations has ever run an 
election, and the leadership has been chosen  by deals made between the most powerful companies. 
Therefore, leaders of Chinese associations are normally only interested making profits for their individual 
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families and companies. My interviews also confirmed the widespread skepticisms toward the dubious 
leadership of associations: 
“Current members of the Friendship Associations are mostly from the Wenzhou city and Rui’an, 
while members of the Trading Association are mainly from Wencheng. The Friendship 
Association has a Chinese school here and so to emulate it, the Trading Association also wants to 
have one but has failed many times… We Wenzhouese are not as solidary as Fujianese people. 
We like to fight with folks (wolidou)... There has so far been no democratic election in 
associations. We did and elected one Chinese representative which turned out to be another 
disaster. XX, the guy we elected was a businessman with bad reputation. But he was the only one 
who showed interest at that position. And because those big entrepreneurs don’t want to waste 
their time on the community affairs, they all agreed. I don’t know what it will be like in future.” 
A Chinese professional, interviewed in 2/28/2012, in Prato 
“What has the Fujian Association done? They’ve done nothing except for paying a one-way ticket 
back to China if some folk was found dying. Other than that, they did not care about us.” 
Fujianese apparel worker, interviewed in 3/6/2012, in Prato 
 
Economic hierarchy of the hometowns 
As Ceccagno and Rastrelli (2008, 81–2) show, the Chinese community in Prato is far from homogeneous. 
Each of the three major groups of immigrants, the Wenzhouese (including those from the city of 
Wenzhou and Rui’an), the Wenchengese, and the Fujianese, occupies a specific position in the pronto 
moda. Therefore, the differential interests and relative power of associations can be partially explained by 
the hierarchy of these hometowns in the production system. Mistrust between hometowns has further 
made the collective bargaining and internal cooperation impossible. 
The majority of Chinese immigrants in Italy are from Zhejiang province, and in particular, from the area 
of Wenzhou city in the southern part of the province. Looking closely into the Zhejiangese community in 
Italy, however, one can easily discover the disparities between specific hometown counties in the 
Wenzhou area. My interviews found that there were three major subgroups within the Zhejiangese 
community, and each subgroup dominated a specific city in Italy: people from Qingtian mostly 
concentrate in Milan; people from Wencheng in Turin; Rui’an and other areas (hereafter, I use Rui’anese 
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to differentiate this particular group from the broader Wenzhouese, although they also include people 
from the urban area of Wenzhou) in Prato. All these subgroups of Zhejiangese have their specific dialects. 
Even though they normally manage to dialogue with each other, they nevertheless maintain their distinct 
local identity.  
Their relative power in each area depends on the time of their arrival in that area. In Prato, it is the 
Rui’anese people who opened the first apparel workshops and successfully upgraded into final firms in 
the late 1990s. To date, entrepreneurs from Rui’an still occupied the top of the pronto moda, owning most 
of the final firms and dyers. People from Wencheng came later and therefore occupied a lower status in 
the community. Although there is no statistics available, all the 4 stitching workshops that I interviewed 
in Prato were owned by Wenchengese people, while all the 3 final firms were owned by people from 
Rui’an. Therefore, the mistrusts between final firms and stitching workshops can also be read as the 
conflicts between people from Rui’an and those from Wencheng. 
At the bottom of the system are the Fujianese who arrived later than both Zhejiangese subgroups. So far, 
most of the Fujianese immigrants are still stitching workers. The only exception is the owner of a dyeing 
company and the president of the Fujian Association, who is in fact of Wenzhou descent: 
 “Most of the Fujianese people arrived in Italy in the late 1990s. The Wenzhouese and I arrived 
instead in 1989/1990. Before we came to Prato, there was actually no Chinese here… Although I 
was born in Sanming, grew up in Nanping (both cities in the west of Fujian Province), both of my 
parents are Wenzhouese. That is why I speak Wenzhouese dialect fluently. Because they came 
late, Fujinese people have not been very well established yet. It’s getting better in recent years 
however… This Fujian Association was established in 1999. Upon their first arrival, the 
Fujianese did not get well with the Wenzhouese. And our former president founded this 
association for helping Fujianese workers, such as in labor disputes and arrears of wage. But in 
general, our association is still weak since very few of Fujianese is company owner. The majority 
are still workers. When they get cancer or die, we will give them financial supports.”  
Owner of a dyeing company, interviewed in 4/13/2012, in Prato 
The remarks of the president of the Fujian Association clearly show the disparity between Zhejiangese 
and Fujianese people in Prato. In this specific case, the mistrust between hometowns is translated into a 
class struggle between Fujianese workers and Zhejiangese capital. Therefore, except for the Buddhist 
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Society which is not interested in politics in general, all the three main associations in Prato in fact 
coincided with the interests of the big capital, petite bourgeoisie, and the workers. Mistrust among 
different hometowns further diminished the possibility of internal cooperation in the pronto moda. 
Beyond these three main groups, however, there is a marginalized group of Chinese which falls 
completely outside the pronto moda. The Northeasterners (dongbei ren), people who are from Liaoning, 
Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces are seen as the lowest class in the Chinese community. As many 
scholars have shown, this group of people arrived in Italy in the mid-2000 and so far has been 
discriminated in the main ethnic sectors (Cologna 2005; Ceccagno and Rastrelli 2008, 82). In pronto 
moda, the Northeasterners mainly work as the so-called miscellaneous workers (zagong), such as chefs 
and janitors who earn the lowest wage in apparel firms. Beyond the pronto moda, many of these people 
worked in the restaurants while some women have been reported to perform prostitution (Cologna 2005). 
Unlike people from Zhejiang and Fujian, the Northeasterners are mostly from urbanized area and used to 
be workers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The major motive for their migration was the reforms in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s that closed down the majority of SOEs in that area. Therefore, these people 
were traditionally less entrepreneurial than Zhejiangese and Fujianese, and were more willing to work as 
wage labor. Cologna (2005) also discovers that the Northeasterners are also more likely to work for 
Italian employers than other Chinese groups since the aforementioned social norms of self-employment 
simply do not work for them. However, this has in return reinforced the stereotype of Northeasterners in 
the Chinese community and further marginalized them in pronto moda, becoming the de facto 
lumpenproletariat (Tyner 2013, 4–5). 
“It is really a shame that these women (the Northeastern women) work as prostitutes. It is a 
shame for the entire community. They are just too lazy and want to make money without real 
work (bulao erhuo)… I never hired Northeasterners as apparel workers in my company.” 
Owner of a stitching workshop, 2/20/2012, in Prato 
Because of the economic, social and cultural disparities between hometowns, none of these Chinese 
subgroups has legitimate leadership in the Chinese community in Prato. Except for the Buddhist Society 
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which plays a central role in the community ceremonies as I show later in the chapter, all the three other 
associations play very limited roles except for profiting their leaders. As Li (1999) indicates, one of the 
most common motives for Zhejiangese entrepreneurs in Europe to invest titles in the associations has 
been to establish political connections with the Chinese consulates and higher level Chinese officials who 
visit Europe. These connections are potentially valuable when these entrepreneurs go back to invest in 
China. Lacking legitimacy, the conflicts between subgroups and class struggles so far have precluded any 
possibility of collective bargaining between final and phase firms, and between workers and capital, a 
situation that has resulted in a more asymmetric power relation, particularly between final firms and 
stitching workshops. 
Power asymmetry between final firms and stitching workshops 
The power asymmetry between final firms and stitching workshops is first of all evident in their numbers. 
In Prato, there were between 700 and 800 Chinese final firms in 2011, about 1/5 of the total Chinese 
establishments (3,489) in the apparel sector (Camera di Commercio di Prato 2012). Since the number of 
other types of apparel firms is nearly negligible, the average ratio between final firms and stitching is 
around 1 to 5—that is, an average final firm would have 5 stitching workshops working for it. However, 
the most successful final firms can have more than 10 stitching workshops in the team (Author’s 
Interviews). Since the technology required for stitching is quite limited, the workshops are highly 
substitutable in the pronto moda. Based on the fact that owners of the stitching workshops have to 
personally show up each time at the front door of the final firm to get order, it is not hard to imagine the 
power asymmetry. The power asymmetry is also evident in the ways in which a “production team” is 
organized. Unlike dyer-washers who can work for more than one final firm, stitching workshops are 
typically captivated in the team led by one final firm. Stitching workshops are usually not allowed to 
work outside the team even during spare season. The only exception is for those newly established final 
firms who have contingent orders and limited capacity of production. They might have to contact the 
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workshops to see if someone is willing to work for a specific order. Only new final firms rely on an ad-
hoc team of stitching workshops, most of which are newly established workshops as well. 
 
Fig. 6.1: Comparison between the (a) Pratese textile industry and (b) Chinese pronto moda 
As literature of GVCs-GPNs shows, the captive governance in the buyer-driven chains is one of the most 
asymmetric relations between buyers and producers (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005, 87) (also 
see Chapter 2). The relationship between final firms and stitching workshops to a certain degree nicely 
resembles this power asymmetry.  In this particular value chain, most of the value is captured by the final 
firms while the least profitable phase—stitching work—is subcontracted to workshops. Annual profit of 
big final firms can be as high as 1 million euro in 2011 (Author’s interviews), whereas many of the 
stitching workshops barely paid off their costs in the same year. 
“Actually in 2010, the business was ok, although the profit was not big. But since 2011, and 
especially after the Greek crisis in the second half of 2011, business went down very fast. I think 
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even Italians had no idea of what was going to happen before that point. So basically after being a 
boss (laoban) for 2 years, I did not make much money. I know that sweatshop work is difficult 
and everyone wants to get out of it. But now even though I want to sell the workshop, no one 
would buy it. It cost me 20,000 euro when I bought it from other Chinese. Now I could not sell it 
for a single buck. So I am basically stuck here.” 
Owner of a stitching firm, 1/17/2012, in Prato 
Risk management 
This asymmetry in the apparel value chain has also resulted in a particular spatial organization. While 
profits are captured by final firms, the risks of using undocumented labor and below-standard working 
condition are pushed downward to the stitching workshops. On the one hand, these final firms are not 
typically labor-intensive but have to be open to the public. Final firms maintain only a relatively small 
workforce which requires higher technical skills, and so labor abuse is much less necessary except in the 
busiest season. Workers in final firms either rent their own apartments or live in separate dorms provided 
by the final firms, and the working conditions in final firms are usually clean and spacious. Moreover, as 
the place where external buyers stop by and make orders, the physical space of final firm (at least part of 
it) is designed to be open to the public. All these made final firms the “public face” of pronto moda. 
On the other hand, workshops specializing in low-skilled labor-intensive work can easily remind 
outsiders of the gloomy days of the 19th century capitalism. There are two factors making this phase of 
production particularly less favorable. First, many of the sewing works have to be done overnight during 
the peak season. Extra-long hours of working on sewing machines have become the epitome of the 
stitching workers’ life. Moreover, many workshops are located in the loosely partitioned warehouses, 
where workers work, eat and sleep in the same building. Even for those in the houses that were designed 
for Italian family factories back in the 1960s and 1970s, working condition can still be unpleasant since 
the building is normally overcrowded, lacking standard hygiene facilities, and has no A/C in the summer 
and no furnace in the winter. By allowing unbridled overtime work, nearly all of the stitching workshops 
not only challenge the common sense of contemporary Italian society, but also directly violate Italian 
labor law. Second, stitching workshops are where undocumented workers concentrate. Because they 
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require little language or technical skills, the stitching workshops are the ideal places for immigrants who 
just arrived in Italy. Ceccagno and Rastrelli (2008, 91) show that after the 2002 amnesty, the ratio of 
Chinese undocumented workers in Prato declined to 11% of the working population in pronto moda.  My 
interviews confirm that after the 2012 amnesty, the percentage of undocumented workers was further 
reduced to less than 10%. Both the bad working condition and presence of undocumented workers force 
stitching workshops to obliterate themselves from public sight. 
This hiddenness of the apparel manufacturing is actually a common phenomenon across the world. As 
Begg et al. (2005) show, garage factories are widespread in Bulgaria and the manufacturing in these 
factories is always “hidden” from the public. A similar situation can also be observed in immigrants’ 
apparel workshops in US cities (Waldinger 1984; Kwong 1999).  However, in none of these places, this 
particular spatial organization of apparel production became the central problem in local society. What is 
distinct in pronto moda is not only the captive relation between final firms and stitching workshops, but 
also the particular ways in which an economic problem is spatially articulated with social and political 
problems. 
6.2. Spatial heritage and Chinese reinvention 
In fact, it is not the Chinese pronto moda that created the problems of productive spaces in Prato. Since 
the beginning of the ID in the 1950s, urban space has always been a central debate between the municipal 
government and local society. The genealogy of (failed) urban planning in Prato created a unique urban 
space oriented to a particular form of production of family-based SMEs. I argue that this urban space is 
both the context in which Chinese companies emerged and the main instruments that Chinese companies 
used to subcontract the risks of using irregular labor. It is within this built environment that the spatial 
organization of pronto moda is problematized by both Chinese and Italian agencies. 
Failed proposals 
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There have been three proposals for town planning in Prato since the end of WWII. All of them failed as a 
result of struggles between the municipal government and textile producers. The consequence of little 
spatial regulation was an urban space in Prato that reflects the needs of textile producers. The struggle 
between spatial rationalities of capital and government resulted in a basically “unregulated” productive 
space. This part of discussion heavily relies on secondary materials in Becattini (2001), and Bressan and 
Cambini (2009; 2011). 
The first idea of town planning, the Nello Baroni Plan in Prato emerged in 1954 right after the takeoff of 
the industrial district, and immediately provoked vast rejections from nearly all the textile producers. The 
main worry of the producers was that the rigid zoning regulations would impede the nascent 
industrialization and discourage the burgeoning entrepreneurship in the town. Strong opposition drove the 
government to propose the Leonardo Savioli Plan in 1955 which largely removed regulations and allowed 
more freedom for individual textile companies. The Savioli plan “aimed to restore to Prato ‘in a broad 
concept the human scale which, though still alive in the Middle Ages, is now completely lacking (…) in 
the chaotic post-war building boom’ (as Savioli’s report puts it) – and aims to make the most of the 
particular polycentric structure of the settlements in the quarter comprising the territory of the Commune” 
(Becattini 2001, 73) (originally in (Giovannini and Innocenti 1996, 286)). However, after four years of  
debates between the municipal and employer’s associations, the Savioli Plan was turned down in 1960 by 
“the pressure applied by the craftsmen and industrialists who regarded it as an excessive limitation of the 
potential development of the industrial areas” (Becattini 2001, 73) (originally in (Mori 1986, 826)). 
A completely new proposal, the Plinio Marconi Plan, was commissioned in 1961 and finally approved in 
1964. However, the actual implementation of the plan was postponed to 1972 as debates between textile 
producers and the municipal government went on. In the final plan, the municipal government agreed to a 
major compromise by allowing virtually no control of the textile industry. “In order to respond to the 
fictitious needs of ‘inflated’ forecasts, an expert remarked, the territory returned to being an uncontrolled 
blot spreading across the landscape” (Becattini 2001, 75) (originally in (Mariotti 1988)). It was estimated 
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that “by 1995 Prato would have 350,000 inhabitants and 100,000 workers in the textile industry (!)” 
(Becattini 2001, 75).  As of 2011, the province of Prato had 249,775 inhabitants (ISTAT 2012).  The 
employment of the textile industry peaked at 61,097 in 1981 but fell from then on (Dei Ottati 1996, 36). 
The Plinio Marconi Plan was, as a result, too optimistic. In fact, the regional plan of about the same time, 
the Florence Inter-Commune Plan drafted in 1965, soberly examined the textile industry in all 
neighboring provinces and deemed the prosperity “a purely temporary phenomenon” (Becattini 2001, 76). 
The regional government turned out to be correct with its prediction but was unable to do anything with it. 
The Plinio Marconi Plan ended up being a plan without real effect. 
The continuous failure of town planning had a number of consequences in shaping the spaces of the city. 
First, the absence of building regulation allowed individual family-based companies to build their own 
factory-houses as they wanted. The consequence was a large number of factory-houses dispersed across 
the province. These houses combine the factory, normally the ground floor and backyard, with the living 
space on the second and third floors. They not only saved potential costs for renting separate factory 
floors but also allowed for the convenience of overtime work which was quite normal in the textile 
industry between the 1950s and 1970s (Becattini 2001, 143; Bressan and Cambini 2011). Second, most of 
the roads in the Macrolotto areas were built by individual companies with little collective coordination. 
These private roads were not well coordinated, and many of them were dead-ends. In fact, being a dead-
end helped companies to keep away outsiders and maintained their production’s invisibility (Bressan and 
Cambini 2011, 212). Other problems included insufficient sewage system and accumulating garbage 
particularly in the 1960s and 1970s (Becattini 2001, 76). Therefore, the new part of the city of Prato 
(generally the areas outside the wall of the medieval city) was built piece and parcel by individual family-
based companies and oriented to a more flexible mode of production. 
Chinese reinvention 
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Fig. 6.2: Bird view of Macrolotto 0 and 1 (Google earth) 
 
While the Pratese textile industry gradually shrank in the 1980s onward, the Chinese pronto moda took 
over their abandoned spaces and reinvented them to their own uses. Both final firms and stitching 
workshops found the most suitable spaces for their type of production, and the spatial division between 
final firms and stitching workshops reflects the power asymmetry as discussed in the previous section. 
A majority of final firms concentrated in the southern part of the city commonly known as the Macrolotto 
1 where textile final firms used to concentrate (Bressan and Cambini 2011). Its proximity to the 
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Autostrada 11 makes it an ideal place for receiving orders and shipping out goods. Roads are wider in this 
area which allows trucks to drive in. These mills and warehouses were repartitioned by Chinese 
companies into two parts: a show room of finished products in the front and a factory with cutting 
machines and computers in the back. Visitors and potential buyers were normally welcome in the front 
part and were able to select their orders from the stands of models on display. 
The spatial conditions of stitching workshops are more complicated than final firms. There are generally 
two types of space these workshops occupy, and all of the workers I interviewed unanimously preferred 
the first to the second. The luckier ones are able to rent the factory-houses which were perfectly designed 
for a family workshop in the Macrolotto 0. Sewing machines were placed in the ground floor and 
backyard, while bedrooms were transformed into workers’ dorms. Dead-end roads protect these factory-
houses from potential intruders when they work overnight. In addition to the design of the houses, the 
Macrolotto 0 is also close to the city center where restaurants and other entertainment facilities are 
located. Also, since stitching workshops only deliver a few hundred pieces of garments every time, they 
normally handle the shipping by vans instead of trucks. The narrower roads in Macrolotto 0 nicely fit 
their needs. The second group of stitching workshops is less lucky than the first, since they have to 
collectively share a warehouse or mill. Typically one of these former warehouses has to host three to four 
workshops depending on size. Internal space in the warehouse is artificially partitioned by paper boards 
into living and working areas. This second group of workshops can be located in either Macrolotto 0 or 1.  
As police reports show, working and living condition in some of these warehouses can be indeed 
scandalous (e.g., see a case of building abuse in (Notizie di Prato 2012)).17 
The urban space of Prato turned out to be ideal for pronto moda. These family-based SMEs, now Chinese, 
nicely fit into the buildings abandoned by the closed textile SMEs and further exploit the space in more 
                                                          
17 Police reports are mainly collected from local newspaper Notizie di Prato (www.notiziediprato.it) between 
January and March 2012. 
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abusive ways. Although the importance of a planned urban space has been repeatedly downplayed by 
local textile companies, the emergence of the Chinese pronto moda changed their attitudes. 
 
Fig. 6.3: outside a final firm in Macrolotto 1 (taken by author on 11/2/2013). 
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Fig. 6.4: exhibit room of a final firm (taken by author on 11/1/2013). 
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Fig. 6.5: a former textile mill now hosting stitching workshops in Macrolotto 0 (taken by author on 
11/9/2013). 
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Fig. 6.6: factory-houses in Macrolotto 0 (taken by author on 11/9/2013). 
161 
 
 
Fig. 6.7: ground floor of a factory-house (taken by author on 11/9/2013). 
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Fig. 6.8: dorm room on the attic of a factory-house (taken by author on 10/31/2013). 
163 
 
6.3. Problematization of the space 
 “‘There’s no plan’, said Xu Qiu Lin, a local entrepreneur and the only Chinese member of 
Confindustria in Prato, echoing a widespread sentiment. ‘There’s no plan; that’s the problem.’” 
(Donadio 2010) 
As Bressan and Cambini (2011, 211–2) show, never having been a planned city, the città fabbrica 
(factory city) of Prato has always been riddled with problems such as diffusion of resident and productive 
activities, utility and building abuse, widespread pollution, and degraded working condition. In other 
words, being without a city plan has been the default state in Prato since the 1950s. It is therefore 
important to ask why the city space of Prato suddenly became a central problem when the Chinese pronto 
moda occupied the same location? What makes the spatial organization of pronto moda such a salient 
debate in Prato? In what follows, I analyze the practices and discourses through which different ways of 
using and perceiving production and living spaces get re-articulated by both Chinese companies and 
Italian regulators. 
Spatial irregularities of pronto moda 
In Italy, every company upon registration needs to apply for a certificato di agibilità e accessibilità 
(certificate of viability and accessibility) and follow the local edilizia obbligatoria (building mandatory, 
referred to as the mandatory hereafter). Each municipal government has its specific building mandatory 
that regulates in detail the ways in which a particular building can be used. Companies that fail to comply 
the mandatory will be fined and closed (LR Toscana n. 1/2005). However, many Chinese apparel firms, in 
particular the stitching workshops find difficulties to conform. The material of this section is based on 
two interviews with a Chinese Italian lawyer on 2/24/2012 and 10/27/2012. 
Stitching workshops that share a warehouse building become the easiest target of police investigations. 
According to the mandatory, any working or living place has to be carefully assessed and endorsed by the 
municipal government. No one should live in the workplace. Moreover, the kitchen and bathroom have to 
be separated from the workplace and equipped with specific facilities. For these workshops, however, to 
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follow the regulation is both economically unprofitable and practically unfeasible. As I showed earlier, 
stitching workshops are at the bottom of the production system and capture the least profit in the value 
chain. Very few workshops can afford renting an additional dorm for its workers or even for the owner’s 
family. Mixing different types of space can save a significant amount of money, particularly for newly 
established workshops. Moreover, mixing up spaces is also seen as very convenient for the owners. Since 
workers demand hot and fresh Chinese food for every meal and since normally for smaller workshops the 
owner is the cook, having the kitchen in the same building is quite necessary. All of these violate the 
mandatory in Prato. 
Even for those workshops in factory-houses, strictly following the law can be also difficult. First of all, 
the law determines different rates of electricity and water for different types of spaces: utilities used for 
productive activities are charged much more than those for everyday life. Therefore, to determine a utility 
check for a factory-house is to specify which part of the house belongs to production and which part to 
living. To evade additional utility costs, many workshops register the entire building as a residential 
house. Second, because of the extreme flexibility that pronto moda requires, some of the in-house rooms 
have to cater to multiple uses and transform from one use to another constantly. For example, an Italian 
factory-house sometimes has a room specific used for the company office. However, during the busiest 
season, this room might also be used as either factory or dorm. It is simply impractical to apply for the 
specific use every time it changes. Last but not least, the mandatory determines a maximum number of 
people living in a factory-house. Even though a workshop does not further partition the existing bedrooms, 
it might put many more workers into the house than allowed during the busiest season. The law requires 8 
square meters of living space for each worker, which many workshops find difficult to comply. 
Overcrowding is thus a common problem for stitching workshops. 
In fact, irregular use of buildings has become one of the main reasons that some workers fail to get the 
residence permit. As a local lawyer indicates: 
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“To get a resident permit, one needs to register with an address. This address must follow all the 
requirements of the edilizia obbligatoria and can only be attached to a limited number of people. 
Hence it is practically impossible for these workers to get such an address. Very few of them live 
in a certified place. Even though they do, the address might have already been registered for other 
people. This is the most important reason why many workers pay local Italians to register with 
Italian’s home address. It is a serious violation of law.” 
Lawyer in Prato, 1/15/2013, by phone call  
Widespread irregular uses of space have triggered frequent police raids on the Chinese apparel companies. 
The number of police raids has increased continuously since the right-wing municipal government was 
elected in 2009. Guardia di Finanza (Italian financial police), Carabinieri (police), INPS (Italian social 
security), and the Prato Public Health Agency (ASL) have all initiated particular investigations on the 
pronto moda (Bressan and Cambini 2009, 156). 
“Unfair competition” and “livable factory” 
Although many Italians think what Chinese companies have been doing mirrors the way in which they 
worked back in the 1960s and 1970s, discontent toward the Chinese pronto moda is evident from local 
Italian, in particular from the associations of employers and trade unions (Bressan and Cambini 2009). 
Reactions can be quite hostile as in the case of the municipal government and many of the textile artisan 
workshops, or they can be relatively moderate and constructive in the case of bigger industrialists. The 
contrast between two extremes reflects their different economic interests and the conflicts within the 
Italian society. 
On the one hand, the irregularities are articulated into the discourse of unfair competition that sees 
Chinese apparel companies as a major economic threat to the Pratese ID. In particular, the spatial 
organization of pronto moda has been depicted as “closed” or “black”, and so has endangered the local 
economy that has been “open”. Based on this discourse, the spatial/physical exclusiveness of the stitching 
workshops nicely represents the “blackness” of the pronto moda. 
“The problem is the “blackness”. By “blackness”, I mean working out of rules, I mean not 
respecting the laws, I mean using clandestine immigrants paying them just a little bit, and I mean 
using just cash flow instead of invoices and documents, just not to pay taxes here. We have the 
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data here showing that from Prato to China, they exported something around one and one and half 
million Euros. This should not be the problem if they pay a little bit taxes. Because we are very 
open, very liberal, we are for who wants to invest money here in Italy and produce richness. But 
in this case, Chinese community, the most part of the community produces richness just for 
China.” 
Councilor of the municipal government, 4/11/2012, in Prato 
It is not hard to imagine why the municipal government puts pressure on pronto moda. Part of the reason 
is the widespread irregularities particularly in the stitching workshops. However, the other part of the 
reason may be attributed to the decline of the local textile industry (see Chapter 3). It is the smaller 
family-based producers, such as weavers and knitwear makers, that suffered the worst crisis (Dei Ottati 
2009, 1820). When the more powerful companies upgraded and transformed into real estate holders, these 
smaller companies had no other options but to close down. They were the main losers of the game. 
Therefore, it is the artisan’s associations that strongly oppose the Chinese pronto moda, and they became 
the supporters of the right wing municipal government (Bressan and Cambini 2009, 134). 
On the other hand, bigger companies (former final firms) take a much more moderate attitude toward the 
pronto moda than artisan workshops. PratoFutura is an independent association of particularly younger 
Italian entrepreneurs which has been doing research for the industrial district since 1983 (Chapter 3). 
Among other efforts it has made to cooperate with the Chinese companies and ameliorate the hostility 
between the two communities, PratoFutura proposed an experimental project called the fabbrica abitata 
(livable factory) to help correct the building abuse of Chinese stitching workshops without incurring too 
much costs for the owners. The whole idea is to create an architectural model based on which empty 
factories and warehouses can be transformed into a building integrating both living and productive 
functions. 
“We definitely think the law must be respected, but we have to find out a right way of legalizing 
together. Because we think that cooperation provides big opportunities for the local economy. By 
saying this, we are not only pointing to the interests of Italians. In fact, we do think that by 
improving the current condition, it would be good for Chinese themselves to have a better life and 
better working condition.” 
Member of the PratoFutura, 2/15/2012, in Prato 
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However, the motive of the project has to be articulated with the broader social sentiment toward 
immigration in Prato. In its introductory video (http://vimeo.com/39757408), the motive of the project is 
presented as “Can a symbol of degradation become a righteous project?” (“Un simbolo del degrade può 
diventare un progetto virtuoso?”) The legal way of using the factory space is depicted as “the western 
model”, whereas the fusion of living and productive spaces in the pronto moda is depicted as “the eastern 
model”. 
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Fig. 6.9: Conception of the fabbrica abitata (http://vimeo.com/39757408) 
The “western” way of organizing space is thus associated with images of well-planned cities, whereas the 
“eastern” way is associated with all sorts of the irregularities that Pratese people have been quite familiar 
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with through the local media. By so doing, a regime of truth about the correct/preferable way of spatial 
organization is constructed. The irregularities of the pronto moda become an essence of the eastern 
culture which can be pinned down to particular (underdeveloped) parts of the world. It needs to be 
modernized and appropriated in the city space of Prato, even though the city space itself in fact has been 
far from the “ideal” as shown by the images.  
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Fig. 6.10: Essentialization of western and eastern models of production (http://vimeo.com/39757408) 
 
Who is benefiting? 
My interviews with Italian authority and Chinese business owners in Prato generally agreed that the 
current organization of pronto moda is unsustainable and needs to be reformed. Indeed, with intensifying 
hostilities between Chinese and Italian communities, these irregularities ought to be corrected. But the 
central question is: who is going to pay the cost? So far, in both communities, everyone has remained 
silent on this question. In particular, within the pronto moda, because of the lack of an effective 
negotiation mechanism, it is nearly impossible to reach a consensus between final firms and stitching 
workshops. An owner of one of the leading final firms admits: 
 “There will be less and less stitching workshops of course. Most of the final firms are legal, 
whereas stitching workshops have all sorts of problems. I am indeed worried about these 
workshops, because they are the people who make our business successful. We have no solution 
to this problem yet.” 
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Owner of a final firm, 3/23/2012, in Prato 
By pushing the irregular part of the production into the stitching workshops, it is the final firms who are 
benefiting from this particular spatial organization of the pronto moda. Their public, “open” image relies 
on the secret, “closed” production of the stitching workshops. But they might not be the only ones who 
are benefiting. 
“Actually the people in power here usually play two roles: a public one and a private one. When 
they behave as public voices, they are against Chinese community and have racist voices. But 
when they act as private voices, they have very strong economic interests in the Chinese 
community and also in China. Actually many of buildings of the Chinese companies are owned 
by these people in power. Most of these people have these dual faces. So they know the 
difficulties of Prato people to stay with Chinese people. Many local Pratese are not accustomed to 
other cultures, and the Chinese they saw is only a particular portion of Chinese from Zhejiang and 
Fujian. They are manipulating the local public voices.” 
Social activist, 2/13/2012, in Prato 
Beginning in the late 1980s, in response to the prolonged crisis in the textile industry, some of the most 
powerful textile companies quit manufacturing and invested instead in real estate (Dei Ottati 1996, 45) 
(see Chapter 3). But this strategy could be profitable only if there were people who wanted to rent the 
buildings. Lacking effective town planning, Prato finally realized that it had built too many factories in 
the 1990s. As a result, it was the Chinese companies that saved the real estate market in Prato. Because of 
the emergence of pronto moda, the average housing rent in Prato follows prices in the tourist city of 
Florence, which are much higher than its neighboring industrial towns. Based on the Italian real estate 
website, the immobilare.it, as of June, 2013, the highest rent in Florence is 10.2 euro per square meter, 
while it is 9.1 euro in Prato (immobilare.it 2013). For example, in the city of Pistoia, the rent is 8.1 euro 
per square meter. Moreover, because of the discriminatory pricing practices of Italian landowners, the 
actual price for Chinese immigrants could be even higher. 
“Rent for a final firm could reach 5 to 6 thousand euros, but the receipts that they give to Chinese 
usually show a much lower value, since they Italians also want to evade taxes.” 
Lawyer, 2/24/2012, in Prato 
 “The rent for Chinese people is exceptionally high. Because of the Chinese, the housing price is 
soaring here. Lease for an apartment of 80 square meter costs between 800 and 900 euros.” 
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Lawyer in Prato, 1/15/2013, by phone call 
Because of the bubbles in the housing market, the real estate holders are able to maintain their profits. 
Therefore, while smaller Italian manufacturers in the textile industry have been pushing forward to 
regulate the Chinese firms, many bigger manufacturers who are also the property owners generally take a 
more neutral view toward the pronto moda. 
6.4. Dragon parade as spatial demarcation 
Since the late 2000s, there have been dragon parades every year for celebrating the Chinese New Year in 
Prato. Seen as the ceremonial representation of the Chinese presence in Prato, the forms of dragon parade 
evolved with the fluctuating relationship between the municipal government and Chinese community. 
Issues around the parade have been generally about which part of the city it can go through and to what 
extent the local institutions should get involved in. Thus, the dragon parade ritually defines the Chinese 
community into a part of seeable and a part of unseeable. The dragon parade is, thus, an excellent site 
through which we can understand the spatial demarcation of the racially mixed space of the Prato City. 
The dragon parade is an important tradition in China and all over the Chinese Diasporas. Since the 
majority of Chinese Pratese people are from Wenzhou and Fujian, the dragon parade in Prato is a little 
different from those in other places. The dragons leading the parade are supposed to march from one 
factory or store to another. The dragon’s visit is generally believed to bring good lucks for the whole year 
to the owner of the business. In return, factories and stores visited have to give the dragon money in red 
packets to show gratitude. During the heyday of 2010, the gratitude of each company went as high as 500 
Euros. Metaphorically, the dragon parades in Prato have been organized by the local Buddhist Society, 
one of the four Chinese associations and the only one without specific hometown affiliation. The money 
was thus collected for Buddhist charity. This particular tradition of dragon parade is said to be rooted in 
the southeastern part of China, in southern Zhejiang and northern Fujian areas (Author’s interview). 
Therefore, in Prato, dragon parade does not only function as an exotic symbol to celebrate 
multiculturalism, but also plays a very practical, philanthropic role in the community. 
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Since the early 2000s, because the prosperity of the pronto moda and the decline of the local textile 
industry, anti-immigration and anti-China sentiments have been brewing in the Pratese community. Many 
of the sentiments focus on the lack of transparency in the Chinese community and the low degree of 
social integration of Chinese immigrants (Di Castro and Vicziany 2009, 180). Discontent accumulated to 
the point that in 2007 Andrea Frattani, the Municipal Councilor for Multicultural Affairs Section, banned 
the dragon parade that year. Being a member of the Italian Communist Party, Frattani claimed the ban 
was to encourage social integration on the part of the Chinese community (Di Castro and Vicziany 2009, 
181). With no political voice in the municipal government, the Chinese associations had to compromise 
and they cancelled the public parade that year. As an alternative, the parade was moved into the Museo 
Pecci and symbolically performed for 30 minutes. The ban not only physically erased the ceremonial 
presence of the Chinese community in Prato, but also jeopardized its practical function within the Chinese 
community to spread philanthropy. It is because of this very concrete function in the community that 
whatsoever, the Chinese associations wanted the dragon back. 
Intermediated successfully by the local artistic-activist group DryPhoto, the parade was brought back in 
the next year in 2008. However, this ban had at least two long-term consequences for the parade. First, it 
dramatically transformed the route of the parade in the following years. Through the ban and related 
political debates, how to manage the visibility of the Chinese community became a central issue for both 
the municipal government and the communities. For the municipal government, the Chinese presence has 
to be controlled to a “manageable” degree that is tolerable to its electorate. Therefore, the Buddhist 
Society agreed to limit the parade mostly outside the wall of the symbolic medieval city. The ending point 
of the parade from then on was put in Piazza San Domenico, about only 100 meters inside the city wall. 
“That’s it, and no more.” For the Chinese community, the ban has made the companies more careful 
about their (in)visibility. For example, in the 2012 parade, dragons were directed only to the more 
established final firms and Chinese restaurants which are supposed to be “public face” of the Chinese 
community, whereas all the stitching workshops were carefully avoided on the way. For the Italian 
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community, the parade was intended to be the only chance every year to look into Chinese businesses. 
Many Italians followed the dragons into the firms and stores to see the inside that was normally “closed” 
to them. To cater to their curiosity, Chinese firms and stores normally arranged a table of various Chinese 
snacks and fruits for the visitors. 
“We also want to make sure the parade happen because we think the dragon parade is the only 
place and time that the Chinese community becomes visible and transparent to Italians. You 
know, during the parade, people could walk into the shops, into the pronto moda and actually see 
the inside.” 
Social activist in DryPhoto, 2/13/2012, in Prato 
Second, since the initial motive for the ban was to urge the “social integration” of the Chinese community, 
the content of the parade in the following years was adjusted to show the willingness of the Chinese 
community to be integrated, at least for its leaders (i.e., owners of final firms). Multiple Italian elements 
have been gradually integrated into the parade, including the Sbandieratori (a group of players dressed in 
medieval costume and playing medieval flags, a typical Italian holiday tradition). Finally in 2012, both of 
the two dragons were played by Italians. With continuous struggles and compromises, the dragon parade 
has become the prism of different (spatial) rationalities in the Chinese and Italian communities in Prato, 
embodying the contingent articulation of economic, social and political forces in Prato surrounding the 
Chinese pronto moda. 
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Chapter 7: Economic cooperation and the role of the local government 
In order to survive globalization, IDs have to develop new competitive advantages by either reducing 
labor costs or improving their position in global value chains (Rabellotti, Carabelli, and Hirsch 2009; 
Chiarvesio, Di Maria, and Micelli 2010; De Marchi, Lee, and Gereffi 2013).  Italian textile companies in 
Prato have been trying to upgrade their products or diversify into service sectors since the 1990s (Dei 
Ottati 2009; also see Chapter 3).  However, both the local entrepreneurs and workers suffered during this 
transformation, as the number of textile firms declined and unemployment rate remained high.  As a 
consequence, the local government has become involved in trying to control the negative impacts of the 
transformation and explore new opportunities for the Pratese ID. 
The role of the local government has always been crucial in Italian IDs.  On the one hand, as Becattini 
and many others indicated, because of the limited capital of the Italian small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), their transformation must be supported by an active local/regional government 
(Becattini et al. 2003; Becattini, Bellandi, and De Propris 2010).  On the other hand, the current model of 
local government in Prato has seemed to be unable to lead the industrial transformation, and the existing 
model of local negotiation based on business associations has failed to cope with radical changes (Bailey 
et al. 2010).  Therefore, Prato has had to explore a new model of local/regional development in which the 
role of the local government has had to change.  It is in this sense that the case of Prato is interesting and 
perhaps also unique.  Similar to other IDs, the Pratese local government also has to reposition itself in the 
industrial transformation (Bailey et al. 2010).  However, unlike many IDs which have been investing 
heavily abroad, Prato has a unique clustering of “foreign direct investment” in its homeland, i.e., the 
Chinese pronto moda. 
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The central questions of this chapter are: How can the Chinese pronto moda in Prato help the 
transformation of Prato, and what role should the local government take to improve the cooperation 
between Chinese and Italian firms in Prato?  Although it may be natural to think that the Chinese pronto 
moda provides business opportunities for the Pratese ID, the Chinese apparel firms in Prato pose three 
distinct dilemmas for the local government and Italian community.  First, it poses an economic dilemma 
for Italian firms which want to cooperate with Chinese firms but cannot find a good way to do so.  I have 
shown in Chapter 5 that the Chinese pronto moda has been by and large independent from the local textile 
industry.  Because the Italian textile industry has upgraded into higher-value markets, while the Chinese 
pronto moda is devoted to lower-value products, there has been very little synergistic cooperation 
between the Chinese apparel firms and Italian textile firms.  Meanwhile, unlike some other IDs where 
immigrants solely serve as labor for Italian owners, Chinese workers in Prato have been exclusively 
reserved for Chinese capital.  Thus the competitive advantages of the Chinese pronto moda are not easily 
shared with local Italian firms.  On the other hand, because of widespread labor irregularities in the 
Chinese stitching workshops, it is very difficult to completely regularize them in a short period of time.  
However, for the local government, to leave the Chinese firms completely unregulated means to lose the 
support of the Italian firms.  The Italian local government has therefore oscillated between the two 
extremes of over-regulation and under-regulation. 
Second, the Chinese pronto moda also posed a political dilemma for the Italian local government.  There 
has been no dominant lead firm in the Chinese pronto moda.  Unlike the Italian SMEs which are 
represented by well-organized business associations (Chapter 3), the Chinese associations in Prato have 
no legitimate authority over the majority of the Chinese apparel firms.  As I show later in this chapter, the 
absence of leadership in the Chinese community has made the negotiation between the local government 
and Chinese firms very difficult.  In order to improve the negotiation, the Pratese local government has 
turned to diplomatic channels and hoped that the Chinese government could help organize the Chinese 
firms in Prato.  However, in this chapter, I show that these efforts have been by and large failed. 
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Finally, there is a social dilemma with which the Pratese local government struggles.  Since the majority 
of Chinese immigrants in Prato are not Italian citizens, and since most of them speak little Italian, the 
communication between the two communities has suffered from multiple misunderstandings (also see 
Chapter 6).  The social/cultural gap between the two communities has made economic cooperation even 
more difficult.  I cannot predict the future of the social cooperation since both the Italian and Chinese 
communities are rapidly changing after the 2008 crisis.  Indeed, the Italian local government has begun to 
realize that the ultimate hope for a more integrated Pratese economy might rest on the second generation 
of Chinese immigrants. 
With this conjunctural dilemma as its backdrop, this chapter focuses on the ongoing project of the 
CREAF (Centro di Ricerche e Alta Formaznione, Center for Researches and Higher Education) which 
has been conducted by the region of Tuscany and the province of Prato.  The CREAF has been aimed to 
create a joint research center in Prato with capital and personnel inputs from both Tuscany and Zhejiang, 
where the majority of Chinese immigrants in Prato came from.  Although the international cooperation 
between Tuscany and Zhejiang is indeed necessary, the CREAF failed to recognize the importance of the 
“investment promotion community” (abbr. investment community hereafter) which includes not only 
firms and governments, but also banks, business associations, and other semi-public/semi-private 
organizations which have better knowledge of China and Chinese immigrants (Sellar and Lan 2013).  I 
show that the Italian regional and provincial governments have by and large failed on the project because 
of the top-down process they chose for the project.  Comparing the CREAF with the more successful 
Fondazione Italia Cina (Foundation Italy China) which has embedded itself in the investment community, 
I argue that the Pratese local government may need to adjust its role in the CREAF and in other 
cooperative projects. 
This chapter is divided into five sections.  Section 1 and 2 analyze the economic cooperation between the 
Chinese and Italian firms in Prato.  While the institutional level of cooperation (that is, through the 
traditional business associations) does not work very well (section 1), a small number of Italian firms 
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have developed individual relationship with the Chinese firms (section 2).  Section 3 analyzes the 
cooperation between Chinese and Italian local governments using the example of CREAF.  The project of 
CREAF is intended to create a joint research center and incubator in Prato with supports from the 
Zhejiang province.  Initiated in 2010, the progress (or the lack thereof) has been instructive for the local 
governments of both sides.  Section 4 introduces the “investment promotion community” with both 
governments and non-government actors across the Sino-Italian national border.  Using the example of 
the Fondazone Italia Cina, I argue that the active involvement of the investment community may solve 
many of the problems faced by the CREAF.  The last section goes beyond the economic cooperation and 
investigates the current debate of economic/social integration in Prato.  I show that the integration of the 
Chinese community in Prato has in fact been dependent upon a nuanced balance between over-regulation 
and under-regulation for the local government.  Integration has therefore produced a deadlock which may 
not be easily solved in the near future.  
7.1. The limitation of the business associations 
The Chinese pronto moda in Prato has created both opportunities and problems for local Italian 
companies. On the one hand, the Italian companies have been longing for the transnational connections of 
the Chinese pronto moda, and they wish to collaborate with Chinese companies either for exploring the 
Chinese market or for outsourcing to China.  Because most are SMEs and possess limited knowledge 
about China, they need Chinese partners.  On the other hand, because of the economic, social, and cultural 
disparities between the Chinese and Italian firms, the Italian entrepreneurs have found it very difficult to 
collaborate with the Pratese-Chinese.  In particular, the fact that the Chinese apparel firms refused to join 
the existing mechanism of business associations in Prato frustrated the Italian firms.  As shown in Chapter 
3, the business associations have been a nexus of local development since the takeoff of the Pratese 
economy in the 1950s.  However, because the business associations were incompatible with the goals of 
the Chinese apparel firms, Italian firms needed to develop new mechanisms of cooperation. 
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Unlike some other Italian IDs, there has been no major process of delocalization of manufacturing in 
Prato, at least not on a large scale.  Most of the textile manufacturing had been carried out in Prato until 
recently (Chapter 3).  As Dei Ottati (2003; 2009) shows, the two major trends among Italian firms in 
Prato since the 1990s have been the upgrading of the products and diversifying into other sectors such as 
real estate.  Unlike some IDs in Emilia-Romagna and in Veneto which have been investing heavily in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (see Sellar 2007), the Pratese ID has never had a “sister” industrial 
cluster in CEE.  Partly because of company size and partly because of its inexperience with globalization, 
the Pratese ID has been less active than others in manufacturing outsourcing.  For example, one of the 
Pratese textile companies recently transformed into manufacturing of LEDs (Light-Emitting Diode, a new 
lightening technology).  Instead of outsourcing manufacturing to lower-cost places, most of its 
manufacturing was still carried out in Prato: 
“For us, it is difficult to invest in China. We once sold something in China, when somebody wanted 
to produce something. But probably because they managed to copy our product, we lost the clients 
finally. At the moment, if we want to start a new factory, we probably want to build it in India.” 
Owner of an Italian electronic firm, interviewed in Prato on 2/15/2012 
“Those little companies do not have enough money and enough knowledge, and so are not able to 
go to China... These are textile and electronic companies.” 
Owner of a sourcing firm, interviewed in Prato on 3/23/2012 
Potentially, Chinese firms in Prato may help these Italian SMEs to explore the Chinese market or 
outsource manufacturing to China.  As the Unione Industriale Pratese (UIP) insisted, their Italian 
members were interested in collaborating with the Chinese companies in Prato (interview on 3/16/2012).  
However, there are several barriers to such collaboration.  Among them, the biggest complaint has been 
that the local Chinese firms did not want to join the traditional business associations, such as Unione 
Inudustriale Pratese (UIP) and Confederazione nazionale artigianato pratese (CNA Prato).  At the time 
of writing, only two Chinese firms have joined  the UIP. Of these two, one shifted from manufacturing to 
wholesale in 2010, while the other only joined the association in 2013.  Because the requirement for 
joining CNA is much lower than the UIP, and because the CNA has a longer tradition of recruiting 
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smaller immigrant manufacturers, the number of Chinese members in CNA is much larger, recently 
reaching 70 (CNA Toscana 2013).  As shown in Chapter 3, these local business associations have played 
an important role in the local industrial development, from collective bargaining between smaller and 
bigger manufacturers, to negotiations between firms and the local government.  Therefore, refusing to 
join the Italian business associations, the Chinese apparel firms directly challenge the cooperative 
conventions in Prato.  
Among the reasons the Chinese apparel firms did not join the business associations, were one economic 
reason and one legal reason (Author’s interviews).  First, although the Italian textile firms insisted that 
using locally produced fabrics was an opportunity for both Chinese and Italian firms, the Chinese apparel 
firms did not think so.  Since the Chinese pronto moda produces for lower-value working-class consumer 
markets, their demand for the locally produced higher-value fabrics is very limited (Chapter 5).  There 
have not been enough incentives for the Chinese apparel firms to join the business associations.  Such a 
gap between the two parallel value chains is evident in the following remarks: 
“It is very difficult. In the past, when the commissions of Zhejiang province came, as a gift, they 
would buy the goods that Italian government suggested. In Toscana, it was wine and textile. Wines 
were good and the Zhejiangese government could easily persuade companies to buy them up. But 
for textile, no one wanted to buy, because Italian textiles are way too expensive for them. On the 
one hand, China now produces most diverse and the biggest quantity of textiles in the world. On 
the other hand, even though the quality of Italian textile is high, this quality is not necessary for the 
Chinese pronto moda. Textiles made in China are good enough for both companies in China and 
these in Prato.” 
Association of friendship between Chinese and Italians, on 2/22/2012 
Second, because of the widespread irregularities among Chinese apparel firms in Prato (see Chapter 6), 
they normally cannot or do not want to comply with the regulations of the associations.  Common 
irregularities among the Chinese pronto moda include disregarding the safety guidance, tax evasion, and 
undocumented labor (Ceccagno and Rastrelli 2008). One major complain from the UIP is that some of the 
Chinese firms closed down after enjoying the tax incentives of the first two years, but later reopened 
under a new name. 
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“They (the Chinese apparel firms) were too new, registered for only one year or half. How can they 
be our members? This is the major part. This is not our problem, because we cannot accept 
members with one or two years, and think of closing down now and opening another. There is no 
official requirement for the admission, but we need to know a bit more about the firms. We have to 
know who you are and how you work. We Confindustria, not only us the UIP but all the branches 
of the Confindustria have ethical standards. This is very important to guarantee the history of the 
company. You can have one year of history but you have to show you are doing legally well.” 
UIP, interviewed on 3/16/2012 
Some of these legal problems in fact derived from the different business conventions between Chinese 
and Italian firms.  As mentioned in earlier chapters, the Chinese apparel firms typically require long 
working hours and higher flexibility from their workforce.  It is very common for them to exceed the 8-
hour limitation of the Italian labor law and violate the safety regulation that requires working place to be 
separated from the dorms.  These irregularities make it impossible for them to pass the inspections 
required by the associations.  Therefore, even though there can be a variety of benefits for being a 
member of UIP or CNA Prato, including an improved reputation and more bargaining power with the 
local government, the majority of the Chinese apparel firms have decided to stay outside. 
It is unfair to attribute the failure of the traditional Italian associations to the rigidity of their institutional 
structure.  In fact, many less formal associations have faced similar problems when dealing with the 
Chinese firms in Prato.  For instance, the Prato Futura, a business association of younger entrepreneurs 
but also a research institute, has been trying to create a number of cooperative projects with the Chinese 
firms, including the fabbrica abitata (livable factory, see Chapter 6).  Like more traditional associations, 
they have also faced reluctance from the Chinese firms. 
“It was a difficult experience. On formal greetings, we were OK, but when we got to the real points, 
they were very reluctant to talk. We found ourselves on different planes, while we really wanted to 
discuss the real things, the Chinese were too formal. During the meantime between then and now, 
there were also a lot of meetings that we organized with young entrepreneurs. The last one was in 
June or July two to three years ago with ASSOCINA. During these meetings, we always found 
these younger Chinese entrepreneurs interesting, but still failed to talk about real things as they 
were too formal. Turns out that every time we needed to start over with basic issues, so every time 
was the first time.” 
Prato Futura, interviewed on 2/15/2012 
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Prato Futura certainly realized the reasons why Chinese apparel firms have been less willing to join.  The 
economic and legal gaps between the two sides blocked cooperation.  Even though the Prato Futura 
proposed the idea of the fabbrica abitata, without positive feedback from the Chinese community, they 
still cannot make the program effective.   
7.2. Firm-level cooperation 
The ineffectiveness of the business associations does not mean that there is no cooperation between the 
Chinese and Italian companies at all. In fact, my research shows that despite the stagnation at the 
institutional level, the cooperation at firm level has never ceased to exist.  For instance, to offer sourcing 
services to Italian SMEs, a number of sourcing companies recently emerged in Prato.  Unlike the 
experience that local business associations have had with the Chinese companies, these sourcing 
companies have become important intermediates between the Chinese and Italian firms.  For instance, one 
company “M” has been sourcing from China since 2005.  As its owner indicated, these intermediate firms 
play an important role in bridging the business cultures between Italy and China. 
“If we say ‘twenty days’, it is twenty days. But no, Chinese is not doing in this way. We said the 
same thing to our Chinese suppliers in Ningbo: twenty days. And then they had more than 24 hours 
for their day. I like Ningbo, which is a very beautiful place. We had this partner who ran a tiny 
company. We asked: ‘Stephen, when are you able to finish the contract?’ And he answered: ‘hmm, 
forty days.’ And for me, it means 120 days. It is this way. Timing is something that Chinese never 
respects. And there is another problem in China. When you claimed, the problem didn’t exist. For 
example, one time we wanted to import MP3s from China. And this Chinese entrepreneur shows us 
this and that, perfect. And I asked: ‘Hey buddy, have you owned all the certificates and licenses for 
producing this?’ ‘Yes, of course’ he answered. We paid in advance, and import say 1,000 pieces. 
MP3 has been registered, and so I asked the guy for the document which allowed us to use the 
‘MP3’ name. They said: ‘yes, but it is 2 dollars more for each piece.’ ‘No, this is not right.’ ‘But 
you haven’t asked…’ And then I said: ‘OK, $2,000, I will pay. But I will come to claim.’” 
Owner of the Italian sourcing company, interviewed in Prato on 3/23/2012 
Instead of having Chinese partners in Prato, the M had opened offices in Shanghai and Hong Kong, and 
directly sourced from Ningbo and the Pearl River Delta.  As the three Italian firms I interviewed 
confirmed, many Italian sourcing firms simply jumped over the local Chinese firms to reach China.  
Although I still have no data to show the real number of the Pratese FDIs in China, such phenomenon 
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seem to be increasingly common.  The different business conventions between Chinese and Italian firms 
are in fact bigger than one may think.   
While Chinese firms respect the infinite liability of the company owner (i.e., debts of a company will be 
collected from the owner even after the company is closed), the Italian firms follow the limited liability 
model (i.e., debts of a company will be defaulted after bankruptcy).  All Chinese apparel firms that I 
interviewed (13 in total) except one reported debt defaults of their previous Italian business partners.  
Debt defaults seem to be common with the contracts between Chinese and Italian companies.  Informants 
claimed that this became one of the main reasons why they preferred to partner with Chinese firms.  
Because of limited language skill and their own irregularities, they were reluctant to go through legal 
cases with Italian firms. 
Besides the frequent defaults, informants also claimed that Chinese companies tended to make the 
payment faster than Italian ones.  While in the apparel industry, Italian cutter-designers usually pay 
between three and six months after the shipment of the finished products, Chinese cutter-designers can 
pay in less than two months.  Therefore, the integration of the apparel production within Chinese 
networks dramatically reduces the fixed capital requirement for opening a business in pronto moda. 
In short, the cooperation between local Chinese and Italian firms in Prato has been limited for at least two 
reasons.  First, because of the little economic incentive and huge legal obstacles, many Chinese firms in 
Prato did not want to join the Italian business associations such as UIP and CNA Prato.  This has made 
the institutional (or semi-government) cooperation very difficult.  Second, because of the different 
business conventions, the cooperation at the firm level is also limited.  If Becattini (2001) is right, and all 
the previous successful transformation can be explained by historically contingent but successful 
negotiations between firms and local government, can the Pratese local government provide leadership 
this time?  What has the local government done with the opportunities and problems of the Chinese 
pronto moda? 
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7.3. CREAF and its problems 
Different from previous crises that Prato has successfully managed, the current crisis of the local textile 
industry requires a different model of leadership, in which the Pratese local government has failed to 
perform (Bailey et al. 2010).  I argue that the Pratese ID is currently transitioning from an old mechanism 
of firm-government interaction (see Chapter 3) to a new one in which the business associations can no 
longer be the central actor.  The two main problems of the CREAF have been the top-down process of its 
decision making process and its failure to recognize the importance of the “investment promotion 
community”.  I discuss the first problem here and the second in the next section. 
Comparing the recent development of Prato and the English ID of the West Midlands, Bailey et al. (2010) 
argued that the traditional bottom-up leadership in the Italian IDs (which they call the organic leadership) 
has not been able to overcome the radical changes and failed to take an alternative development path.  
Thus a new and cross-scalar leadership is needed.  The previous section argued that the old interactive 
mechanism between the local government and business associations could not deal with the emerging 
Chinese pronto moda, and that the majority of Italian firms are not able to make use of the transnational 
connections that the Chinese pronto moda relies on.   It is this inability of the existing “leadership” that 
blocks the potential cooperation between Italian and Chinese firms, and thus triggers a series of social and 
political tensions.  Based on my research, there have been three major obstacles for the coming of a new 
organic leadership: the political conflict between the left and right, the institutional inertia on both Italian 
and Chinese sides, and the lack of effective leadership in the Chinese pronto moda. 
Top-down process of the CREAF 
Founded by both the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economic Development under 
the bigger program of MAE-Regioni-Cina, the CREAF has been a typical top-down decision-making 
process which is completely different from the traditional bottom-up process in the Italian IDs.  Initiated 
in 2009, “the program was founded with the objective of providing technical support to the relationship 
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between Italian regions and Chinese provinces, aiming to create virtuous dynamics of collaboration that 
have measurable impact on the territory, with particular attention to the areas of the South.” (MAE-
Regioni-Cina 2013)18  Practically, each of the Italian regions has to pick up one or more partner provinces 
in China, and through the diplomatic introduction of the Italian government, develop specific joint 
projects.  Until 2011, the participant Italian regions included Emilia-Romagna, Campania, Marche, 
Molise, Puglia, Veneto, and Tuscany, while the Chinese partners were all located in the Yangtze River 
Delta including Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang.  Specific projects included renewable energy, tourism, 
and textile innovation. 
Under the MAE-Regioni-Cina, the Region of Tuscany (Puglia also involved with a lesser extent) picked 
Zhejiang as her partner and decided to create a joint research center in Prato with firms and research 
institutes from both China and Italy (the following part is based on author’s interview with the organizers 
of CREAF in 2/2012 and 11/2013).  The name CREAF stands for the Centro di ricerche e alta 
formazione (Center for Research and Higher Education).  Physically, the center is an old two-story textile 
factory building with 13,000 square meters which has nearly been finished at the point of my writing.  
Although there have been a number of meetings between the two sides since 2010, the actual “research” 
for the research center was approved only recently.  In 2012, the Region of Tuscany and the Province of 
Zhejiang signed an agreement to create the joint research institute called TEX TECH, which, as its name 
implies, will focus on textile innovation with capital (about 200,000 Euro) and personnel (about 20) from 
each party.  Besides the TEX TECH, the CREAF currently receives very lukewarm welcome from both 
the local Italian and Chinese companies.  At the time of writing, only one Italian engineering company 
has decided to move in after it is finished. 
There are a number of reasons that stalled the progress of CREAF: (1) the political conflicts between the 
left-wing regional and provincial governments, and the right-wing municipal government (the comune), 
                                                          
18 “Il Programma nasce con l’obiettivo di fornire sostegno tecnico ai rapporti fra Regioni italiane e Province cinesi, 
mirando a creare dinamiche virtuose di collaborazione che abbiano ricadute misurabili sul territorio, con particolare 
attenzione alle aree del Mezzogiorno.” 
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(2) the opposition from the local Italian business associations, (3) the lack of effective leadership of the 
Chinese apparel industry in Prato, and (4) the different interests between Tuscany and Zhejiang. 
 Political conflicts 
Italian partisan politics has always been engaged with struggles over the legislation of immigration.  
Zincone (2006) shows that changing Italian immigration policy since the 1990s has been more a 
consequence of the partisan conflicts than of the actual effects of the policy.  This has an important 
consequence in Prato.  After the 2009 election, the center-right coalition won the municipal government 
(the comune), while the regional and provincial governments were still held by center-left coalition 
(Fazzino 2010).  The political conflict between the comune and the province-region has been one of the 
major obstacles of the CREAF.  While the province-region has been the main organizer of the CREAF 
and has sent multiple commissions to China, the comune supported by the most powerful Italian 
industrialist families has been lukewarm on the project.  In terms of the current stagnation of the CREAF, 
the province-region blamed the partisan parochialism, while the comune referred to the actual mistakes 
that the province-region made in the project.  
“The different stances between the two are political not economical, because the provincial is 
center-left while the commune is center-right. The main disagreement is on the cost of CREAF. 
The problem we have is that we used to be late in terms of timing. They said that our topic was not 
so clear. There are only political differences, not economic differences. While disagreeing with us, 
they didn’t give any proposal.” 
Province of Prato, interviewed on 3/15/2012 
“It’s not easy, because at the political level, we don’t agree with both the means and the goal of the 
project. Entrepreneurs are afraid that this project will steal the Italian knowhow of our production 
and lose it to China; the knowhow is now the only thing left here. So they are suspicious of the 
project. So we are not involved in this project. The mayor is involved, but he doesn’t agree with the 
policy.” 
Comune of Prato, interviewed on 4/11/2012 
In particular, the center-right comune has made the regularization of the Chinese firms a prerequisite for 
any cooperation.  As Zincone argues, as the Italian public opinion shifted from central-left to central-right 
in the past two decades, the political strategy of the central-left parties had to respond.  One consequence 
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for the center-left has been the adoption of the identitarian and legalitarian discourse toward immigration 
(Zincone 2006, 359).  While the region-province adopted a more moderate attitude toward regularization, 
the comune insisted it to be the prerequisite for any cooperation. 
“We are investing first of all lots of resource in teaching Italian and a project of integration between 
families and students. This is a project funded by the province and the region. This is an agreement 
of all the schools here from the primary to the university. To the other side, the region of Tuscany 
will create a new project very soon, perhaps in 15 days. The goal is to help black Chinese 
entrepreneurs to legalize themselves.” 
Province of Prato, interviewed on 3/15/2012 
“The problem is the ‘blackness’. By ‘blackness’, I mean working out of rules, I mean not 
respecting the laws, I mean using clandestine immigrants paying them just a little bit, and I mean 
using just cash flow instead of invoices and documents, just not to pay taxes here. We have the data 
here showing that from Prato to China, they exported something around one and one and half 
million Euros. This should not be the problem if they pay a little bit taxes. Because we are very 
open, very liberal, we are for who wants to invest money here in Italy and produce richness. But in 
this case, Chinese community, the most part of the community produces richness just for China. ” 
Comune of Prato, interviewed on 4/11/2012 
As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, complete regularization is nearly impossible at the current moment.  
Since the majority of Chinese Pratese people were first generation, they were not able to learn Italian 
immediately.  Meanwhile, a large part of the competitiveness of the Chinese pronto moda relies on the 
irregular production activities of the stitching workshops, and it is nearly impossible for these workshops 
to be completely regularized.  As shown in Chapter 6, many stitching workshops violate the Italian labor 
law by working extra long hours and mixing the factory with dorms in one building.  Similar to what 
Ceccagno (2007a) shows, these irregularities contribute to the flexibility of stitching workshops that are 
the foundation of the Chinese pronto moda.  Without economically compensating the stitching workshops, 
neither the moderate approach of the region-province nor the radical approach of the comune is likely to 
have immediate outcome. 
Opposition from the Italian business associations 
Despite the potential importance to the Pratese ID, the CREAF has been boycotted by the local Italian 
business associations, in particular, the UIP.  In fact, the attitude of the UIP and its Italian member firms 
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has been complicated or even self-contradictory toward the cooperation.  On the one hand, the UIP 
strongly opposed the idea of the CREAF.  The main worry has been that a joint research center will 
eventually teach the Chinese apparel manufacturers the tricks of fashion innovation which is the last 
advantage of the Italian firms.  On the other hand, individual firms as members of the UIP continued to 
cooperate with their specific Chinese partners.  In fact, some of the lead firms in the UIP circumvented 
the association and created their own long-term relationship with some of the more powerful Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Prato. 
As aforementioned, the CREAF has been so far a top-down process initiated by the Italian national 
government and conducted mainly by the region of Tuscany and the province of Prato.  The Italian firms 
and their business associations only participated in the project recently. The UIP, association of the 
Pratese industrialists in particular have voiced strong opposition to the CREAF for two reasons: 
“We have the first doubt—that is, probably this project will set us in a bad condition by giving the 
Chinese our knowhow, which is very important to us. We don’t know if this is going to be changed. 
The second doubt is also fundamental. This project is currently still an empty box. This is only 
about the project itself, not about anything else, not about the Chinese people. It is now clear that 
the aim of this project is not for us, not for the industry. We are convinced that they are supporting 
knowledge innovation and technology improvement. But we doubt if the government is able to 
achieve such goal. We don’t like such project.” 
Unione industriale pratese (UIP), interviewed on 3/16/2012 
The opposition of the UIP to the CREAF was also confirmed by the provincial government.  However, 
the provincial government carefully distinguished the business association from its individual members, 
and claimed that the CREAF had won popularity among the member firms: 
“The other economic part, which is outside of the UIP, supports us. And it’s the UIP who is a little 
bit cold, but individual entrepreneurs agree with us.” 
Province of Prato, interviewed on 3/15/2012 
At the first glance, there seems to be a contradiction between the complaints of the UIP and the 
explanation of the province.  However, both of the parties are right to a certain extent.  While the UIP did 
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boycott the CREAF and the leadership of the provincial government in the economic cooperation with 
Chinese firms, individual Italian firms have been actively working with their local Chinese partners. 
“One of the two Chinese members in the UIP is actually working with an Italian entrepreneur for 
his branch in China. He has a big place in Northern part of Zhejiang. They are building this big 
development for Made-in-Italy goods, such as showrooms.  More interestingly, the chairman of the 
UIP after denounced our project recently went to China with his own Chinese partners.” 
Organizer of CREAF, interviewed on 11/8/2013 
In fact, I want to argue that the UIP’s opposition against the CREAF has been just part of its inability to 
continue to play a central role in the changing situation of the Pratese ID and to participate in the 
economic cooperation with local Chinese firms.  In particular, the inertia of its institutional format is not 
compatible with the Chinese pronto moda.  Because of the widespread irregularities among the Chinese 
pronto moda, it has been difficult for the UIP to admit Chinese members without changing its rules.  
Although the UIP and other business associations tolerated the irregular labor of Italian textile firms 
between the 1950s and 1970s (Becattini 2001), they seem to be less flexible with the Chinese apparel 
firms in the 2000s. 
Lack of effective leadership of the Chinese community in Prato 
The absence of a representative leadership in the Chinese community in Prato also created problems for 
cooperation between Chinese and Italian firms in Prato.  Although there have been four Chinese 
associations in Prato, none of them has the legitimacy to represent the interest of the whole community 
(Chapter 6).  Without an effective leadership, the Chinese community in Prato simply cannot fit into the 
existing mechanisms that are familiar to the Pratese local government and business associations. 
“They didn’t ask for contact with the institution, that is, with us. When we tried to contact them, it 
was difficult to find the representative, and it was difficult to find the one to speak with.” 
Comune of Prato, interviewed on 4/11/2012 
“We have difficulties to identify which institutions represent the Chinese community, so we didn’t 
know which young Chinese entrepreneurs came to the meeting. And all these were not formal 
meetings; they were only dinners. Our current president brought in a few Chinese entrepreneurs 
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through two or three of Chinese associations here. We talked about everything at the dinner, but 
when we tried to talk about our way of doing business, the conversation stopped.” 
UIP, interviewed on 3/16/2012 
Therefore, in order to engage with the local Chinese community, the regional administration of Tuscany 
asked the Chinese Consulate at Florence for help.  In 2012, supervised by the Chinese Consulate, the first 
“liaison team” of the Chinese community in Prato was formed.  Comprising seven representatives 
including not only Chinese entrepreneurs but also Chinese professionals and professors, the liaison team 
was supposed to bridge the communicative gap between the Chinese community and Italian government 
in Prato. 
“The Chinese Consulate plays the most important role in the communication between us and the 
Italian local government.  The liaison team was organized by the consulate.  Whenever needed, we 
normally asked the consulate to speak for us, because we cannot represent the whole of the 
community.” 
One of the Chinese associations, interviewed on 3/23/2012 
According to the Italian local government, the liaison team did not dramatically improve the 
communication.  As one informant of the comue indicates, the liaison team was nothing but an ad hoc 
creation of the Chinese consulate (interviewed on 4/11/2012).  Even though the team comprised members 
from a variety of sectors, it still did not have the legitimacy to represent the community as a whole.  For 
instance, as of 2013, none of the members was a migrant worker or ran a stitching workshop.  As a 
consequence, both the Italian local government and business associations continued to complain about the 
ineffectiveness of the team.  The Italian request for regularization cannot be solved by the team because 
the real bearers of the irregularities (stitching workshops and workers) are not in the team. 
“The main the problem is the representative of the people with whom we are in contact. Too many 
times, we thought we were speaking to the representatives, but they said: ‘no, we don’t know about 
this issue and so are not the right persons to speak with.’ Last month, we called up representatives 
to talk about Chinese enterprises. We have been assigned seven representatives, but it was tiring to 
have them in the meeting. In the meeting, they answered that they were not the right persons to 
speak about enterprises, because they are not involved in this kind of work. So we asked why, since 
we sent invitation to the president of the association and to the seven representatives. Now, we 
don’t know with whom we should talk about Chinese enterprises, because we are doing a project 
about enterprises.” 
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Comune of Prato, interviewed on 4/11/2012 
Therefore, without an effective and representative leadership, there has been no voice of the local Chinese 
community in the CREAF or in any broader cooperation between the Italian and Chinese governments. 
“For CREAF which is so far not really working, there is not much (involvement of the Chinese 
pronto moda). But last week, there was this Chinese company which showed interests to open an 
office in CREAF. But for the kinds of the Chinese companies you know in Prato, I don’t know. For 
the subcontractors, if some new demands generate from CREAF, they will be involved anyways. 
This will be kind of an indirect benefit or involvement.” 
Organizer of the CREAF, interviewed on 11/8/2013 
 
Different interests between Tuscany and Zhejiang 
The cross-border nature of the CREAF also posed a completely new problem for the Pratese local 
government.  Since the Chinese apparel firms in Prato are disorganized and reluctant to join the existing 
institutional network of business associations, the only way for the Pratese local government is to seek 
helps from the Chinese government.  However, the region of Tuscany and the province of Prato had no 
prior experience with the Chinese government.  Two years after the first commission to China, the Italian 
local government and organizers of the CREAF have realized that they could not presume the same 
interests from their Chinese counterpart (with Organizer of the CREAF, interviewed on 11/8/2013). 
The CREAF has been primarily proposed by the Italian side as a research project, whereas the Chinese 
side preferred the idea of a joint business venture.  The organizers of the CREAF include the Italian local 
governments and University of Florence, but neither Italian nor Chinese local firms were involved at the 
beginning.  However, on the other side the cooperation, a Chinese private company has been in charge of 
the entire project and handled most of the commissions between the two countries.  Such mismatched 
interests between the two sides have created a lot of tensions during the project.  It has been clear that 
while the main purpose of the Italian side was to bring in Chinese investments and researchers for public 
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good, the Chinese side is merely interested in specific joint ventures with local Italian producers to make 
use of the Made-in-Italy label for Chinese market. 
“To us this is a completely new kind of approach which is much more market oriented than we 
were. So our leaders were very skeptical about cooperating with this lady because they were afraid 
of the fact that she was much more oriented for making her own profits. Maybe this is good on the 
personal base between one Italian company and one Chinese company, but not good with this 
project of a joint research center. This is the situation that has blocked us for a couple of years. 
Now the leaders are still the same.” 
Organizer of the CREAF, interviewed on 11/8/2013 
Despite the complaints from Tuscany, the joint business venture has actually been a very common model 
for the Chinese local governments to create joint ventures with foreign capital.  After the local 
governments set up the platform of cooperation through diplomatic channels, they normally leave the 
actual negotiation to individual firms, mostly state-owned but sometimes also private (Thun 2006).  With 
little experience about China, the organizers of CREAF were confused in the meetings: 
“On the technical base the conversation was absolutely easy. The researchers speak more and less 
same language. They know what kind of issues they have to cope with, such as fibers, machines 
and so on. And they were really interested in discussing with each other. But we really couldn’t 
find a way to make a step forward with the company (which is in charge of the Chinese side).  It’s a 
very strange situation. For example, when we went to Rome to the Chinese embassy, they (the 
Chinese embassy) knew exactly what was going on but they said: ‘You have to be patient. You 
have to wait and something will move.’ But nothing really changed.” 
Organizer of the CREAF, interviewed on 11/8/2013 
All four problems pointed to the fact that the top-down process of the CREAF did not work with the 
transnational cooperation.  Unlike previous crises that Prato has overcome, the current crisis of the ID 
requires a different solution that is no longer dependent on the local business associations.  What is this 
new solution?  How can the Pratese adjust themselves to the era of globalization?  I argue that the 
emerging transnational investment community may be a potential solution for the Pratese ID. 
7.4. Toward a cohesive, transnational investment community 
As the 2008 crisis deepened, a debate emerged about the uniqueness of this crisis.  Some scholars argued 
that the current crisis may mark the turning point of the global trade, in which emerging economies such 
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as China are now winning more shares from the European Union (EU) and the US (Cattaneo, Gereffi, and 
Staritz 2010).  What does this second wave of “Global Shift” (Dicken, 2010) mean to Italian IDs in 
general, and to Prato in particular?  Sellar and I (2013) have argued that the crisis represents a watershed 
moment in which pre-existing relationships between institutions, firms and territories undergoes deep 
transformations.  In particular, a transnational, but cohesive “investment promotion community” (abbr. 
investment community hereafter) has emerged including government agencies at multiple scales, financial 
institutions, consultancies and business association.  Actors in the investment community actively share 
information and personnel, and facilitate the investments between two countries in both directions (both 
for Chinese in Italy and for Italians in China).   
What has been missing in the CREAF is precisely the recognition and active involvement of the 
investment community.  Originally a top-down process from the Italian national government, it has been 
difficult for the CREAF to reach consensus with non-state actors.  On the one hand, the Pratese local 
government has not been able to work with the local business associations who are suspicious of the very 
idea of the CREAF.  On the other hand, the Pratese local government has little knowledge of China, and 
therefore, has not been able to develop concrete investment projects attractive to the Chinese agencies and 
the local government of Zhejiang.  Moreover, the traditional model of economic development based on 
business associations could not help much in filling the gap. 
Can there be a new model of local development for Prato?  Can the investment community between 
China and Italy facilitate the transformation and globalization of Prato?  Based on my research, it seems 
to be possible.  In fact, there have been a number of transnational programs between the two countries 
beyond the MAE-Regioni-Cina.  The most successful ones in fact never followed the top-down process as 
in the MAE-Regioni-Cina.  Instead, they have been heavily relying on the investment community which 
effectively prevents the problems faced by the CREAF.  The Fondazione Italia Cina (Italy-China 
Foundation) has been one of the best examples. 
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Founded in Milan in 2003, the Foundation is a private non-profit organization primarily for facilitating 
international investments between Italy and China (Fondazione Italia Cina 2013).  Based on a group of 
national and local governments, banks, business associations, and Italian and Chinese firms, the 
Foundation embodies a typical platform for the investment community: 
“On the board, we have institutions. We have central government, local governments in Italy (a 
selected number of them). Then we have big enterprises which are investing in China, among the 
big enterprises in Italy. There are FIAT and Pirelli, from both manufacturing and service sectors. 
We also have the three biggest Italian banks, and Confindustria and other associations of 
enterprises. So our board is highly representative of businesses in Italy which reference to the 
Chinese market. Our membership base is actually constituted by investors in China and a select 
number of Chinese multinationals which invest in Italy, and a number of businesses who have 
ongoing businesses with China but don’t have FDIs in China, but generally evaluate the possibility 
of the Chinese market.” 
Fondazione Italia Cina, interviewed in Milan on 11/12/2013 
The Foundation is peculiar in two ways.  First, while being a private organization, it has close relationship 
with the Italian national government.  The government support has lent the organization a semi-public 
image and allows it to obtain respect from the Chinese local governments and state-owned enterprises.  
This semi-public image has been deemed very important for cooperating with the Chinese government: 
“We know how much government is respected and valued in China, and how much important to 
facilitate or make possible a number of gears. The fact that an Italian company tells the Chinese 
government that they are part of our foundation which has government backing can be well, 
positively perceived by the Chinese government.” 
Fondazione Italia Cina, interviewed in Milan on 11/12/2013 
Second, and more importantly, the Foundation offers a shared platform for not only Italian firms in China, 
but also Chinese firms in Italy.  In such a way, the Foundation has better knowledge of individual 
demands of both Italian and Chinese firms, and has been able to offer the opportunities for cooperation on 
a concrete basis.  In particular, the access to both Chinese and Italian banks has helped them maintain an 
information channel for both Italian firms in China and Chinese firms in Italy. 
“It happens to us quite often that Italian investment banks and Chinese investment banks which are 
located in Italy, for example Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, all in Milan, 
to provide them assistance in finding potential partners and potential targets for investment and etc.” 
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Fondazione Italia Cina, interviewed in Milan on 11/12/2013 
With these two advantages, the Foundation developed a very effective and efficient framework to 
facilitate the cross-scalar cooperation between Italy and China.  The best example is the joint project 
between Emilia-Romagna and Guangdong (author interview with the Foundation on 11/12/2013).  
Similar to the MAE-Regioni-Cina, the Guangdong-Italy Traineeship has been initiated by the Italian 
national government, and managed by five Italian regions, Emilia-Romagna being the leading one.  What 
differs from the MAE-Regioni-Cina is that the concrete projects of the program have to be proposed by 
individual firms in the region.  With the concrete need of the firm, the Foundation goes to the diplomatic 
channels, and finds specific corresponding partners at each level of the project. 
“The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatically approached the Bureau of Foreign Affairs 
of Guangdong Province. The Bureau of Guangdong identified an internal office of SMEs which 
can be directly referenced for this specific project.  This office is exactly aligned with a department 
in the region of Emilia-Romagna, the department for internationalization of SMEs. And then this 
office of SMEs of Guangdong identified the Guangdong Association of Corporation and Exchange 
of Private Enterprises (GACEPE) for our foundation. So the layers are exactly the same. The 
delegations are exactly the same. Two governments, ministry of foreign affairs of Italy and 
ministry of foreign affairs of China, and two regional and provincial governments, and we and the 
GACEPE. GACEPE is not fully private, which is very typical in China, but in fact very similar to 
our association. We cooperated very successful on this project and we are now seeking to cooperate 
on more projects.” 
Fondazione Italia Cina, interviewed in Milan on 11/12/2013 
In this case, not only government actors of different levels, but firms and semi-public organization (i.e. 
the Fondazione Italia Cina) actively share a same information channel and work toward a concrete 
demand of a specific firm.  By so doing, all of the four difficulties that the CREAF has been facing were 
controlled.  Conversation is held between specific institutions and therefore partisan conflicts are avoided.  
Projects are requested by specific firms and therefore business associations are appeased and play a less 
important role.  With the support from specialized institutions from China, the Italian firm can also 
identify the most suitable Chinese partner.  At last, with corresponding institutions at each level of the 
two governments, shared interests are always confirmed. 
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This mechanism seems to nicely fix the problems of the CREAF.  However, it is still not perfect.  The 
biggest problem is that most of the Italian SMEs are not able to get involved in such a private Foundation, 
and as a private organization, the Foundation has no obligation to help the SMEs. 
“Considering the industrial sector of Italy is represented by 95% of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, I can easily say that the SMEs however in our foundation represent around 1/3 of the 
companies. But this is a direct consequence I believe of people’s perception of our position in the 
business world. We are seen as a lobbying organization which represents interests mostly of the 
investors. The investors are usually medium and large companies. Also, the price of our 
membership is quite high compared to the chamber of commerce, considering that we are sort of 
holding under our foundation the Italy China Chamber of Commerce. For them, fee is 1,000 euro to 
be a member, or 2,000 euro to be a member of board. In our case, the minimum fee is 1,500 euro to 
be a member. To be a member of board, you pay 30,000 euro.” 
Fondazione Italia Cina, interviewed in Milan on 11/12/2013 
It is not the place for me to give policy advice here.  What I am trying to do is to explore the potential of 
the investment promotion community in the globalization of the Pratese SMEs.  Considering the current 
problems of the CREAF, the model of the Fondazione Italia Cina seems to be instructive.  Although the 
Tuscan government has realized the importance of the Chinese local government in the local development 
project, it failed to develop a practical model to work with the investment community.  This may be the 
most crucial reason why the CREAF has been stagnant so far. 
7.5. Economic cooperation and integration 
“But we cannot make integration if there’s no wish of the Chinese community to integrate 
themselves. There is part of Chinese community who wants to live here, especially the second 
generation who was born here, speaking Italian with Tuscan accent, and who want to grow up here 
studying in Italian universities. They are thinking of living in Italy for life long. But here is a very 
big part of Chinese people who don’t want to live here for the rest of their life. So they don’t want 
to integrate but to go ahead keeping Chinese citizenship and sending back money to China, just 
because they want to go back to China when they are old… Because to have integration, you have 
to distribute people all around the city and integration means to let our social tissue to absorb 
immigrants.” 
Comune of Prato, interviewed on 4/11/2012 
There has been an emerging literature and political debate in Italy around the “integration” of the 
immigrants.  While a number of scholars believed that the Chinese community in Prato has formed a 
parallel ID (Dei Ottati 2009; Toccafondi 2009), many others have argued that the community has been 
200 
 
partially integrated into the tissues of the Pratese economy, if not the Pratese society (Ceccagno 2007b; 
Barberis 2009; Berti and Valzania 2010).  Because of the physical presence of a large number of foreign 
faces and behaviors, the political debate about integration has been one of the most critical social issues in 
Prato.  The local government is situated in the center of all criticisms.  Beyond economic cooperation, a 
lot of resources have been put into the social integration of the Chinese community.  Perhaps also because 
of the stagnation of the CREAF and other economic projects, the local government has been hoping that 
the social integration can eventually help economic cooperation. 
In fact, the very idea of integration has seemed to me worth investigating.  On the one hand, since the 
pronto moda is physically located in Prato, it must have myriad economic connections with the broader 
Pratese economy including infrastructure, real estate market, and machinery supplies.  Therefore, by 
asking for integration, the local Italian firms really want a bigger share of the apparel value chain in the 
pronto moda.  To completely wipe out the Chinese pronto moda is certainly not in the interests of local 
Italian business owners.  On the other hand, for the local government, the demand for integration also 
comes from the complaints from the former textile workers who do not have any share in the apparel 
value chain whatsoever.  In particular, the problems of tax evasion and under-standard working conditions 
have spurred hostilities from these unemployed workers.  The latest fire of a stitching workshop in 
Macrolotto 0 on December 1, 2013 killed seven Chinese workers in the attic of a used textile mill and 
triggered a new wave of political pressures on the local government (Stokes 2013).   
The local government has been caught in the oscillation between under-regulation and over-
regulation.  Neither complete removal nor complete liberty of the pronto moda is feasible for the local 
government and Italian community.  What the fabbrica abitata, the CREAF, and many other projects 
have been trying to do is to draw a middle line between the two extremes.  The problem of integration is 
in fact not only about how to have Chinese immigrants comply with the Italian laws or to speak Italian 
language, but more importantly, it is about how to find a nuanced balance between the two cultures.  As 
Barbu et al. (2013) recently argued, it is this delinquency between the two different conventions that make 
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many of the problems problematic.  Even though irregularities of production have always been common 
in the history of the Pratese ID, the otherness of an enormous Chinatown made it unbearable. 
Such contradiction may not even be solved by any successful economic cooperation between the Italian 
and Chinese firms, or between Italian and Chinese governments, since even though the local government 
finds a more suitable way to cooperate with the Chinese government and firms (e.g., through the 
investment promotion community), the disparity between the Chinese and Italian business conventions 
may still persist (also see Chapter 6).  This is why both the provincial and municipal governments of 
Prato have recently invested more resources on the social part of integration. 
“We have to create the occasions of integration, for example, cultural events and recreational 
events. We begin to believe that the only way to integrate the Chinese community is to put them 
inside of our ways of living, our recreational moments and cultural moments.” 
Province of Prato, interviewed on 3/15/2012 
“We organized many activities to promote the integration at the social level. First of all, we offer 
Italian classes and many activities at school to help Chinese students to speak Italian and do better 
at school. We have other guidelines and offices to help them understand the policies about family 
reunion, refuge, interracial marriage and etc. We tried to solve conflicts through our mediation in 
specific areas in the city and we have spent a lot of money in this.” 
Comune of Prato, interviewed on 4/11/2012 
The Italian local government has realized that real economic integration can only be possible by social 
integration—that is, by making the Chinese immigrants (at least be able to) think, speak, and behave in 
the Italian way.  Then the problem seems to return to the original point of the cycle.  Because the majority 
of the Chinese immigrants in Prato are the first generation, and very few of them obtain Italian citizenship, 
the only hope may indeed rest upon the second generation. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
On December 1, 2013, fire burnt a stitching firm in Prato, killing seven Chinese workers who were 
sleeping in the attic of the building, a very similar setting as shown in Fig. 6.8.  After the tragedy, the 
local branch of CGIL (one of the biggest Italian trade unions) stated: “This was a tragedy waiting to 
happen, a direct consequence of the serious living and working conditions people are forced into in 
extreme weakness and are unable to rebel against because they are at the margins of legality… The battle 
for working conditions is the first battle: this applies to all companies, of all nationalities, who operate in 
our country.” (Stokes 2013) This has become another echo for regularization of the Chinese apparel 
industry in Prato. However, without understanding the historical complexities behind the irregularities, 
none of the previous pushes had any real effect. If the CGIL fails to understand these complexities, its 
new effort is likely to be no exception.  In particular, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4, the Chinese workers 
are in fact not completely passive in their own exploitation. In fact, very similar to the Italian textile firms 
which rejected the trade unions and a number of urban planning proposals between the 1950s and 1960s, 
both the workers and entrepreneurs have been actively participating in the industry and its widespread 
irregularities. 
In this dissertation, I have shown that the emergence of the Chinese pronto moda was historically 
contingent on a series of institutional contexts and socioeconomic changes at different scales.  In 
particular, the Italian immigration policies, Chinese economic reform, Wenzhouese migration tradition 
and social norms, and a unique history of Prato all contributed to its emergence.  On the one hand, the 
Italian immigration policies were never designed for an immigrant group who had such strong 
entrepreneurial aspirations. On the other hand, the Wenzhouese immigrants never planned to create an 
industry on such a scale. In short, no single party actually predicted it before it happened.  Meanwhile, the 
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Chinese pronto moda also emerged thanks to the persistent economic crisis of the Prato’s textile industry 
since the 1980s.  On the one hand, a declining textile industry provided available infrastructure for the 
Chinese apparel industry. On the other hand, because of institutional and social borders between Chinese 
immigrants and local society, the Chinese immigrant labor remained exclusively reserved for the Chinese 
employers. Thus, the emergence of the Chinese apparel industry in Prato indeed did not benefit the 
majority of Italian entrepreneurs and workers who lost their jobs during the industrial transformation. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I showed that flexible and cheap labor alone does not explain the rapid expansion of 
the Chinese pronto moda.  The success of the Chinese pronto moda also relies on both production teams 
located in Prato and a horizontally integrated trade network of Chinese migrant traders across Europe.  
The organization of the pronto moda has been a unique response to the rise of fast fashion and 
regionalization of apparel value chains in Europe.  On the one hand, the production teams led by final 
firms were relatively stable in terms of workforce and highly flexible in terms of working hours. They 
guarantee fast delivery and smart inventory control required by the fast fashion. On the other hand, 
migrant traders across Europe provide latest information about fashion and market demand, and help 
integrate the production networks from textile sourcing through apparel selling. In particular, the Chinese 
pronto moda targets a niche market of low end fast fashion, such as women’s summer clothes which are 
fashion sensitive but technologically unsophisticated.  Being closer to major consumer markets in 
Western and Southern Europe, the pronto moda is thus able to outcompete both major fashion brands and 
Made-in-China garments in this specific niche market. 
However, the flexible production of the pronto moda has triggered many tensions between Chinese 
immigrants and local society in Prato.  One of the most important tensions has been around the ways in 
which Chinese firms use their space.  While the Chinese entrepreneurs and workers prefer to live and 
work in the same building, the Italian law strictly forbids such mixture.  Adopting the methodology of 
conjunctural analysis, I frame it as a set of contradictions between capitalist logic of chasing profits, 
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Chinese social norms, and Italian regulatory regime.  Attempts to regularize the Chinese firms have 
reached a deadlock and further contributed to the social tensions in Prato. 
 The deadlock between Chinese firms and Italian authority also reflects a bigger paradox in the 
development of the industrial district and its apparel production networks.  The geographical extent of the 
Chinese pronto moda necessarily exceeds the traditional border of the industrial district, but the older 
mechanism of collective bargaining and business associations has not been able to capture the change.  
First, because of the institutional inertia, but also because of the internal conflicts between larger and 
smaller firms, the Unione Industriale Pratese (UIP) has been unable to integrate the local Chinese firms.  
Second, because of the partisan conflict and traditional top-down process, the local governments of 
Tuscany and Prato also failed to conduct effective cooperation between local Chinese and Italian firms.  
In Chapter 7, I argue that such a paradox might be solved by the involvement of the investment promotion 
community which is a group of private and semi-public agencies specializing in transnational business 
cooperation. 
As I have stated earlier, this dissertation does not intend to generalize the case of Prato and offer any 
overall policy suggestion for the Italian IDs. Instead, it sees Prato as a unique case in which global forces 
including transnational migration and trade policies met with a localized industry.  However, as the 2008 
economic crisis deepens in Europe and the Chinese economy continues to grow, many scholars have 
begun to question the sustainability of the pronto moda (Ceccagno 2012), and Chinese migration to Italy 
in general (Cologna 2012).  Although I do not have any definite answer to either, there are some questions 
I want to ask in the end. 
First, as Cologna suggests, the growth of the Chinese economy may eventually drain the labor input for 
pronto moda.  Zhejiang and Fujian are among the most developed provinces in China, the per capita GDP 
of both exceeding $10,000 in 2013 (Xinhua Net 2014).  Although the per capita income of Wenzhou was 
still significantly lower than Prato, 4,144 euro vs. 12,983 euro based on data in 2012 (NBSC 2013; 
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ISTAT 2012), the gap is nevertheless reducing quickly.  Since irregular labor has been one of the major 
competitive advantage of the pronto moda, decreasing labor inflow might hurt its competitiveness. 
Second, unlike the findings of Ceccagno, my research shows that the deepening crisis may also help the 
expansion of the pronto moda which targets a niche market less concerned about quality than price. With 
less income but still in need of fast fashion, more consumers might be interested in Made-in-Prato 
garments.  However, what is really uncertain is the continuous expansion of fast fashion brands.  The fact 
that even Zara is shifting its manufacturing from Europe to Asia might indicate another wave of 
capitalization in fashion industry.  Major fashion brands might further push down the price and occupy 
this particular niche market that pronto moda targets to. 
Third, it is still uncertain if the Pratese local government and Italian firms can figure out a better way to 
cooperate with local Chinese firms, and no one is sure if the CREAF will turn out to be a success in a few 
years. What is more likely to happen is that with the development of the investment promotion 
community between China and Italy, Chinese and Italian firms in Prato may find a project, in which both 
parties can benefit.  This may require a complete transformation of the local business associations and the 
leadership of the local government.  Meanwhile, the new capital flows directly from China may also 
transform the organization of pronto moda in Prato, and finally “regularize” the industry. 
Finally, how the pronto moda and its trade network across Europe are to change the European fashion 
market remains a question.  As some scholars have argued, the expansion of Chinese capital, commodity 
and population might usher a new version of globalization, which they called “the globalization with 
Chinese characteristics” (Henderson and Nadvi 2011; Henderson, Appelbaum, and Ho 2013).  In 
particular, as discussed in Chapter 6, the expansion of a horizontally integrated trade network controlled 
by Chinese migrant traders might be transforming the traditional low-end markets in some of the 
Southern European countries. In particular, since these markets were always participated by other 
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immigrant groups, it still remains a question who will be benefited and who will be driven out of the 
value chains.  
  
209 
 
References 
Ceccagno, Antonella. 2012. “The Hidden Crisis: The Prato Industrial District and the Once Thriving 
Chinese Garment Industry.” Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales 28 (4): 43–65. 
doi:10.4000/remi.6211. 
 
Ceccagno, Antonella, and Renzo Rastrelli. 2008. Ombre Cinesi? Dinamiche Migratorie della Diaspora 
Cinese in Italia. 1a ed. Roma: Carocci editore. 
 
Cologna, Daniele. 2012. “Getting Closer: Shifting Identities, Socio-Economic Roles and Perceptions of 
the Other in the Chinese-Italian Experience”. Unpublished manuscript. Milan. 
 
Henderson, Jeffrey, Richard P. Appelbaum, and Suet Ying Ho. 2013. “Globalization with Chinese 
Characteristics: Externalization, Dynamics and Transformations.” Development and Change 44 
(6): 1221–53. doi:10.1111/dech.12066. 
 
Henderson, Jeffrey, and Khalid Nadvi. 2011. “Greater China, the Challenges of Global Production 
Networks and the Dynamics of Transformation.” Global Networks 11 (3): 285–97. 
doi:10.1111/j.1471-0374.2011.00326.x. 
 
ISTAT. 2012. “Mappe, Popolazione, Statistiche Demografiche dell’ISTAT.” Accessed on Nov 7, 2012. 
http://demo.istat.it/. 
 
NBSC. 2013. “China Statistics Yearbook 2012”. 中国统计年鉴 2012. National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/indexch.htm. 
 
Stokes, Robert. 2013. “ITALY: Union Seeks Safety Reforms after Fatal Factory Fire.” Just-Style. 
December 2. Accessed on Dec 2, 2013. http://www.just-style.com/news/union-seeks-safety-
reforms-after-fatal-factory-fire_id119924.aspx?lk=dm&utm_source=daily-
html&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=02-12-2013&utm_term=id84080. 
 
Xinhua Network. 2014. “Six Provinces per Capita GDP Exceeded 10,000 Dollars; Income Accounted for 
Only 40%.” 六省人均 GDP超 1万美元 居民收入仅占 4成. Xinhua Network 新华网. January 
3. Accessed on Mar 22, 2014. http://zgws.xinhuanet.com/info.aspx?id=40017&typeid=46. 
 
 
